VZCZCXRO2448
OO RUEHBC RUEHCHI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDT RUEHGI RUEHHM
RUEHJS RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHNH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKL #1010/01 3560715
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220715Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3610
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KUALA LUMPUR 001010 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PHUM PREL KISL KDEM PGOV OPDC
SUBJECT: MALAYSIA AND FORWARD THINKING ON THE "DEFAMATION 
OF RELIGION" ISSUE 
 
REF: A. STATE 128320 WAY FORWARD ON DEFAMATION ISSUE 
     ¶B. KL 966 MALAYSIA UNLIKELY TO CHANGE ON DEFAMATION 
        RESOLUTION 
     ¶C. KL 900 MALAYSIA BACKS OIC DEFAMATION RESOLUTION 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  If approached as part of a joint, 
transparent outreach effort to Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) countries, the Government of Malaysia may 
modify its strong support for the UN "Defamation of 
Religions" resolution, or a new treaty along the same lines 
(ref A).  In that context, Malaysian officials might hear us 
out on the need to balance respect for religions with 
protection of free speech, and could provide needed 
leadership to change the OIC's views.  On the other hand, we 
see little prospect of splitting Malaysia -- a founding 
member and recent Chair -- from the existing OIC consensus. 
It is and for the foreseeable future will be very unlikely 
that Malaysia could be persuaded to lead a departure from the 
OIC status quo, but we stand a good chance of persuading KL 
to follow others toward a new OIC consensus.  End Summary. 
 
Core Support for the OIC 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Government of Malaysia has made clear that it 
supports the OIC's 2009 defamation of religions resolution 
both through its votes ("yes" on all occasions) and in its 
responses to demarches (refs B, C).  Several Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs officials have responded to our demarches on 
the issue with puzzlement, saying, in essence, that the 
defamation issue is important to the OIC, and the OIC is 
important to Malaysia, so that it would be quite difficult 
for Malaysia to deviate from the OIC consensus.  Pressed 
about USG concerns that the resolution conflicts with free 
speech, MFA Under Secretary for Human Rights Rohana Ramli 
offered to discuss specific wording that the USG found 
problematic, but did not otherwise give ground (ref B). 
 
¶3. (SBU) The OIC is a central component in Malaysia's world 
view.  Malaysia was a founding member in 1969 and its 
2003-2007 Chair, with its own ambitious agenda.  GOM 
officials cite the OIC as second only to ASEAN (which does 
not develop common foreign policy positions) in terms of its 
importance to Malaysia (although we would add the Non-Aligned 
Movement to the list).  Welcoming the 40th anniversary of the 
OIC in September, Prime Minister Najib Razak said the 
organization needed to defend against extremism and 
Islamophobia internationally.  In a December 5 op-ed entitled 
"Getting to the heart of diplomacy" in the 
government-influenced "Star" newspaper, MFA Secretary General 
Mohammad Rastam wrote, "Malaysia continues to play a key role 
in the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which we 
consider important for promoting cooperation among the 
Islamic countries."  The only other international grouping he 
mentioned was ASEAN.  In addition to the official emphasis on 
the OIC, the Malaysian public's primary foreign policy 
concern is the future of Palestine, in line with the OIC's 
reason for being.  For these reasons, appealing to the GOM to 
depart from the OIC consensus on a core OIC issue (mentioned 
in the OIC Charter) is unlikely to succeed without a broader 
strategy that engages directly the OIC and identifies others 
to lead the change. 
 
How to Use Malaysia to Add Momentum 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Malaysia sees itself as a leader within the OIC as 
well as a potential bridge between the Muslim world and the 
West.  Therefore, an outreach effort to the OIC Secretariat 
and member countries, including Malaysia, on both defamation 
of religion and freedom of speech would resonate well here: 
Article 10 of the Malaysian Constitution provides for freedom 
of speech, assembly and association (with some limitations); 
Article 11 provides for freedom of religion.  Such an 
approach to "moderates" in the OIC Secretariat could be 
framed as a response to OIC Secretary General Ekmeleddin 
Ihsanoglu's January 20, 2009 letter to President Obama, where 
he cited the OIC's principle of moderation and modernization, 
welcomed the appointment of a U.S. Special Envoy to the OIC 
and called for increased cooperation with the United States. 
The approach could also reference Ihsanoglu's February 11, 
2009 statement, "OIC clarifies its views on the draft 
resolution on combating defamation of religions," which 
refers to the need to maintain "...a delicate balance between 
freedom of opinion and respect for all religions and 
incitement to hatred."  Malaysian officials have not yet 
commented on the possibility of a treaty to codify the 
defamation of religions issue (ref A).  In the context of an 
overall approach to the OIC, and presented with convincing 
arguments, the Malaysian Government might be persuaded to 
 
KUALA LUMP 00001010  002 OF 002 
 
 
join other moderates in the OIC to oppose such a treaty and 
ask other OIC members to rethink the issue, but only if 
significant actors within the OIC were publicly identified as 
first-movers. 
KEITH