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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7500
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000591 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID PREF EU FR US CD
SUBJECT: HOW TO THINK ABOUT CHAD: ASSESSING CHAD'S PROGRESS 
REGARDING USG STRATEGIC GOALS FROM 2007-2009 
 
REF: A. YAOUNDE 971 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 406 
 
NDJAMENA 00000591  001.4 OF 004 
 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  The Chad of December 2009 is not the Chad of 
December 2007.  Much has happened in the intervening two 
years and the Chad's overall trajectory has generally been 
positive, when viewed in terms of USG bilateral and regional 
strategic goals.  Any punctual assessment of USG policy 
toward Chad should be informed by appreciation of Chad's 
progress over the past two years across the range of U.S. 
strategic policy goals, which include humanitarian 
assistance, regional stability, democracy and good 
governance, human rights, and 
counter-terrorism/anti-extremism.  Chad's progress has not 
been uniform in all areas and much remains to be done to 
satisfy all USG goals and objectives in Chad and the region. 
 
¶2.  (SBU)  Chad's annus horribilis was 2008; the country's 
political system reached its nadir in February of that year, 
when armed rebel attacks, barely repulsed by the GOC, exposed 
at once Chad's diplomatic isolation, the weaknesses of the 
Chadian political system, and the vulnerability of the Deby 
regime.  Since then, partly due to lack of alternatives and 
partly in response to international demands, including those 
of the USG, Chad has made strides in areas relevant to USG 
strategic interests: 
 
-- HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:  Chad 
hosts 250,000 Sudanese refugees, 110,000 IDPs, a massive 
humanitarian assistance operation and the UN PKO MINURCAT. 
 
-- REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY:  Chad has pursued every 
available multilateral approach aimed at normalizing 
Chad-Sudan relations and ending the proxy war.  Chad has 
reconciled with major elements of the armed rebellion and 
former regime opponents, including Soubiane and Goukouni. 
Chad has patiently pursued a bilateral track with Khartoum 
also aimed at normalization with Sudan and ending the proxy 
war.  The GOC has distanced itself from JEM rebels in Chad. 
 
-- DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE:  The GOC has broadened its 
base to include senior opposition party leaders.  The August 
13 political and electoral reform process has progressed to 
where Chad is poised for credible legislative and municipal 
elections in 2010.  President Deby has put the full weight of 
the GOC and his own personal prestige behind the goal of the 
2010 elections.  The GOC has reestablished normal relations 
with IFIs and improved its public revenue management and 
budgetary postures.  The GOC has invested heavily in basic 
infrastructure projects and is conducting significant 
campaigns aimed at fighting official corruption and promoting 
environmental protection and food security. 
 
-- HUMAN RIGHTS AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:  While its overall 
human rights record remains poor (with impunity still the 
major problem), Chad has improved adherence to some 
international standards, particularly with regard to child 
soldiers and gender-based violence.  The Chadian press is 
effectively free of GOC interference and criticizes the 
government and President Deby freely and pointedly, despite 
the continued existence of "Ordinance Five," an emergency 
measure that could limit press freedom and that has outlived 
whatever usefulness it may once have had. 
 
-- COUNTER-TERRORISM AND ANTI-EXTREMISM:  The GOC's record on 
religious tolerance is excellent.  Chad remains a willing and 
forthcoming partner in USG efforts to ensure that terrorism 
and extremism do not become rooted in the Sahelian region. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Chad's generally and incrementally positive 
trajectory over the past two years is no accident, and the 
GOC deserves credit for what it has accomplished -- albeit 
starting from a low base line.  Such progress, however 
 
