VZCZCXYZ0007
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0612 3551613
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211613Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7525
INFO RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000612 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE AND RUEILB/NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ASEC CD PREL PTER
SUBJECT: CHAD: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: A. STATE 109989 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 00149 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 00151 
     ¶D. NDJAMENA 00214 
 
¶1. (U)    Per Ref A, Post submits the following text for 
consideration for inclusion in the 2009 Country Reports on 
Terrorism. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  As in 2008, Chad experienced several incursions in 
2009 by anti-regime rebel forces. The armed confrontations 
between Government of Chad troops and anti-regime rebels were 
short-lived in 2009, compared to the 2008 conflict, and 
occurred only in Eastern Chad.  The most significant rebel 
incursion into Chad occurred between May 4th and 6th, when 
three to four columns of vehicles, perhaps totaling 200, 
entered southeastern Chad.  The rebel forces never gained a 
foothold and soon retreated, after being severely weakened by 
Government fire.  (See Refs B-D for details.)  While Chad did 
have rebel incursions in 2009 (albeit ones that were 
successfully repelled), it has not experienced any 
significant act of international terrorism, nor is it 
believed that the Government of Chad provided safe haven to 
any terrorist or terrorists organization. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  The decline in rebel ability to engage 
successfully with Government troops has been coupled with 
more intensive dialogue between the GoC and some 
rebels/dissidents-in-exile who have returned to Chad 
voluntarily in the course of the year.  Not having to fight 
an active rebellion will allow the GoC to focus on 
counterterrorism training, including through strengthening of 
the military, so that advantage is not taken of Chad's porous 
borders or uncontrolled spaces by terrorist groups.  The GoC 
actively wants to work with the USG to reduce the ability of 
terrorists to attack or operate in Chad. 
 
¶4.  (U)  Due to Leahy vetting concerns, Chad's Antiterrorism 
Assistance program was temporarily suspended in 2009, along 
with most types of military assistance.  Following resolution 
of mot of these concerns, five DS/ATA-sponsored courses are 
scheduled for 2010, and military training through TSCTP is 
also expected to resume.  The courses by offered by DS/ATA 
will reinforce efforts by Chad's law-enforcement community to 
successfully counter terrorists and their organizations 
within Chadian borders. 
 
¶5.   (SBU)  In spring 2009, Guantanamo detainee al-Qarani was 
returned to Chad.  Embassy and GoC officials are coordinating 
to ensure that he does not make contact with known terrorists 
abroad.  Embassy also makes a priority of outreach to Muslim 
populations, and religious diversity programs, so that 
Chad,s tradition of cultural tolerance does not erode. 
 
¶6.  (U)  Point of Contact:  Michael L. Cygrymus, Regional 
Security Officer, cygrymusml@state.gov, country code 235 / 
251-7009 extension 4215 
NIGRO