VZCZCXRO0392
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0588/01 3421159
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 081159Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7496
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000588 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID PREF EU FR UNSC CA CD
SUBJECT: CHAD:  MINURCAT MAKING BIG PUSH ON SECURITY IN EAST 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 520 
     ¶B. N'DJAMENA 511 
     ¶C. N'DJAMENA 521 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU)  MINURCAT SRSG Victor Angelo met December 7 with 
representatives of UN member states resident in N'Djamena to 
describe the PKO's "big push" over the past month to enhance 
security in Eastern Chad, in the wake of recent kidnappings 
and a general increase in criminal activity directed against 
the international community (described in Refs A and B, as 
well as below).  Initiatives undertaken since Angelo's last 
periodic meeting include additional MINURCAT air and ground 
patrols, additional DIS patrols and escorts, provision of 
supplemental international assets to the DIS, and 
inauguration of new coordination meetings among MINURCAT, the 
DIS, and local Chadian government authorities, police, 
gendarmes, nomad patrols, the Chadian military, and 
traditional/tribal leaders, all of whom have a stake in 
regaining control of security and reducing criminality in the 
vicinity of the Chad-Sudan border.  Although criminality in 
the East has forced reductions in some NGO operations, and 
although there are clear limits to what MINURCAT can do to 
manage the problem -- particularly given slow international 
deployments (Ref C) -- we remain impressed with Angelo's 
honesty, proactiveness, creativity, and commitment, as well 
as his success at coordinating with the range of Chadian 
players.  At the end of his meeting, Angelo briefly sketched 
out a list of issues on which future international reflection 
will be needed, including MINURCAT's mandate renewal process, 
to begin among the UNSC membership in February 2010.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
-------------- 
CRIMINAL THREAT 
--------------- 
 
¶2.  (SB)  Angelo reported that two kidnappings of 
humantarian aid workers, five car-jackings, three instances 
ofbreaking and entry, two direct attacks on he DIS, and 
three problems with unexploded ordnace had occurred in 
Eastern Chad/Northeastern CAR(with one B&E case in 
N'Djamena) since November 4.  The kidnappings and attacks 
were having a "negatively transformative effect" on 
humanitarian operations, he stressed.  There was no clear 
evidence that the individual incidents were linked, but some 
appeared to be copy-cat initiatives inspired by earlier 
activities.  That all the kidnapping victims were apparently 
now being held across the border in Sudan led to suspicion 
that the kidnappers knew one another.  All of the criminal 
acts seemed to be motivated almost exclusively by a desire 
for financial gain, although some of the kidnappers had 
expressed vague Islamist aspirations and anti-colonial 
sentiments.  The personnel of one nation in particular 
(France) seemed to have been targeted, although all 
internationals and Chadians working for the international 
community were vulnerable, Angelo pointed out. 
 
¶3.  (SBU)  Asked whether the kidnappers might have ties to 
radical Muslim groups in the Sahel, Angelo repeated that the 
copy-cat phenomenon seemed to be a more salient explanation, 
adding that no organizational links to groups such as AQIM 
had been uncovered thus far.  He advised that the UN strongly 
opposed payment of ransom, and offered that ransom payments 
believed to have been made earlier in the year in the cases 
of other kidnapping victims might have planted ideas in the 
minds of the current kidnappers.  Angelo described efforts to 
explain to the kidnappers the humanitarian motivations of the 
organization for which their victims worked, which the 
kidnappers had lauded -- making clear that they hoped the 
organizations would resume the important work suspended as a 
result of rampant criminality -- before reiterating demands 
for ransom.  Angelo noted that Chadian government 
representatives and local sultans and tribal leaders had been 
uniform in condemning the rise in criminality near the Sudan 
 
NDJAMENA 00000588  002 OF 003 
 
 
border and uniform in expressing frustration at their 
powerlessness to bring the situation under control. 
 
---------------------- 
RESPONSE FROM MINURCAT 
---------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Deputy Force Commander Ahern reported on efforts 
to deploy incoming MINURCAT military assets, including units 
from Mongolia in the northern sector, Ghana in the dangerous 
central region (encompassing Farchana and Guereda), Namibia 
in the south, and Nepali reserve units to Abeche, along with 
troops from Bolivia, Bangladesh, Paraguay and Pakistan to the 
airport in Abeche.  Ahern detailed increases in air and 
ground patrols, with helicopter overflights numbering 74 in 
November (vice 49 in October), MINURCAT escorts numbering 78 
and MINURCAT patrols numbering 151 since November 4.  DIS 
patrols in November amounted to 1283, as opposed to 943 in 
September and 851 in October.  DIS escorts in November were 
544 in number, vice 270 in September and 212 in October. 
 
