VZCZCXRO8218
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK
DE RUEHMO #3151/01 3641542
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301542Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5836
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 0372
RUEHEK/AMEMBASSY BISHKEK PRIORITY 2748
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE PRIORITY 0086
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0395
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY 0001
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO PRIORITY 1758
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2813
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI PRIORITY 3921
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4312
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0550
RUEHAST/AMCONSUL ALMATY PRIORITY 0015
RUEHLN/AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG PRIORITY 5566
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK PRIORITY 3437
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 003151 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CTR 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KNNP PARM TSPL RS
SUBJECT: ISTC GOVERNING BOARD IN MOSCOW APPROVES WORKING 
GROUP ON TRANSFORMATION; CELEBRATES 15 YEAR ANNIVERSARY 
AMID UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
 
 Sensitive but Unclassified ) please handle accordingly. 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (SBU) Amid continued uncertainty over its future, the 
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) held 
Coordinating Committee (CC) and Governing Board (GB) 
meetings, and celebrated its fifteen-year anniversary 
December 7-10, 2009 in Moscow. The GB agreed to establish a 
working group, to be co-chaired by the U.S. and Russia, to 
discuss the future of the ISTC.  The main objective is to 
address Russian questions about the ISTC,s continuing 
relevance.  Arguing that its assistance legislation did not 
give it any flexibility, the European Union opposed U.S. 
language in a draft "joint statement" designed to alleviate 
Russian embarrassment over the existing ISTC Agreement,s 
implication that Russian scientists remain the same kind of 
proliferation threat they did in the early 1990's.  All 
participants were able to agree to weaker language that 
reiterated the December 2008 GB statement about the ISTC's 
success in meeting its original objective of redirecting 
former weapons scientists. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Secretary Clinton's congratulatory message at the 
December 10 celebration of the ISTC's 15th Anniversary, read 
by Ambassador Beyrle, sent a strong signal of U.S. 
sensitivity to Russian concerns and interest in developing a 
reinvigorated ISTC.  The U.S. Party led by Ambassador Bonnie 
Jenkins also held bilateral meetings with senior officials 
from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, state nuclear 
power corporation Rosatom, and the four other Funding Parties 
of the ISTC.  The MFA, which opposes the ISTC in its current 
form, was pointedly absent from all of the week's official 
events.  END SUMMARY. 
 
¶3. (U) A U.S. delegation led by Coordinator for Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Programs Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, and 
including Department, DOE, and Embassy officials, 
participated in the preparatory ISTC Coordinating Committee, 
a non-governmental organizations (NGO) Roundtable, the 
decision-making Governing Board, and Fifteenth Anniversary 
meetings in Moscow December 7-10, 2009.  U.S. GB member 
Victor Alessi and overall GB Chairman Ronald Lehman also 
played important roles in the meetings. 
 
------------------------------- 
Working Group on Transformation 
------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) At the CC meeting, the U.S. Party  put forward 
language that went beyond the December 2008 GB Statement 
recognizing the success of the ISTC in achieving its original 
mission of redirecting weapons scientists and proposing that 
a consultative process therefore be developed to discuss 
future options for the ISTC.  The European Union (EU) and 
Russian Party agreed in principle to establishing a 
consultative body but not to the statement as proposed. In 
pre-meeting discussions in Moscow, the EU representatives 
said that they had been unable to get clearance for the 
stronger language in a U.S.-proposed "joint statement" 
designed to allay Russian irritation over the existing ISTC 
Agreement's implication that Russian scientists still 
represent a serious proliferation threat. Such a statement, 
the EU argued, would undermine their legislation's 
justification for assisting Russia, a justification founded 
on the need to redirect Russian scientists. At the GB 
meeting, the Parties agreed to the related U.S. proposal to 
open consultations among the ISTC parties in order to find 
common ground on which to base a possibly transformed Center. 
 
