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Viewing cable 09NEWDELHI2435, INDIAN AF-PAK PUNDITS VOICE "CRITICAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09NEWDELHI2435 2009-12-03 13:18 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO6370
OO RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDBU RUEHLH RUEHNEH RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHNE #2435/01 3371318
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031318Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8798
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMCSUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002435 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PTER IN AF PK
SUBJECT: INDIAN AF-PAK PUNDITS VOICE "CRITICAL 
APPRECIATION" FOR PRESIDENT'S DECEMBER 1 SPEECH 
 
1. (SBU) Summary:  The overall reaction of selected Political 
Section interlocutors - a diverse group of journalists, 
commentators, academics, think-tank analysts, and 
parliamentarians from different religious communities and 
political orientations - to President Obama's December 1 
speech on Afghanistan was guardedly positive.  While contacts 
approved of the President's emphasis on development and 
agriculture assistance and a re-affirmation of USG commitment 
to the region, their expressions of "critical appreciation" 
also included dismay over the setting of July 2011 as a 
beginning date for the transfer of U.S. troops out of 
Afghanistan.  We pushed back by reminding interlocutors that 
July 2011 is only a starting date, a point that seems 
completely lost in local discourse.  While interlocutors had 
varying reactions to speech content regarding Pakistan, they 
were virtually united in their insistence that the USG 
toughen its position on Pakistan and exert greater pressure 
on Islamabad to crack down on terror groups regardless of 
where the activities of such groups are focused.  End Summary. 
 
Afghanistan: Focus on July 2011 
------------------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) Most of the contacts whom we polled provided an 
overall positive assessment of the portion of the speech that 
dealt with Afghanistan.  Several, like Jamia Millia Islamia 
University professor Radha Kumar, voiced praise for USG 
recognition that development - particularly agricultural 
development - was key to stability.  Other interlocutors such 
as freelance columnist Mahendra Dev, opined that the speech 
was a winner because it communicated a renewed U.S. 
commitment to the region.  Dev told us that he also teaches a 
journalism class at a local college, and he devoted 
yesterday's class to a debate among students over the merits 
of the new USG approach.  He divulged that about half the 
students saw it as a strategy for success, while the other 
half characterized it as "too little and too late." 
 
3. (SBU) A recurring theme voiced by most commentators with 
whom we spoke (and a theme featured prominently in media 
editorials, some of which were written by our contacts) was 
distinct unease over the speech reference to July 2011 as the 
time in which the U.S. will begin the transfer of forces out 
of Afghanistan.  "Hindustan Times" foreign editor Pramit Pal 
Chaudhuri voiced a representative opinion by expressing 
"skepticism that much can be achieved between the time all 
new troops are deployed and July 2011."  Sushant Sareen, an 
Af-Pak specialist in an Indian Foreign Ministry-funded think 
tank, opined that mention of a withdrawal commencement date 
"cancels out all the positive parts of the speech" because it 
sends the message in Afghanistan and Pakistan that the USG is 
not a long-term partner and is looking for an exit from the 
region, thus obliging Karzai and the Pakistani leadership to 
"start hedging their bets."  Several interlocutors claimed 
that a stated withdrawal date violates the new COIN strategy 
that emphasizes building confidence among the host nation 
population in a long-term international commitment of 
support.  We reminded our interlocutors that the July 2011 
date is only a starting date, a point that seemed completely 
lost among local pundits. 
 
4. (SBU) Not all contacts viewed the July 2011 reference in 
negative terms.  Some, like think-tanker Kaustav Chadhury, 
opined that the eighteen month period may be sufficient to 
develop sufficient governance and security capacity among 
Afghans in conflict areas to undercut the Taliban's appeal 
and their ability to retake by force areas that had been 
cleared, held, and built-up.  Afghan scholar VP Vaidik argued 
that the President's timeline was required to create a sense 
of realistic urgency within the Karzai government and Afghan 
army to stand on their own feet. 
 
Pakistan: Keep Up the Pressure 
------------------------------ 
 
5. (SBU) We encountered a wide variety of opinions on the 
portions of the speech that dealt with Pakistan.  Sandeep 
Dixit, Senior Defense Correspondent for "The Hindu" daily, 
intoned that while the USG strategy in Afghanistan seems 
"unrealistic because you alienated your local allies with 
your preoccupation about corruption," the new approach toward 
Pakistan is "more pragmatic" because it signals a new USG 
 
NEW DELHI 00002435  002 OF 002 
 
 
toughness toward Islamabad.  Think-tanker Kaustav Chaudhury 
maintained that the speech was "wise to underplay in public 
Pakistan's role in Afghanistan" and posited that the "acid 
test" in U.S.-Pakistan relations will be whether Islamabad 
takes action against the Haqqani network in North Waziristan. 
 Former GOI minister Arief Muhammad Khan warned against 
excessive reliance on Pakistan to sort out the situation in 
Afghanistan and advised us instead to compel Saudi Arabia to 
exercise its significant influence among Afghan and Pakistani 
Taliban.  Local media maven Saeed Naqvi called on the USG to 
exert more pressure on Pakistan to crack down on terror 
groups regardless of where the activities of such groups are 
focused, a view expressed in one form or another by most 
other interlocutors. 
Ruminations from Parliamentarians 
--------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU)  Given that foreign policy seldom enters the Indian 
domestic political debate, the new Afghanistan and Pakistan 
strategy is unlikely to get much attention in the Indian 
Parliament, which is currently in session.  The reaction of 
Members of Parliament (MPs) contacted by the Embassy was 
guardedly positive.  Congress MP Madhu Goud Yaskhi welcomed 
the decision to send additional troops to Afghanistan but 
suggested that the United States should consider sending 
forces into Pakistan as well.  He told Poloff that pursuing 
the Taliban inside Afghanistan is a worthy objective but the 
primary goal should be to target the terrorist networks 
within Pakistan because they are more dangerous. 
 
7. (SBU) Balbir Punj of the Bharatiya Janata Party was 
pleased that President Obama had taken Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh "into confidence" before his West Point 
speech.  Punj said that the strategy announced by President 
Obama was "good but with shortcomings."  Echoing Yaskhi, Punj 
told Poloff that the United States would never be able to 
stabilize the region if it did not "finish" the Taliban and 
Al Qaeda "mentors" living in Pakistan.  Both Yaskhi and Punj 
misread the July 2011 date and raised questions about this 
so-called exit timeline.  Yaskhi asked whether 18-24 months 
would be enough time to get the job done and whether the 
United States would be letting down Afghanistan once again if 
it departs without completing the mission.  Punj called the 
timeline premature.  "What makes you think you can finish 
this in 18 months?" he asked. 
ROEMER