VZCZCXRO4610
RR RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS RUEHTM
DE RUEHME #3626/01 3572243
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 232243Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9534
INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MEXICO 003626 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR KCRM MX
SUBJECT: PRODUCTIVE MEETING ON AIR INTERDICTION AGREEMENTS 
WITH GOM 
 
¶1.  Summary.  In a breakthrough meeting with Mexican 
representatives from relevant national security and foreign 
affairs agencies, a U.S. delegation reviewed issues related 
to efforts begun in 2007 to obtain assurances that the GOM 
will not damage, destroy, or disable civil aircraft while "in 
service."  This is a U.S. statutory requirement before USG 
agencies can share air interdiction information with the GOM. 
 The GOM now has a better understanding of our legal 
requirements and will respond in writing to our concerns, as 
well as identify additional issues it would like to discuss 
in the future.  Both sides concurred that an eventual 
exchange of diplomatic notes would be an acceptable vehicle 
for securing the safety assurances the USG is seeking.  End 
Summary. 
 
 
Background 
 
¶2.  In 2007, Embassy Mexico City sent to the GOM Diplomatic 
Note 727, which requested consultations on language for a 
proposed Aerial Interception Assistance Agreement (AIAA). 
The primary purpose of the agreement was to protect civil 
aviation, as well as U.S. personnel, who under U.S. law, may 
be held criminally liable in certain circumstances when the 
assistance they provide to a foreign government is used to 
damage, destroy, disable, or threaten a civil aircraft "in 
service."  The language was pro forma text that the U.S. 
routinely sends to all countries that seek to receive 
Cooperating Nation Information Exchange System (CNIES) 
data/assistance.  The GOM never responded officially to our 
Diplomatic Note, although informal exchanges made it very 
clear that there were significant reservations on the Mexican 
side. 
 
¶3.  Increased assistance to Mexico since the inception of the 
Merida Initiative, and the potential for providing expanded 
real time aerial intercept information beyond CNIES, has 
heightened our need to secure an AIAA agreement that provides 
GOM safety assurances required by law.  All countries that 
receive aerial intercept assistance from the U.S. have signed 
such an agreement governing their aerial interception 
practices except Mexico.  These agreements fall into two 
distinct categories.  First, there is a standard Aerial 
Interception Assistance Agreement that all countries have 
signed, with the exception of Colombia (Note: These standard 
AIAAs cover all assistance, radar data, intelligence, 
equipment, training, etc, that could be used for aerial 
interception purposes.  End Note.)  A separate category is 
the Letter of Agreement that the USG signed with Colombia, 
which provides greater operational flexibility in exchange 
for much more intrusive oversight by the USG. 
 
¶4. In the case of Mexico, the USG has proposed a third 
option.  We would ask for only minimal assurances in keeping 
with the special relationship with the GOM that has 
intensified under Merida.  These assurances would still 
satisfy the USG's requirements for providing aerial 
interdiction assistance.  U.S. air interdiction assistance to 
Mexico is a critical tool in our mutual efforts to stop the 
flow of drugs north.  Thus, the USG's proposal to Mexico 
distills the essential components of the AIAA in order to 
protect the safety of civil aviation and U.S. personnel from 
liability, while respecting the operational needs and 
sovereignty of Mexico. 
 
 
Latest Progress Report 
 
¶5.  After two years of stalled activity and fragmented 
conversations, Embassy Mexico City convened a December 9 
meeting that included officials from L, INL, WHA, and the 
Embassy Judicial and Defense Attaches Offices and the 
Political Section.  This delegation met with a GOM 
interagency team that included representation from the 
Foreign Ministry, Transportation, Federal Police, Army, Navy, 
and the Attorney General's office.  The USDEL laid out the 
USG requirements for an agreement, noting that our proposal 
sought to focus on the minimum assurances necessary.  These 
include:  (1) legally binding assurances that the Government 
of Mexico will not damage, destroy, or disable (or make 
threats thereof against) civil aircraft "in service" (defined 
 
MEXICO 00003626  002 OF 003 
 
 
as extending from the time that preflight preparations begin 
until 24 hours after the aircraft has landed)  (2) 
Modification of section 8.3 of the Mexican aerial 
interception procedures to eliminate the possibility that 
such actions would give rise to liability for damaging, 
destroying, or disabling (or make threats thereof against) 
civil aircraft in service.  Modifications should include: (a) 
specifying that all efforts should be made to avoid damage to 
the aircraft (not just to minimize loss of life); (b) setting 
a safety perimeter around the aircraft that may not be 
targeted; (c) removing all indications that strafing runs are 
intended as threats; (d) agreeing to give the U.S. 
information about cases where an aircraft has been hit; and 
(e) issuing notices to the flying public that force will not 
be willfully used against civil aircraft "in service." 
 