MOSCOW 00003151  002 OF 004 
 
 
 Russian GB member Lev Ryabev suggested that a working group 
be established at which he would be able to present his 
"personal" views.  Accepting this idea, the GB Record of 
Decisions included the following: "The Board decided to set 
up a working party with a mandate to discuss options and to 
make proposals regarding the future of the ISTC including a 
possible review of the Agreement." The U.S. drafted Terms of 
Reference for the Working Group and received feedback from 
the other Parties. The Working Party will meet in Moscow in 
March and will be prepared to report to the GB at the next 
meeting in June. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Shifting U.S. Priorities at the ISTC 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (U) The U.S. continues to focus its funding at the ISTC on 
projects that relate to nonproliferation cooperation, 
institutionalization of financial self-sustainability, and 
support of supplemental budget activities such as the 
Targeted Initiative on Biosecurity.  This is in line with our 
vision of a transformed ISTC that can be a platform for 
scientific cooperation among equal partners on areas of 
global importance, including nonproliferation ) in contrast 
to the existing, assistance-based mission centered on 
redirecting weapons scientists.  At the CC, the U.S. 
announced funding for a project to develop technologies to 
more effectively detect nuclear materials in cargo, an 
initiative on the prevention of biological threats, and an 
agreed framework to cooperate with Russia on high-intensity 
light research.  The U.S. also encouraged the Secretariat to 
continue to develop an initiative on nuclear forensics. 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Russian Perspectives on Future of ISTC 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) In discussions on the margins of the meetings, 
Rosatom representative and Russian GB member Lev Ryabev 
agreed to the U.S.-proposed consultations on the future of 
the ISTC.  Ryabev suggested a working group that he could 
attend as a member of the GB.  Ryabev said that all Russian 
stakeholders agreed that the ISTC had been a success and that 
the situation had changed dramatically since the ISTC was 
launched fifteen years ago. The point, consequently, was that 
there was no longer a nonproliferation threat from Russian 
scientists (a view that MFA representative Rozhkov strongly 
emphasized in a separate meeting*see para 10).  The 1992 
ISTC Agreement, in effect, labeled Russia a nonproliferation 
threat; this stigma represented a serious problem for the 
Russian government today.  Ryabev said there were varied 
points of view within the government on a future role in 
Russia for the ISTC.  Some proposals had been made, including 
that the ISTC be closed, but no final decisions yet reached. 
With the scientist redirection objective accomplished, the 
task now, in Ryabev's own view, was to define a new objective 
for the ISTC.  In a brief discussion with Ambassador Beyrle, 
he stressed that Russia would not agree to continue the ISTC 
for its own sake, but might be willing to support 
transformation in the context of demonstrating that it would 
add value for implementing new science projects of benefit to 
Russia.  The projects, not the ISTC, should be the starting 
point.  Rozhkov made similar points separately at the MFA. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
Roundtable with NGO Representatives 
------------------------------------ 
 
 
MOSCOW 00003151  003 OF 004 
 
 
¶7. (SBU) In a roundtable hosted by Post, representatives from 
the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center) and the 
Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF)in Moscow 
met with Ambassador Jenkins to share views on the ISTC and 
Russian nonproliferation activities in general.  The PIR 
Board is composed of many well-known Russian and U.S. 
nonproliferation experts, including Anatoly Antonov, Nikolay 
Spassiky, and Rose Gottemoeller. The Russian PIR 
representative stated that the ISTC was perceived very 
differently among various parties in Russia, from very 
positive to not so positive.  In this context, he referenced 
other initiatives dating back to Gorbachev times and how many 
of those had been forgotten. 
 
¶8. (SBU) In the context of discussing transitioning the ISTC 
from an assistance-based organization to one based on 
partnership, the representative for the Civilian Research and 
Development Foundation (CRDF) in Moscow stated "technical 
assistance is a necessary part of partnership", that 
partnership should not replace technical assistance in 
relations between Russia and the U.S., and that any 
transition should be conducted over a period of several 
years. In separate informal meetings, the representative from 
PIR agreed to explore the possibility of hosting a roundtable 
among government representatives and nonproliferation experts 
in Russia on the future of the ISTC. 
 
