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OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0586/01 3411820
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 071820Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7491
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000586 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
STATE FOR AF/C 
STATE FOR S/USSES 
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON 
NSC FOR GAVIN 
LONDON FOR POL - LORD 
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID EU FR US CD
SUBJECT: CHAD POISED FOR CREDIBLE LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL 
ELECTIONS IN 2010: AN AUGUST 13 ACCORD PROCESS UPDATE 
 
REF: A. NDJAMENA 458 
     ¶B. NDJAMENA 441 
     ¶C. NDJAMENA 410 
 
------------------ 
SUMMARY AND COMMENT 
------------------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Chad is now poised to hold credible legislative and 
municipal elections in 2010.  The process of implementing the 
August 13, 2007 Accord has produced positive results, and 
many of the essential building blocks for elections are in 
place.  On December 4 President Deby put the full weight of 
the GoC and his personal prestige on the line behind the goal 
of credible 2010 contests.  Nothing, however, is guaranteed, 
and much still needs to be done as time grows short.  But 
there is no objective reason why credible elections cannot be 
held here within a year.  The obstacles are political, 
including opposition party reticence, institutional 
incapacity and lack of leadership, and legislative and 
bureaucratic lethargy.  The potential for violence as the 
electoral campaign itself unfolds will grow, reinforced by 
the conflictual nature of Chadian politics and the society it 
reflects.  The Chadians have managed to get as far as they 
have thanks to the willingness of their democratic partners 
-- the USG, France, Germany, Switzerland, the EU, AU, UN and 
OIF -- to advise and support them, politically and 
financially.  Continued commitment on the part of these 
partners will be essential to reaching the goal of credible 
legislative/municipal elections before the end of 2010. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The USG has assisted the process thus far by 
funding this summer's demographic census; sponsoring ongoing 
conflict mitigation and resolution projects in wide areas of 
the country; encouraging journalist professionalism and 
"community radio stations"; and producing radio spots on 
electoral awareness and voter responsibility.  Promotion of 
democracy and good governance is the primary non-crisis 
strategic goal of USG policy in Chad (ranking along with 
humanitarian assistance in Eastern Chad as long as the Darfur 
crisis continues).  We intend to remain engaged both 
bilaterally and in harness with our international partners to 
advance Chad,s progress toward the goal of credible 
elections in 2010.  We play a leading role in the informal 
assistance and support group of Chad's international partners 
(see para 10 below) and USAID experts are here now to advise 
us on how to program USDOLS five million for elections and 
conflict mitigation over the coming electoral cycles. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The strong personal and very public commitment of 
President Deby to the electoral process is particularly 
significant because although his constitutional position will 
be not affected by the 2010 polling (whatever the result), 
his political position will definitely impacted by the 
results of local and legislative elections.  We believe that 
President Deby seeks credible 2010 elections both to burnish 
his democratic credentials with the international community, 
and to solidify his own political position within Chad.  This 
means not only strengthening his ability to win another 
presidential run in 2011 (if he chooses to run) or to 
hand-pick a successor (if he does not), but also reinforcing 
his position within his own Zaghawa ethnic group, Bidayet 
Clan, and Itno family, from which he draws his influence but 
from which could come the most serious threat to his own hold 
on power.  END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. 
 
--------------------------- 
CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IN CHAD: 
POSSIBLE BUT NOT GUARANTEED 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) The Chadian government and political parties have 
announced that they intend to hold legislative and municipal 
elections in 2010.  The long and slow process of implementing 
the August 13, 2007 Accord aimed at electoral and political 
reform has produced positive results.  Many of the essential 
building blocks of the electoral edifice are in place -- an 
 
