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Viewing cable 09PHNOMPENH890, CAMBODIA AGREES TO PRESS FOR DIALOGUE IN BURMA;

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09PHNOMPENH890 2009-12-04 10:51 2011-07-11 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Phnom Penh
VZCZCXRO7618
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHPF #0890 3381051
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041051Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1422
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0187
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L PHNOM PENH 000890 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR P, EAP, EAP/MLS - L SCHEIBE, EAP/RSP 
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR IO/HR, DRL/IRF 
NSC FOR D WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KIRF BM CB
SUBJECT: CAMBODIA AGREES TO PRESS FOR DIALOGUE IN BURMA; 
LEANS TO SUPPORT UNGA DEFAMATION OF RELIGIONS RESOLUTION 
 
REF: A. STATE 122639 
     B. STATE 121789 
 
Classified By: DCM Theodore Allegra, Reason 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador demarched the RGC on the need 
for the Government of Burma (GOB) to engage Burma's 
democratic opposition and to move forward with democratic 
reform and out of isolation.  RGC officials agreed that the 
2010 elections indeed represented an "open door" for Burma 
and were amenable to raising the issue with their GOB and 
ASEAN counterparts.  Ambassador also raised USG concern 
regarding the "Defamation of Religions" resolution at the 
UNGA.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The Ambassador discussed Ref A message regarding the 
need for dialogue in Burma with MFA Secretary of State Ouch 
Borith, on December 3.  Ambassador briefed Ouch Borith on A/S 
Campbell and DAS Marciel's early November visit to Burma and 
highlighted their key objective of pressing the GOB to engage 
democratic opposition -- including Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) 
and the National League for Democracy (NLD).  The Ambassador 
focused on Burma's need for dialogue, particularly in advance 
of the planned 2010 elections.  She noted that these 
elections represented an opportunity for Burma to move 
forward with democratic reform and out of isolation, but that 
Burma would need help from friends like Cambodia to do so. 
The Ambassador explained that a good first step would be for 
the GOB to allow meetings between ASSK and NLD leadership -- 
particularly members of the NLD's Central Executive Committee 
(CEC).  The Ambassador emphasized that another bad election 
would not help Burma in any way and pressed the MFA to 
actively engage the GOB on this issue. 
 
3. (C) Ouch Borith agreed that Burma's planned 2010 elections 
were a good opportunity for the GOB to demonstrate an "open 
door" for democratic reform and, moreover, agreed that it was 
a good time to push forward with an engagement policy. 
Noting Cambodia's experience and past challenges with 
elections and national reconciliation, he expressed his 
belief, and that of Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, that open 
and legitimate elections were indeed in the best interests of 
the people of Burma.  He recalled multiple attempts by ASSK 
to meet with the GOB and had no answer for why GOB leadership 
would not respond to her overtures.  Ouch Borith said that he 
would raise this issue of engagement with ASEAN ambassadors 
to Burma at the first opportunity. 
 
4. (C) Comment: We are encouraged by the consistent Cambodian 
position on Burma and the enthusiasm with which Ouch Borith 
responded to the Ambassador's demarche.  Prime Minister Hun 
Sen has repeatedly stated that Cambodia could play a 
constructive role with Burma in the ASEAN context and to make 
representations to the Burmese leadership on behalf of all 
ASEAN members.  With the Prime Minister's imprimatur, both 
Hor Namhong and Ouch Borith seem ready and willing to deliver 
these messages as often as necessary. 
 
UNGA Resolution on "Defamation of Religions" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) Ambassador also raised USG concern regarding the 
"Defamation of Religions" Resolution at the UN General 
Assembly (Ref B).  The Ambassador highlighted Cambodia's 
record of religious tolerance, and urged the RGC to consider 
voting against the "Defamation of Religions" resolution, or 
at least to abstain.  Ouch Borith acknowledged and thanked 
the Ambassador for her remarks, but expressed Cambodia's 
solidarity with the ASEAN position on this issue. 
Nonetheless, Ouch Borith promised to look deeper into the 
issue and study the U.S. position. 
RODLEY