NDJAMENA 00000591  002.4 OF 004 
 
 
limited and incomplete, should not be taken for granted in 
the region, to say the least.  Neighboring Cameroon, for 
instance. has drifted or gone backward in areas that involve 
USG strategic interests in that country, according to Embassy 
Yaounde (Ref A), which regards the country's trajectory as 
generally if not irretrievably retrograde.  Embassy 
NDjamena's reporting over the past two years amply documents 
the incremental progress that Chad has made, as well as the 
many and serious deficiencies that still need be addressed in 
order that USG strategic goals can be more fully achieved, 
both bilaterally and regionally.  We supply references to our 
past reporting below.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------- 
HUMANITARIAN AND PKO ASSISTANCE: 
COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL 
(AND OUR) EFFORTS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Despite the internal political and socio-economic 
stresses involved, and especially over the objections of 
influential neighboring states, the GOC welcomed Sudanese 
refugees from the beginning of the Darfur crisis: Chad has 
never refused to accept Sudanese refugees and has never tried 
to return them to Sudan against their will.  The GOC adapted 
its refugee coordination mechanism -- CNAR, established in 
1996 to manage pre-Darfur refugee crises -- to the needs of 
the Darfur refugees.  It has consistently worked closely with 
the international community to improve conditions of refugees 
and IDPs. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Also over the objections of influential neighbors, 
Chad has closely cooperated with the desire of the 
international community to provide security for civilians in 
Chad, including refugees and humanitarian workers.  It has 
welcomed two peacekeeping operations under UN mandate, the EU 
force EUFOR in 2008 and the UN's MINURCAT in 2009.  The GOC 
established a new coordination mechanism, CONAFIT, to ensure 
effective collaboration with international peacekeeping 
efforts.  In addition to other duties, MINURCAT trains 
Chadian police officers, the DIS, who provide security inside 
refugee camps.  The GOC has recently promoted local 
coordination councils in Eastern Chad to conjugate the 
efforts of local officials, police, gendarmes, nomad patrols, 
sultans and village/tribal elders with those of MINURCAT and 
DIS to improve security for humanitarian aid workers. 
(References:  Ndjamena 588, 542, and 539). 
 
------------------------------ 
REGIONAL SECURITY:  CHAD-SUDAN 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Chad has pursued every available multilateral 
approach aimed at normalizing Chad-Sudan relations.  Chad 
participated seriously in the Dakar Accord process and with 
AU, Libyan, and Qatari attempts to mediate between Chad and 
Sudan.  Chad has patiently pursued a bilateral track with 
Khartoum also aimed at normalization and ending the proxy war 
through confidence-building measure to assure both sides that 
the other's territory will not be used by respective 
anti-regime rebels.  In preparation for this, the GOC has 
distanced itself from JEM rebels in Chad, including by moving 
to close the primary JEM recruiting center in Chad and by 
pressuring JEM to join international negotiations aimed at a 
peaceful solution in Darfur.  (References:  Ndjamena 562, 
536, 485, 479, 462, 466, and 447.). 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Chad has reconciled with major elements of the 
armed rebellion and former regime opponents.  Chad's National 
Mediator, whose mandate involves crisis resolution and 
negotiation with leaders in exile, has worked assiduously to 
encourage return of former rebels opposed to GoC and ensuring 
that Chadian Diaspora and former regime opponents are 
reintegrated into political life.  Most recently, armed rebel 
leader Ahmat Soubiane and former president and regime 
opponent Goukouni Oueddei returned to Chad and vowed to 
participate peacefully in efforts toward complete "national 
 
NDJAMENA 00000591  003.4 OF 004 
 
 
reconciliation."  The total number of returned and reconciled 
rebel fighters is in the three to four thousand range, 
significantly weakening the military effectiveness of those 
who remain in Sudan.  (References:  Ndjamena 503, 457, and 
353). 
 