NDJAMENA 00000586  002 OF 004 
 
 
Electoral Reform Committee (ERC); a new Government of 
National Unity open to opposition parties; enabling 
legislation; a demographic census; and an Independent 
Electoral Commission (CENI).  President Deby has put the 
weight of the GoC and his personal prestige behind the goal 
of the 2010 contests, for his own political ends, by 
convoking all political parties December 4 to forge a general 
consensus in favor of credible, non-biometric legislative and 
municipal elections before the end of 2010.  The President 
expressed his concern that delaying elections would create a 
legal void and deny the "legitimate aspirations" of the 
Chadian people.  Leading opposition figures welcomed the 
President's remarks and said they believed that with the 
support of the body politic, there would be a credible vote. 
They urged public support for the CENI and efforts to improve 
of the security and media environment relating to the 
elections.  The CENI President expressed his thanks for the 
President's leadership and said he looked forward to moving 
the electoral process forward toward a vote. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Nothing is guaranteed, however, and much still 
needs to be done: a Permanent Board of Elections must be 
formed; an electoral census must be conducted and 
constituencies drawn up; voter registration and vetting of 
lists of candidates are needed, among other prerequisites. 
These tasks will not be easy to accomplish and time is 
running short.  Still, there is no objective reason why 
credible elections cannot be held here within a year.  The 
obstacles to holding them as scheduled are political, 
including continued reticence on the part of some in the 
opposition to participate because they fear they will lose; 
lack of capacity, especially lack of leadership, on the part 
of Chad's nascent electoral infrastructure, in particular the 
CENI; as well as legislative and bureaucratic lethargy.  The 
potential for violence as the electoral campaign itself 
unfolds will grow, reinforced by the conflictual nature of 
Chadian politics and the society it reflects. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The Chadians have managed to get as far as they 
have thanks to the willingness of their democratic partners 
-- France, Germany, Switzerland, the EU, AU, UN and OIF, in 
addition to the U.S. -- to advise, support, finance, and 
accompany them politically.  Continued commitment on the part 
of these partners will be essential to reaching the goal of 
credible legislative/municipal elections before the end of 
¶2010.  The U.S. has assisted thus far by funding the 2009 
demographic census, conflict mitigation/resolution projects 
and initiatives to promote professionalism among journalists. 
 Encouragement of democracy and good governance is the 
primary non-crisis goal of the USG in Chad.  We intend to 
remain engaged, both bilaterally and in harness with our 
international partners, to advance this goal with respect to 
elections. 
 
--------------------------------- 
IMPLEMENTING THE AUGUST 13 ACCORD 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) The August 13 Accord, signed between the GOC, 
President Deby's majority Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS) 
party coalition and a group of opposition parties in 2007, 
aimed to encourage reconciliation between the government and 
its various opponents and to lay out formal processes for 
future elections.  (The current Chadian constitution calls 
for presidential elections five years from the previous vote, 
which occurred in 2006.)  Many of the goals of the August 
Accord have now been achieved, starting with the formation in 
late 2007 of a multi-party steering committee, called the 
Electoral Reform Committee (ERC), to oversee the political 
reform process laid out in the Accord.  In May 2008, based on 
requirements in the Accord, President Deby named a new 
government, which brought opposition figures into key cabinet 
positions, including that of the Prime Minister.  In the 
summer of 2009, a population census was held -- a precursor 
to an electoral census -- and an Electoral Code was passed by 
the National Assembly, along with a charter on entitlements 
and responsibilities of political parties, and legislation to 
 
NDJAMENA 00000586  003 OF 004 
 
 
limit proliferation of splinter parties.  Later in the 
summer, an Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) was named, 
15 of whose members represent the MPS and 15 the opposition, 
with the Chair able to cast deciding votes. 
 
----------------------- 
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE 
----------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) The CENI, composed of party activists rather than 
impartial individuals competent to organize an election, has 
been prone to deadlock since it began meeting this September. 
 Its efforts to develop electoral timelines and consider 
modalities for an electoral census broke down along party 
lines very early, with many opposition members calling for a 
delayed timetable.  President Deby convoked party leaders 
December 4 to spur action, and the CENI met the following day 
to declare that all of its membership was committed to 
legislative and municipal elections in 2010 and that the 
group had adopted, by consensus, the notion of a 
"computerized electoral census," thus ending a protracted 
debate on whether to use an expensive biometric process 
favored by the opposition as a means of postponing a vote. 
Conducting the computerized census will have to be done 
fairly soon so that a voter registration campaign can begin. 
Other outstanding tasks include formation of a Permanent 
Bureau of Elections, vetting of candidates and establishment 
of candidate lists, and improvements in the media climate for 
elections. 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The ERC continues to meet to encourage achievement 
of the last outstanding element of the August 13 Accord: 
promotion of general political dialogue.  The body, which 
includes MPS and opposition figures as well as observer seats 
for international reps, has been going about this task by 
undertaking "sensitization campaigns" in the countryside on 
citizens' entitlements and responsibilities, particularly 
with regard to voting.  Although the ERC might arguably be 
viewed as redundant were the CENI able to function more 
effectively, the ERC's success at acting as a bipartisan 
champion of political dialogue has earned it support from the 
international community. 
 