¶6.  The GOM delegation raised concerns about private planes 
taking off from the U.S. that were breaking Mexican law by 
entering their national airspace without a flight plan. 
(Note: U.S. law does not require a flight plan for private 
planes flying by visual flight rules and taking off from an 
uncontrolled U.S. airport. End Note.)  The GOM delegation 
requested that the USG require a flight plan for all flights 
in the vicinity of the border.  The U.S. delegation promised 
to look into the issue, but suggested not linking the issue 
with the one related to safety assurances.  We agreed that at 
our follow-on meetings, a member of the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
would be invited in order to address this concern and others 
that may fall in the realm of general aviation and not air 
interdiction. 
 
 
Positive Result 
 
¶7.  The meeting was successful in dispelling GOM myths and 
misperceptions.  First, the Mexicans now understand that the 
proposed assurances that the U.S. seeks would not prohibit 
law enforcement action against civil aircraft "in service" 
that are suspected of illicit activity.  Second, the U.S. 
delegation clarified that there is no hard and fast 24 hour 
"quarantine" requirement under which GOM authorities would 
not be able to "touch" a suspected narco aircraft after it 
lands.  However, there are safety requirements that have to 
be respected in accordance with U.S. law.  These requirements 
were designed only to protect innocent civilian lives, while 
leaving room for effective law enforcement action, especially 
on the ground.  Third, all GOM agencies agree that civil 
aviation must be protected to the maximum extent possible in 
order to protect innocent individuals and ensure that our 
mutual counternarcotics efforts are preserved.  Finally, we 
emphasized that these assurances are designed primarily to 
protect the liability of U.S. operators who provide 
information to the GOM. 
 
 
The Way Forward 
 
¶8.  The Mexicans agreed to take the requirements back to 
their interagency and designated the Mexican Embassy in 
Washington to deliver the GOM response.  The Embassy will 
provide us a document with the GOM's specific concerns about 
the USG proposal.  The GOM may also request information about 
obtaining specific additional air interdiction systems. 
(Note: The U.S. delegation was very clear that any agreement 
we might reach will not be linked to quid pro quo provision 
of greater assistance or access to additional systems.  An 
AIAA is but the first step to sustain current assistance, and 
even begin to consider further assistance.  End Note.) 
 
¶9.  The USG will coordinate at the NSC sub-IPC level to 
formulate language for safety assurances that the USG would 
find satisfactory.  This language will be fed into the 
Mexican interagency deliberations.  Furthermore, the GOM 
suggested providing these assurances through an exchange of 
diplomatic notes, which the U.S. delegation accepted. 
 
¶10.  Comment.  The Mexico meeting helped break a two-year 
logjam  and set us well on our way to obtaining an AIAA.  The 
fact that the GOM suggested a follow-up discussion in 
Washington is positive.  Once the Mexican position is blessed 
 
MEXICO 00003626  003 OF 003 
 
 
in a GOM interagency discussion, we should be in a good 
position to work our remaining issues directly with the legal 
attach in the Mexican Embassy in Washington.  The key to 
maintaining momentum on this issue is to address our 
counterparts' concerns, while ensuring our minimum legal 
requirements are met.  Follow-up engagement with the Mexican 
Embassy in the coming weeks can help identify those concerns 
and provide an opportunity to suggest specific language that 
would satisfy the assurances we are looking for.  The Embassy 
will stay in contact with GOM military contacts to clear up 
any lingering concerns.  The Embassy recommends the 
Department reach out to the FAA on ways we might respond on 
the flight plan issue.  End Comment. 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
PASCUAL