VZCZCXRO2228
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #1073/01 3440821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 100821Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0397
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SADC COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1304
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 2969
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 0163

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 001073 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF 
 
E.O.12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KPAO MASS PREL PHUM CG
SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY TRAINING: WHAT THE PUBLIC IN KISANGANI 
         THINKS 
 
REF:       11/12 AF/RSA - Embassy Kinshasa email 
 
KINSHASA 00001073  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  While local audiences in Kisangani 
are supportive of U.S. military training of the FARDC 
battalion, they have expressed concerns about the 
motivations of the U.S. effort, manner in which 
candidates are being vetted, and the nature of follow-on 
activities to sustain the battalion's integrity. 
Concerns over the training, if left unaddressed, could 
harm efforts to improve the civilian perception of the 
FARDC.  In order to develop a sound public affairs 
strategy to convince Congolese audiences of the merits of 
the U.S. military training, Embassy Kinshasa and AFRICOM 
elements must continue efforts to conduct outreach to 
audiences and public-opinion makers.  End summary. 
 
¶2.  (U) On November 26-27, APAO visited Kisangani to 
assess public views surrounding U.S. military training of 
the FARDC Light-Infantry Battalion.  The visit followed 
meetings by an AF-OSD team to meet with civil society 
actors (see ref).  APAO continued the discussions, and 
reached out to members of other target groups.  Meetings 
with University of Kisangani administrators and 
academics, human rights groups, local journalists, and 
leaders for the Kisangani Archdiocese identified clear 
themes that illustrate the public view surrounding the 
U.S. training activity and overall U.S. role in the DRC. 
 
What are U.S. motivations? 
------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) While members of the local community were 
generally supportive of U.S. and international 
initiatives to train the FARDC, they continued to remain 
suspicious of U.S. intentions.  Several interlocutors 
highlighted the 1998 invasion of Rwandan and Ugandan- 
supported rebel groups and expressed their belief that 
the invasion would not have happened without U.S. 
support.  Given this belief, many questioned whether the 
presence of U.S. military trainers was a harbinger of 
another invasion of foreign-backed rebel groups. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Academics noted their concern that, as past 
training had supported Mobutu's hold on power, the U.S. 
military training was a potential means to bolster 
President Kabila's government, and intentions by the Head 
of State to maintain his hold on power.  The battalion 
would act as the potential tool to secure his power. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Interlocutors also expressed the view that the 
construction of the Kisangani training facility was 
paving the way for a permanent Africa Command (AFRICOM) 
presence in the DRC, which would advance U.S. efforts to 
conduct anti-LRA operations, capture potential Islamic 
terrorists filtering in from Sudan, and protect U.S. 
economic interests in the region.  The theme of 
?balkanization? also emerged, as opinion-makers wondered 
whether the battalion's training was an attempt to divide 
the FARDC, and potentially create a fighting force that 
would be exploited by the U.S. and its Rwandan and 
Ugandan allies to promote the break-up of the DRC. 
 
Is the training effective? 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Concerning the actual training, several human 
rights groups questioned the methodology of selecting 
candidates, and assurances that candidates did not have a 
dubious track record.  Expressing skepticism that there 
were too few FARDC candidates who would be suitable for 
training, many asserted the training would ultimately 
need to bring in candidates who did not meet U.S. vetting 
Qneed to bring in candidates who did not meet U.S. vetting 
standards. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Interlocutors also revealed concerns about the 
training of a single battalion.  Audiences appeared to be 
unconvinced that a battalion would be able to act as an 
effective model for the FARDC, citing the failure of past 
initiatives by donors to train Congolese military 
personnel.  As certain civl society representatives 
contested, "didn't foreign militaries train Mobutu's 
army?  Did that help to professionalize the military?" 
 
 
KINSHASA 00001073  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
What happens after the training? 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The most pressing concern expressed by 
audiences was what would happen after the training. 
Specifically, audiences and opinion-makers were concerned 
about how soldiers would be paid and fed following the 
training.  When told the GDRC would have to take 
responsibility for the welfare of the battalion, 
audiences immediately expressed concern the government 
would be unable to satisfy the unit's future monetary and 
supply needs.  As a result, any training activity would 
be unable to professionalize the FARDC. 
 