¶5.  (SBU)  General Chaumont of UNPOL, who has been the 
primary champion and training officer for the DIS, indicated 
that UNPOL had provided an additional 90 vehicles to the 
Chadian force in November, as well as beefing up security at 
DIS headquarters and providing additional armaments and 
equipment to the DIS.  Libya had offered to provide the DIS 
with medevac guarantees and assistance with medical care, 
considering that a number of DIS officers had been injured in 
the course of their duties but lacked obvious sources of 
treatment.  The DIS remained very fragile, but it was clearly 
on the right path, Chaumont concluded. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
ENHANCED COORDINATION WITH CHADIAN ENTITIES 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Angelo reported on a series of new coordination 
meetings among MINURCAT, the DIS, and local Chadian officials 
representing governors, mayors, the police, gendarmes, nomad 
patrol units, the Chadian military, sultans and tribal 
leaders.  Coordination meetings were taking place at least 
bi-monthly in Abeche, Farchana, Iriba and Goz Beida, said 
Angelo, and had achieved goals such as establishment of 
mutually-receiveable radio communications and agreement to 
conduct mixed patrols.  MINURCAT was using the meetings to 
discuss human rights issues with local relevance as well as 
security matters.  The Chadian representatives had uniformly 
expressed dismay at their inability to exert control over 
banditry, as well as strong desire to work with the 
international community to get the situation under control. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  Angelo described MINURCAT's coordination with 
CONAFIT, the Chadian governmental structure designed to 
interact with international peacekeepers, as a work in 
progress, in part because CONAFIT was itself a relatively new 
and rather unusual entity.  He stressed that after the last 
two dangerous months, all Chadian and international actors, 
including humanitarian workers themselves, seemed to have 
developed a better appreciation that they had personal 
responsibilities to carry out if the security situation were 
to become more manageable.  Angelo noted that MINURCAT's 
dialogue with humanitarian workers continued and would 
intensify if that seemed useful. 
 
------------- 
DOWN THE ROAD 
------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU)  Looking ahead, Angelo advised that the UNSC would 
begin considering possible mandate revision or renewal for 
MINURCAT in February 2010.  Recalling that the current 
mandate had provisions for a one-year renewal, Angelo made 
clear that he did not expect major debate, although the terms 
of MINURCAT's involvement in the CAR arguably needed to be 
either expanded, to give it more authority, or reduced, so 
that expectations would not continue to exceed capabilities. 
He also offered that coordination among MINURCAT, UNAMID, 
 
NDJAMENA 00000588  003 OF 003 
 
 
BONUCA and other regional UN peacekeeping and related efforts 
should increase, in light of the interrelationships among the 
problems that the separate operations were designed to 
address.  Angelo pointed out that Chadian FM Faki was quite 
positive about the prospect of MINURCAT's staying in Chad for 
another year, but added that MINURCAT sought concurrence and 
support of government officials at all levels in both Chad 
and CAR.  Angelo ended by making a plug for international 
contributions to the UN Trust Fund, pointing out that the 
DIS, the prime beneficiary of the fund, was "an infant force, 
in need of lots of support at this stage in its life." 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU)  Continued near-anarchy in certain locations along 
the Chad-Sudan border is forcing reductions in some 
humanitarian operations and crippling morale among 
international NGO reps.  Victor Angelo is under no illusions 
regarding MINURCAT's ability to bring about a turn-around, 
although his honesty, proactiveness, creativity, and 
commitment, as well as success at coordinating with the range 
of Chadian players, are impressive and helpful.  The 
inability of some contributing nations to deploy 
adequately-equipped and trained troops so that rotations can 
occur on schedule (see Ref C) is undercutting MINURCAT's 
effectiveness; septel requests demarches to Accra and 
Kathmandu in the aim of accelerating arrival of deployments 
from these contributors. 
 
¶10.  (U)  Minimize considered. 
NIGRO