---------------------------------- 
INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS GROUP FORMED 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (SBU) International players from democratic nations and 
entities (the USG, UN, EU, AU, OIF, France, Germany, and 
Switzerland) have constituted themselves as an informal 
assistance and support group to advance the election process 
in Chad.  We have been meeting regularly in recent weeks to 
plan our common effort.  The French are extremely engaged and 
proactive, and are playing a leadership role in getting 
others in the international community to endorse and support 
our aims.  The EU, which was the main mover behind the August 
13 Accord, has provided the bulk of financial assistance to 
the electoral process thus far, and is deeply committed to 
helping Chad meet minimal standards for electoral 
credibility.  The OIF has much expertise to offer, given the 
similar legal underpinnings of Chadian political arrangements 
and those in French-speaking nations with longer democratic 
traditions.  The UN, despite concerns that elections may 
prove difficult to stage in locations where neither the GoC 
nor traditional leaders are able to ensure security, has 
already provided several teams of technical experts and will 
place additional personnel on the CENI and other bodies in 
need of advice.  The AU says it wants to give Chad a chance 
to become an African electoral success. 
 
--------------------- 
AS FOR THE OPPOSITION 
--------------------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) It is important to bear in mind that the political 
class here is highly fractious, with opposition having become 
a lifestyle (and livelihood) for some.  More than 80 
 
NDJAMENA 00000586  004 OF 004 
 
 
political parties are registered in Chad.  Loyalty still 
tends to develop around local and tribal leaders.  Opposition 
figures range from those like the Prime Minister, who have 
accepted cabinet positions, to those like the non-MPS members 
of the ERC and CENI, who have accepted formalized 
"opposition" slots on government organs, to elected 
representatives of opposition parties in the National 
Assembly, to political dissidents in Chad (often associated 
with the media or legal profession), to dissidents who have 
felt the need to become exiles abroad, to armed rebels.  Many 
opposition parties joined in a boycott of Chad's 2006 
elections, and some key figures are already threatening to 
boycott elections in 2010 and 2011. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Dissident groups have a tendency to stage 
electoral activities to which they invite the international 
community at meeting times of the CENI and ERC, in an effort 
to force Chad's partners to choose between supporting 
government-sponsored initiatives and rival efforts.  There is 
consensus among the international observers group that we 
should offer advice and technical assistance so that the CENI 
can function more effectively; that we should help the ERC 
remain viable and encourage its efforts at civic education; 
that we should continue to press for the lifting of formal 
restrictions on press freedom so that more public debate can 
occur as elections approach; that we should encourage 
compromise and coalition-building on the part of the 
opposition; and that we should support continued 
reintegration of returning rebels and members of the Chadian 
Diaspora into political life. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶13.  (SBU) The strong personal and very public commitment of 
President Deby to the electoral process is particularly 
significant because although his constitutional position will 
be not affected by the 2010 polling (whatever the result), 
his political position will definitely impacted by the 
results of local and legislative elections.  We believe that 
President Deby seeks credible 2010 elections both to burnish 
his democratic credentials with the international community, 
and to solidify his own political position within Chad.  This 
means not only strengthening his ability to win another 
presidential run in 2011 (if he chooses to run) or to 
hand-pick a successor (if he does not), but also reinforcing 
his position within his own Zaghawa ethnic group, Bidayet 
Clan, and Itno family, from which he draws his influence but 
from which could come the most serious threat to his own hold 
on power.  END COMMENT. 
¶14.  (U) Minimize considered. 
NIGRO