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Viewing cable 09OTTAWA879, CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: SOME PROGRESS, WITH STEPS BACKWARD

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09OTTAWA879 2009-12-11 22:21 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Ottawa
VZCZCXRO4231
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHOT #0879/01 3452221
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 112221Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0150
INFO AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
ALL CANADIAN POSTS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 OTTAWA 000879 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR SCA/A, S/SRAP, AND WHA/CAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL MOPS EAID AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA IN AFGHANISTAN: SOME PROGRESS, WITH STEPS BACKWARD 
 
REF: OTTAWA 00429; OTTAWA 00725; OTTAWA 944; OTTAWA 940 
 
1.  (SBU)  Summary.  In its sixth quarterly report to Parliament on 
Canada's engagement in Afghanistan, the government cited slight 
progress - mostly on school construction, micro-finance, and polio 
eradication -- in its efforts in Kandahar Province.  Training and 
mentoring of Afghan Security Forces - both army and police - 
continues, with mixed results.  Signature development projects move 
forward, and border security dialogue between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan is expanding, with Canadian facilitation.  The media and 
Parliament, however, remain more obsessed with allegations that the 
government ignored credible reports of abuse of Afghan detainees 
transferred by the Canadian Forces in 2006 to Afghan authorities 
(ref c), and largely ignored the mostly discouraging news in this 
latest report.   End summary. 
 
 
 
2.  (U)  Minister of International Trade and Chair of the Cabinet 
Committee on Afghanistan Stockwell Day on December 10  released 
the sixth quarterly report to Parliament - mandated under a March 
2008 bipartisan motion that also extended the mandate of the 
Canadian Forces in Afghanistan until the end of 2011 -- on Canada's 
engagement in Afghanistan.  Covering the period from July 1 to 
September 30,  the report painted an often discouraging picture for 
the work of Canadian military and civilian units operating in and 
around Kandahar.  The report recognized that the widespread fraud 
that characterized the Presidential election had raised questions 
of credibility regarding  the Karzai government, but praised the 
willingness of the Afghan people to vote in the face of 
intimidation as well as the efforts of Afghan  security forces to 
provide security.  The report noted that Canada had achieved 
progress toward "many" of its priority objectives in the province. 
 
 
 
3. (U)  The report, however, also highlighted that the quarter had 
witnessed the "heaviest loss of life among the greatly expanded 
coalition forces for any three-month period since 2001," including 
eleven members of the Canadian Forces.  The report admitted that 
"the insurgents have seized the initiative, both in armed conflict 
and by creating a crisis of confidence among the populace through 
the equally important 'silent war' of fear, intimidation and 
persuasion."   It noted that August was also the "deadliest month 
so far this year for Afghan civilian casualties."  The report 
welcomed that the August recommendations from General Stanley 
McChrystal, Commander of the International Security Assistance 
Force (COMISAF), had  in many ways reflected the approach already 
underway by Canadian Forces, notably, the "Village Approach" 
exemplified by Operation Kantolo, which aims to protect the 
population and create a secure environment in which governance and 
development can take root. 
 
 
 
Key Findings of the Report 
 
 
 
Priority One: Training and Mentoring ANSF 
 
 
 
4. (U)  The Canadian objective for 2011 is for the Afghan National 
Army (ANA) to demonstrate an "increased capacity" to conduct 
operations and sustain a more secure environment in key districts 
of Kandahar Province, and for four kandaks (battalions) to be fully 
capable of planning, executing, and sustaining near-autonomous 
operations..  As of this quarter, however, only one of six kandaks 
is  "fully capable" -- unchanged from previous quarter, although 
there is also a new kandak that has not undergone assessment.  Only 
one of the six kandaks or the ANA headquarters has an effective 
strength of 70%  or higher -- down from three kandaks at that level 
last quarter.  The report contended that the ANA  nonetheless had 
succeeded in shouldering greater responsibility for security in 
Kandahar City and by independently executing 80% of security 
operations on its own, as well as by leading more than 70%. This 
exceeded the 65% goal for 2011, and is up from 45%  for the June 
2008 baseline period.  (This was a benchmark that the government 
had added only in the previous report.)  However, in contrast to 
the previous quarter when the ANA had an approval rating of 85% or 
more in five out of six key districts, this was true in only one 
key district during this quarter.  Similarly, in this quarter, 
 
OTTAWA 00000879  002 OF 004 
 
 
there were no key districts in which the majority of Kandaharis 
perceived security as improving, whereas there had been one in the 
previous quarter. 
 