USG outreach strategy 
--------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) During a meeting with public opinion-makers and 
specific interlocutors, APAO sought to respond accurately 
to questions and concerns about the U.S. training in 
Kisangani, using Washington TDY visit's meeting with 
civil society groups in October (see ref) as a basis for 
discussions.  However, the significant interest and 
concerns raised by key representatives of Kisangani's 
community demonstrate the need for a concerted strategy 
to engage with local communities and justify the merits 
of U.S. military training of the FARDC battalion. 
Embassy Kinshasa plans to implement a strategy that (1) 
maintains regular contact with Kisangani public opinion 
makers to effectively address specific concerns and 
publicize positive elements of the training; (2) 
facilitates eventual dialogue between the FARDC and civil 
society groups to permit an exchange of information 
between the two entities; and (3) enhances U.S. public 
diplomacy outreach beyond a focus on perceptions of U.S. 
military training. 
 
¶11.  (U) Thus far, Embassy Kinshasa has sought to 
publicize U.S. public diplomacy efforts by highlighting 
visits by U.S. officials such as Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense Vicki Huddleston, embedding 
journalists in seminars training FARDC officials on 
international humanitarian law, and publicizing medical 
donations to the FARDC.  While the type of message is 
well-received by press and public opinion makers in 
Kinshasa, it fails to reach audiences in Kisangani.  On 
numerous occasions, local public opinion makers informed 
APAO they were unaware of past local press reporting of 
U.S. initiatives to support and train the FARDC.  To 
enhance the outreach to Kisangani audiences, PAS Kinshasa 
will work with USG trainers and OSC Kinshasa to rapidly 
and immediately disseminate any information on the 
training to newly established contacts.  As part of a 
wider outreach effort, we will seek to work with 
AFRICOM?s combat camera to provide audiences with footage 
of positive aspects of the battalion's training.  We will 
also work with our colleagues to have sufficient local 
press coverage for events connected to the USG training, 
such as the January 2010 DIILS training seminar in 
Kisangani, as well as the rollout of the upcoming 
agricultural project. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Embassy Kinshasa should also consider ways to 
facilitate dialogue between civil society and the FARDC. 
Several interlocutors appeared quite pessimistic about 
the FARDC?s willingness to respect human rights practices 
following the departure of U.S. military trainers.  They 
also noted their frustration at the lack of information 
being provided by the FARDC to local communities on the 
progress of military reform.  A regular mechanism of 
contact between the FARDC and local audiences could 
Qcontact between the FARDC and local audiences could 
alleviate these frustrations, enhance the level of 
confidence of the Kisangani population in the FARDC, and 
effectively complement our efforts to professionalize the 
Congolese battalion.  As a precedent, interlocutors 
allude to past seminars in 2005 that brought together 
FARDC officials and civil society groups to discuss 
military integration.  According to them, these 
discussions were supposedly received quite positively by 
all parties, and helped to build confidence between the 
FARDC and civil society. 
 
¶13.  (U) Finally, improvement of the public perception in 
 
KINSHASA 00001073  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Kisangani of the military training can be complimented by 
overall enhanced public diplomacy.  In spite of 
suspicions of U.S. policy, there continues to be a keen 
appreciation in Kisangani for U.S. cultural values. 
Audiences also speak fondly of past U.S. assistance in 
the region, such as dormitories at the University of 
Kisangani that were constructed by USAID in 1970. 
Enhanced public diplomacy outreach will help to establish 
the notion that U.S. interest in Kisangani goes beyond 
military training.  PAS Kinshasa will plan to maintain 
regular contact with local audiences and opinion-makers, 
disseminate products normally distributed in Kinshasa, 
and highlight regular public diplomacy programs for 
Kisangani audiences. 
 
¶14.  (U) Comment:  Public views surrounding U.S. military 
training ranges from highly-sensational to justifiably 
concerned.  A successful strategy to generate public 
support for U.S. training efforts in Kisangani will 
require a constant effort to comprehensively explain our 
objectives, and pro-actively address concerns raised by 
local audiences.  Embassy Kinshasa will actively pursue 
such an effort.  End comment. 
 
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