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238955
2009-12-10 01:22:00
09MEXICO3468
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFISS/HQS USNORTHCOM
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 003468 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MX
SUBJECT: SSP TO REPLACE MILITARY AS PRIMARY SECURITY PLAYER 
IN CIUDAD JUAREZ 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Gustavo Delgado. 
Reason: 1.4 (b),(d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  President Calderon will likely decide this 
week to make the Public Security Secretariat (SSP) the 
primary public security authority in Ciudad Juarez and return 
the military (SEDENA) to a more traditional, supporting role. 
 Calderon's security team is proceeding under the assumption 
he will greenlight the transition.  The shift would indicate 
GOM recognition that the military-led effort has not been 
effective in curbing the escalating levels of violence.  The 
military has suffered from criticism of its handling of human 
rights issues, and the Calderon administration recognizes the 
need for strong, civilian law enforcement institutions 
capable of sustained success against organized crime in 
Mexico.  Planning is still sketchy and command arrangements 
uncertain.  Senior Mexican law enforcement and security 
officials continue to meet on operational arrangements.  A 
central player in driving the change has been National 
Security Advisor Jorge Tello Peon, who gives great credit to 
U.S. engagement for forcing GOM attention to operational 
shortfalls.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) National Security Advisor Tello and Director of the 
Center for Investigation and National Security (CISEN) 
Guillermo Valdes hope to get President Calderon to approve 
Tello's proposal, developed with Public Security Secretary 
Garcia Luna, to give SSP lead responsibility for federal 
public security forces in Ciudad Juarez.  Calderon's security 
team is operating under the assumption that the President 
will concur, and his executive council will meet on December 
10 to work out the operative aspects of implementing the 
plan.  SSP contacts indicate that the Federal Police will be 
the principal player in security efforts within the city, 
with SEDENA taking a supporting role on operations and 
securing the outer perimeter and highway checkpoints.  There 
is no clarity at this point on how SSP, SEDENA, and other 
security forces will share supported and supporting roles. 
 
¶3. (C) The change in strategy will mean an increase in 
Federal Police presence in Ciudad Juarez -- the GOM may send 
north the crowd control units brought into Mexico City for 
the takeover of Luz y Fuerza facilities, as well as large 
numbers of recently minted investigators -- and will allow 
for the military to assume a more supporting role in terms of 
domestic counternarcotics operations.  GOM contacts have told 
us that the SSP could send perhaps as many as 1800 more 
Federal Police. The deployment of additional police does not 
currently presage a reduction of military presence in Juarez. 
 Instead, it may be possible that SEDENA could send as many 
as 2000 more troops to Juarez to reinforce SSP efforts.  SSP 
contacts indicated that the military has achieved the "first 
step" of creating checkpoints and security blocks to stop 
openly armed organized crime convoys.  In the next phase -- 
which is in line with Garcia Luna's action plan for Ciudad 
Juarez detailed for Emboffs earlier this year -- SSP will 
enter and target black market activities, such as red light 
districts, which have served as safehavens for elements of 
organized criminal groups.  The final part of the strategy 
will be a restoration of public and social services to regain 
the confidence and credibility of the population.  But 
according to SSP contacts, detailed planning has yet to take 
place. 
 
¶4. (C) The shift is an indication of the GOM's recognition 
that the military-led Operation Joint Chihuahua has not been 
an effective tool in reducing the violence and organized 
crime that plagues Ciudad Juarez.  Narcotics-related violence 
spiked after only a two-month hiatus following a dramatic 
increase in troop deployments to the city earlier this year. 
Moreover, the military lacks arrest authority and is 
incapable of processing information and evidence for use in 
judicial cases -- only 2 percent of those detained in Ciudad 
Juarez have actually been charged with a crime.  The military 
has also taken a serious beating on human rights issues from 
international and domestic human rights organizations who 
argue that the military is ill-equipped for a domestic 
policing role.  In a report issued this week, Amnesty 
International noted that complaints to the National 
Commission on Human Rights against the military increased 
from 367 in 2007 to over 2000 from January 2008-June 2009. 
 
¶5. (C) Comment: Finalizing this strategy would be a positive 
 
MEXICO 00003468  002 OF 002 
 
 
step in the GOM's willingness to respond to public pressure 
-- including protests in Ciudad Juarez earlier this week 
against SEDENA's failure to staunch record levels of violence 
-- and to focus on building strong, civilian law enforcement 
institutions that are necessary for sustained success against 
organized crime in Mexico.  Tello gave credit to intense U.S. 
engagement with the GOM, and our insistence that 
professionalizing police and judicial institutions must be at 
the core of a long-term citizen security solution.  Likewise, 
our continued emphasis that the military is a blunt-edged 
instrument ill-fitted to combat organized criminal syndicates 
also are influencing the GOM's decisionmaking.  Nevertheless, 
the transition to an SSP-led effort in Ciudad Juarez over the 
next several weeks will be messy and difficult.  The SSP does 
not appear to have a comprehensive transition plan in place, 
must redeploy SSP troops, and communications are poor. 
Ciudad Juarez reports that local GOM actors have virtually no 
idea what is happening, or what is driving the change. 
Further, continuing to employ the military, even in a 
supporting role, raises the same kinds of chain of command 
problems that have plagued the effort from the beginning, and 
no one is talking about what to do with the critical 
municipal and state forces. 
 
¶6. (C) SSP Secretary Garcia Luna previewed the proposal with 
the Ambassador on December 7.  Jorge Tello confirmed today 
his central role in advancing the strategy.  The approval is 
moving forward more quickly than expected.  Valdes said he 
would report the results of the GOM meeting with the 
President once it takes place.  He requested that the 
bilateral evaluation visit to Juarez scheduled for December 
10-11 be postponed; a decision with which the Mission 
concurs.  Valdes and other authorities are certain to stay in 
close contact with us as this develops, and Mission agencies 
and Consulate General CJ will be in a position to assist and 
advise as necessary.  End comment. 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American 
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / 
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