 
 
5. (U)  The Afghan National Police (ANP) performed well during the 
elections, according to the report, providing security at polling 
stations and assisting the Independent Election Commission (IEC) in 
moving and securing elections materials.  Canadian military and 
civilian police in Kandahar City provided basic training for 679 
ANP officers in preparation for the election, up from only 200 in 
the previous quarter (although the report failed to report on the 
total percentage of ANP in Kandahar with such training, unlike in 
the previous report).  There was progress toward the 2011 goal of 
having 80 % of the ANP units capable of planning and executing 
near-autonomous operations.  Two (of 17) ANP units representing 12% 
of the officers were assessed as capable of conducting basic law 
and order operations with occasional assistance from international 
advisors or police mentor team (Capability Milestone 2), up from 
one in the  last quarter. 
 
 
 
Priority Two: Strengthening Afghan Capacity to Deliver Core 
Services 
 
 
 
6.  (U)  The report noted that the ability of the Afghan Government 
to provide dependable basic services such as education, healthcare, 
sanitation, roads, and water is a key test of its ability to gain 
public confidence.   Two of Canada's "signature projects" are 
designed to reinforce the Afghan Government's institutional 
capacity to deliver these services.  Toward the 2011 goal of 
building, expanding, or repairing 50 schools in key districts, 
construction was completed during the quarter on seven schools, up 
from zero during the last reporting period.  Twenty-one schools are 
currently under construction; no new school projects began this 
quarter.  This quarter, 13,500 individuals continued in various 
literacy training programs, identical with the previous quarter. 
 
 
 
7.  (U)   Another 2011 goal for Afghan institutions is  to have 
completed infrastructure projects undertaken by locally elected 
bodies in 75% of communities in key districts. The report cited 
completed projects in 68% of key districts, up from 66% last 
quarter.  Canadian engineers made progress on technical aspects of 
another "signature project," the C$50 million rehabilitation of the 
Dahla Dam.  When completed, this dam and irrigation system will 
ensure reliable water delivery to four out of five Kandaharis and 
support licit agriculture.  A manufacturer for the gates and weirs 
of the associated irrigation system was identified.  The project 
created 157 new seasonal jobs for a cumulative total of 355 (versus 
199 last quarter), against a 2011 target of 10,000.  In this 
quarter, Kandahar already achieved Canada's 2011 target of loans 
for 500 clients through the Microfinance Investment Support 
Facility (against a March 2008 baseline of 30 microfinance loans). 
 
 
 
8.  (U)  The report recognized that insurgent activity in Kandahar 
nonetheless continued to hamper the efforts of both the 
international community and Afghan Government to  provide  basic 
services, however.  Development partners can travel in key 
districts only in armored vehicles with military escort. In other 
areas, movement is not possible.  While 60% of Kandaharis were 
satisfied with the Afghan government's efforts to improve the 
quality of life, this was a decline from 75% in the last quarter. 
However, the percent of Kandaharis satisfied with the provision of 
education grew from 44% to 47%, and those satisfied with employment 
increased from 25% to 40% in this quarter.  However, about 30 pct 
had a favorable opinion of the Taliban, a "modest but steady upward 
trend." 
 
