VZCZCXRO7745
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHNM #0987/01 3501331
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161331Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5521
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NIAMEY 000987 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT (SHORE), AF/W, AF/RSA, INL, DS/IP/AF, AND DS/TIA/ITA 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC SNAR PGOV SOCI KISL PHUM PREL NG
SUBJECT:  Niger: 2009 Country Report on Terrorism 
 
Ref:  State 109980 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) has demonstrated a greater interest in the Republic of Niger 
(RON) in 2009, with attempts to extend its influence into Nigerien 
territory from the largely ungoverned region bordering Mali and 
Algeria.  The porous borders and ungoverned spaces provide violent, 
extremist groups such as AQIM a promising environment for weapons 
and drug trafficking, recruiting, people and contraband smuggling, 
undetected transit, and logistical facilitation.  The RON's severe 
resource constraints stemming from its status as one of the poorest 
countries in the world, and the ongoing political crisis, hamper the 
Nigerien government's ability to prevent AQIM intrusion. 
Additionally, extremist sects in northern Nigeria, such as the Boko 
Haram movement, have drawn Nigerien followers and pose a threat of 
spreading extremism into Niger.  End summary. 
 
Niger's Security Environment 
---------------------------- 
¶2. (SBU) Niger is at great risk from the spread of terrorism and 
violent extremist organizations.  Stark poverty, porous borders, 
large ungoverned spaces and the proximity to known safe havens of 
southern Algeria, northern Mali and northern Nigeria make Niger 
particularly vulnerable.  Further, the Government of Niger's (GON) 
historic tensions with Tuareg rebel groups, traditionally associated 
with cross-Sahara smuggling in northern Niger, contributes to the 
potential establishment of a breeding ground for future terrorists. 
In spite of these external threats, the vast majority of Nigeriens 
practice a moderate form of Sufi Islam and popular opinion condemns 
violence and terrorism.  In Niger, terrorism is of external origin, 
rather than being indigenous. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The GON counterterrorism program has improved to include 
the use of updated terrorist watch lists, more consistent border 
patrols and regular monitoring of mosques believed to espouse 
extremist views.  (Note: Border crossings are not automated and rely 
on handwritten ledgers to record entry and exit.  End note.) 
Further, Nigerien military forces routinely engage smugglers who 
attempt to take advantage of the open spaces and porous borders in 
the north.  The GON has been receptive to Western and regional 
counterterrorism training and is a Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP) country.  Niger, now with a diminished role in 
TSCTP due to USG policy holds and sanctions, has turned primarily to 
regional partners and organizations to support its counterterrorism 
efforts, notably the Algerian-led counterterrorist coalition 
comprised of Algeria, Niger, Mali, and Mauritania. 
 
Events Impacting Niger 
---------------------- 
¶4. (U) On December 14, 2008 AQIM-affiliated persons kidnapped and 
held hostage UN Special Envoy, Robert Fowler, his colleague, Louis 
Guay, and a local Nigerien driver.  They were captured by AQIM 
within 40 kilometers of Niamey, taken across the Mali border and 
held hostage in the Sahara desert for 130 days.  On January 22, 
2009, along the Mali/Niger border, AQIM-affiliated persons kidnapped 
four European tourists and held them hostage in the Sahara desert. 
Three of the European hostages were released months later, but one 
hostage, a Brit, was killed. 
 
¶5. (SBU) In October 2009, an AQIM-linked Mauritanian was captured in 
Niamey following his involvement in terror related activities 
outside Niger. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On 14 November 2009, AQIM associates, armed with AK-47 
assault rifles attempted to kidnap five U.S. Embassy personnel from 
a hotel in Tahoua.  The failed operation is believed to have been 
sanctioned by AQIM leaders.  The perpetrators of this attempted 
kidnapping have yet to be captured. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Although the rise of violent extremist organizations in 
northern Nigeria has yet to directly impact southern Niger, a very 
real threat exists.  Northern Nigeria and southern Niger share a 
common Hausa ethnicity, numerous economic and cultural links, and a 
long, porous border.  Immediately following the July 2009 Nigerian 
break-up of the Boko Haram (anti-Western influence) group, Nigerien 
ties to the group were revealed when dozens of Boko Haram members 
were deported from Nigeria to their home cities in southern Niger. 
 
Prospects for the Future 
------------------------ 
¶8. (SBU) As Niger enters 2010, the horizon looks very troubling with 
increasing threats from AQIM in the north and west, from the Boko 
Haram movement and similar groups from Nigeria.  The growing threats 
together with the looming political crisis in Niger, as sanctions 
are implemented, may limit the much-needed international assistance 
 
NIAMEY 00000987  002 OF 002 
 
 
that can be offered to the GON; this presents an environment ripe 
for exploitation by terrorist and violent, extremist groups.  To 
date, moderate Islam and the Nigerien intolerance for violence have 
prevented terrorism from taking root, but without external support 
and regional cooperation, Niger will remain vulnerable. 
 
¶9. (U) Embassy Niamey point of contact for terrorism-related issues 
is Pol Officer Syga Thomas, who can be reached at 
thomass2@state.gov. 
 
ALLEN