------------------------------------ 
ISTC CELEBRATES 15 YEARS OF SUCCESS 
----------------------------------- 
¶9. (U) A December 10 day devoted to celebration of the ISTC's 
15th anniversary drew hundreds of past and present 
participants in its programs.  Due attention was given to a 
review of the scientific achievements of the ISTC over the 
past 15 years.  The key sentiment expressed by 
representatives of Russian and other former Soviet Union 
scientific institutions was gratitude for ISTC assistance at 
a critical time for their countries.  Ambassador Beyrle, an 
engaged supporter of the ISTC, read a congratulatory message 
from Secretary Clinton. It gave a strong endorsement to the 
work of the ISTC and acknowledged that the challenge it had 
been originally designed for has been met, but also 
recognized its potential to make new contributions and 
expressed U.S. interest in making the ISTC a "nexus for 
renewed and refocused engagement" with scientists of the FSU 
and perhaps beyond.  In  discussions with Beyrle and his 
staff, Jenkins reviewed the options Washington felt the ISTC 
faced: possible improvements under the existing Agreement, 
more sweeping transformation under a review ) including 
possible amendment ) of the Agreement, termination of the 
ISTC in favor of other, admittedly less capable, instruments 
of scientific cooperation, if that became necessary.  Beyrle 
noted the Embassy's misgivings about an approach that might 
reopen the existing Agreement, citing the danger that the 
existing tax and other privileges could be lost in the 
process.  Separately, all of the ISTC funding partners 
expressed similar concerns, while noting it would be 
difficult to avoid this issue. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
Ambassador Jenkins' Bilateral Meetings with ROSATOM and MFA 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins also raised the G-8 
Global Partnership and the Nuclear Summit in meetings with 
MFA and Rosatom officials.  MFA Deputy Director, DVBR 
(Security and Disarmement Department), Oleg Rozhkov noted 
that he was pleased with the pre-Tokyo text of the Nuclear 
Summit Work Plan and could accept most of the language, while 
reiterating the position laid out in Rome that the Russians 
have no redlines on GP geographic expansion but do want 
 
MOSCOW 00003151  004 OF 004 
 
 
assurance that existing commitments will be fulfilled and 
clarity on the amount of additional funds to be made 
available. He noted that the Summit should be focused and not 
distracted by other issues that other countries might raise 
and that, in agreement with a statement by Beyrle, Russia 
should have a prominent role in the Summit. Rozhkov opined 
that ISTC's mission in Russia was completed, and it would do 
better to pursue non-proliferation objectives elsewhere. In 
response to Amb. Jenkin's suggestion that the two countries 
initiate a dialogue on the future of the ISTC, he said it 
would be useful to discuss how fruitfully to use ISTC's 
current assets in other countries.  Any future for ISTC in 
Russia would depend on identifying new programs first and 
then demonstrating the usefulness of ISTC for implementing 
them. 
 
¶11.  (SBU) For Rosatom's part, Deputy Director General 
Spasskiy told Ambassador Jenkins he worried that a full 
nonproliferation schedule of activities between January and 
the Nuclear Summit will result in rushed decision making on 
GP issues.  Spasskiy said that Russian nonproliferation 
priorities are, in order, START, CTBT, and the 123 Agreement. 
He also stated that the Nuclear Summit "cannot be a seminar" 
and that "it has to be a summit" and that the entire process 
should be carefully prepared and orchestrated so as to not 
upstage the NPT Review Conference.  Regarding ISTC, Spasskiy 
said both ISTC's goals and economic privileges in Russia 
belonged to an earlier time.  On the way forward, it would be 
important to protect both the pipeline of ISTC projects and 
our cooperation. 
Rubin