 
 
Priority Three:  Providing Humanitarian Assistance to Vulnerable 
People 
 
 
 
9.  (U)   Canada's 2011 the goal is that humanitarian assistance 
will be accessible to Afghan refugees and internally displaced 
persons in Kandahar and nationwide.  According to this report, 
 
OTTAWA 00000879  003 OF 004 
 
 
Canada's third "signature project"  -- a campaign designed to 
eradicate polio throughout Afghanistan in 2009, in partnership with 
the World Health Organization and UNICEF --  inoculated another 
380,000 children in Kandahar and another 880,000 nationwide. The 
report admitted, however, that it will not be possible to eradicate 
the disease in Afghanistan as projected by the end of 2009, and 
that there were nine new cases in the quarter, with a nationwide 
total of 22 new cases.   Canadian funding helped the World Food 
Programme to double its food aid from last quarter, reaching an 
additional 1.5 million beneficiaries.  Removal of landmines and 
explosives cleared land in 11 villages (an additional 0.25 square 
kilometers of land) during this period, bring the number of 
mine-related civilian casualties to fewer than 50 per month, a 10 
year low.  Estimates are that at least 10,000 explosive hazards 
remain, however, scattered across more than 1000 square miles of 
Kandahar Province. 
 
 
 
Priority Four: Enhancing Border Security and Facilitating Bilateral 
Dialogue Between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 
 
 
10.   (U)  Canada's goal for 2011 is that Afghan and Pakistani 
institutions will exercise "stronger capacity" to control the 
border.  The quarterly report cited two Joint Working Group 
meetings under the Canadian-facilitated Dubai Process, which 
brought together Afghan and Pakistani officials to identify 
projects  that would contribute to efforts in counter narcotics and 
controlling the movement of people.  (Two additional meetings on 
customs and law enforcement took place after the end of this 
reporting period.)  Canadian-facilitated discussions also took 
place along the Kandahar-Baluchistan border between Afghan and 
Pakistani military officers.  These Dubai Process meetings have 
created a regular mechanism for advancing border cooperation. 
 
 
 
Priority Five: Advancing Afghan Democratic Institutions 
 
 
 
11.  (U)  Canada's hope for 2011 is that national, local and 
provincial institutions in Kandahar will exhibit an "increasing 
capacity" for democratic governance.  Although the report 
recognized the major concerns about irregularities and fraud 
related to the Presidential election, it praised the work of the 
Independent Electoral Commission and the Elections Complaints 
Commission as examples of emerging capacity. It admitted, however, 
that voter turnout was less than 40% in the elections.  Training 
for officials from Kandahar and 21 other provinces began during 
last reporting period and continued in this quarter in preparation 
for the establishment of long-term provincial strategic plans  to 
build capacity in conjunction with the Afghan National Development 
Strategy. 
 
 
 
Priority Six: Facilitating Afghan-led Efforts toward Reconciliation 
 
 
 
12.  (U)   The report noted "no further results" on national 
reconciliation, which will depend on the "will of the Afghan 
people."   Canada agreed to provide C$1.6 million to rebuild the 
meeting hall of the Kandahar Provincial Council, providing space 
for community gatherings. 
 
 
 
Reaction in Canada 
 
 
 
13.  (SBU)  While the media covered the December 10 release by 
Minister Day, virtually all of the questioning related instead to 
the on-going controversy over the treatment of prisoners handed 
over to Afghan security forces by Canadian soldiers and what the 
government knew when (ref c).   Minister Day, and -- in a separate 
press conference -- Justice Minister Rob Nicholson insisted that 
the government would not comply with a December 9 House of Commons 
motion (which the ruling Conservatives lost 145-143) demanding full 
release of all relevant documents to the Commons.  Minister Day 
cited operational security, while Minister Nicholas cited legal 
restrictions; both suggested individuals (including MPs) who wanted 
 
OTTAWA 00000879  004 OF 004 
 
 
access to such restricted documents would have to seek them in 
court.  The three opposition parties are united in seeking to 
embarrass the government over this issue and have vowed to call 
into session the Special Committee on Afghanistan even during the 
holiday recess (which began December 10), but have indicated no 
interest in debating the actual Canadian mission in Afghanistan and 
the successes - or failures - of Canada's role as documented in the 
quarterly reports.   As noted in one editorial, the public 
similarly has a "curiosity" deficit" when it comes to Afghanistan 
nowadays. 
JACOBSON