------------------ 
DEMOCRACY AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
------------------ 
 
¶8.  (SBU) ELECTIONS:  Chad is now poised to hold credible 
legislative and municipal elections in 2010.  The process of 
implementing the August 13, 2007 Accord has produced positive 
results, and many of the essential building blocks for 
elections are in place.  On December 4 President Deby put the 
full weight of the GoC -- itself long broadened to include 
senior opposition figure -- and his own personal prestige on 
the line behind the goal of credible 2010 contests.  The 
Chadians have gotten this far thanks to the willingness of 
their international democratic partners -- the USG, France, 
the EU, the UN and others -- to advise and support them, 
politically and financially.  Continued commitment on the 
part of these partners will be essential to reaching the goal 
of credible legislative/municipal elections in 2010. 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  PUBLIC REVENUE MANAGEMENT:  The GOC has 
reestablished normal relations with IFIs and improved its 
public revenue management and budgetary postures. President 
Deby met with senior officials at both IMF and World Bank on 
the margins of the UNGA in September 2009.  The IMF is 
engaged and supportive of Chad's efforts to increase control 
over extra-budgetary spending.  Despite the GOC's poor 
performance under previous programs, the Fund has offered to 
allow Chad more time to meet targets and continues to be 
supportive of helping Chad achieve Highly-Indebted Poor 
Country debt relief.  In October 2009, the World Bank 
announced commitment to restart development programs in Chad. 
 
 
¶10.  (SBU)  ANTI-CORRUPTION: The Ministry of Morality is 
aggressively investigating many allegations of official 
corruption; senior GOC officials including Ministers and 
those close to President are detained and being questioned. 
There has been considerable media focus on corruption, 
reflecting broad public buy-in for the GOC's anti-corruption 
efforts.  (References:  Ndjamena 557 and 431). 
 
¶11.  (SBU)  INFRASTRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT, FOOD SECURITY:  The 
GOC has invested heavily in basic infrastructure projects and 
is conducting significant campaigns aimed at fighting 
deforestation, climate change, and promoting environmental 
protection and increasing food security. (References: 
Ndjamena 586, 501, 467, 461, 460, 458, 448, 441 and 424). 
 
------------------------------ 
HUMAN RIGHTS:  CHILD SOLDIERS, 
AND GBV, PRESS FREEDOM 
------------------------------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU)  While its overall human rights record remains 
poor (with impunity still the major problem), Chad has 
improved adherence to some international standards, 
particularly with regard to child soldiers and gender-based 
violence.  Responding to international concerns, the GoC 
conducted reviews of military camps to eliminate use of child 
soldiers and sensitize military and law enforcement personnel 
to human rights standards.  UNICEF, the GOC's main partner in 
addressing child-soldier problem, has praised GoC efforts. 
With assistance of UNFPA, GoC has launched recent public 
campaigns to address underage marriage, rape and other 
violence against women, FGM, sexual harassment, and 
exploitation of girls, and to promote keeping girls in 
school.  (References:  Chad Country Report on Human Rights, 
Ndjamena 576 and 362). 
 
¶13.  (SBU)  Chad's press enjoys considerable de facto 
 
NDJAMENA 00000591  004.4 OF 004 
 
 
freedom, and devotes much energy to free and pointed 
criticism of President Deby, as well as other national and 
international targets.  Ordinance Five, an emergency measure 
enacted during period of rebel activity in 2008 giving the 
government power to restrict freedom of press related to the 
violent rebellion, remains on the books, although it has not 
been used against journalists.  Draft legislation to modify 
or rescind Ordinance Five is pending among various Chadian 
Ministries.  (References:  Chad Country Report on Human 
Rights, NDjamena 576, 409, 362, and 260). 
 
--------------------- 
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND 
ANTI-EXTREMISM 
--------------------- 
 
¶14.  (SBU)  The GOC's record on religious tolerance is 
excellent.  Chad remains a willing and forthcoming partner in 
USG efforts to ensure that terrorism and extremism do not 
become rooted in the Sahelian region. The GOC strongly 
encourages and defends religious tolerance and pluralism 
among Chad's 54 percent Muslim/44 percent Christian 
population. (Reference: Chad Religious Freedom Report.) 
 
NIGRO