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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1474, PORT SUDAN AS POTENTIAL LOGISTICAL SOLUTION FOR REGIONAL

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1474 2009-12-30 14:54 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO8165
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1474/01 3641454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301454Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4967
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 001474 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH 
UN ROME FOR HSPANOS 
NEW YORK FOR DMERCADO 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI SMIG UN SU
SUBJECT: PORT SUDAN AS POTENTIAL LOGISTICAL SOLUTION FOR REGIONAL 
FOOD AID NEEDS 
 
1. (U) Summary: There is no recent history of vessels with USG 
humanitarian aid cargo waiting for berthing space due to port 
congestion outside of Port Sudan. The same can-not be said for 
Djibouti port to the south. In order to avoid delays of emergency 
food aid delivery to Ethiopia due to port congestion in Djibouti, 
the UN World Food Program (WFP) is working to shift a portion of the 
Ethiopia food aid tonnage to Port Sudan without disrupting current 
Sudan food aid operations. At the end of November, Port Sudan 
received the third vessel of food aid destined for Ethiopia since 
the flexible operation began in April. The vessel transported 27,000 
metric tons (MT) of bulk wheat for Ethiopia and 5,000 MT for WFP 
Sudan. The governments of Sudan and Ethiopia are aware and 
supportive of these cross-border operations. As significant as these 
ad-hoc operations are in helping alleviate this most recent instance 
of Djibouti port congestion, it is important to highlight the 
current user-friendly operational approach within the port that 
could make Port Sudan part of the food aid logistical solution for 
the USG. As long as WFP Ethiopia shipments are conducted on a 
case-by-case, emergency basis, and particularly for bulk cargoes, no 
negative impact is anticipated on the ongoing WFP Sudan program. End 
summary. 
 
----------------------------- 
WFP Port Sudan Relationships, 
Procedures Advantageous 
--------------------------- 
 
2. (U) Port Sudan has a large capacity, with a comfortable operating 
cushion built into the WFP Sudan port operation. Port Sudan 
comprises three different units: the Green Port has a quayside that 
can fit up to five vessels, depending on their individual/collective 
length overall; the North Port, which can accommodate two vessels 
simultaneously; and the South Gate container port, which can berth 
two container vessels at the same time. WFP has a favored working 
relationship with the private-sector SAYGA Flour Mills silo, which 
has a 110,000 MT silo capacity within the port, as well as an 
additional facility just off-port that can hold another 35,000 MT. 
The privately-owned DAL conglomerate owns SAYGA, and there is no 
shortage of capital investment.  Another grain silo is currently 
well under construction and now leased by SAYGA (also within the 
port) with an anticipated additional 100,000 MT grain silo storage 
capacity. WFP has convenient, off-port private warehousing capacity 
of 14 to 17 purpose-built permanent facilities for 200,000 MT rented 
from Immarat Company and the flexibility to expand these rentals as 
required.  Half of these facilities are leased in six-month 
tranches, while the other half are on shorter three-month leases to 
ensure flexibility. 
 
3. (U) While WFP can utilize these warehouses for food aid storage 
depending on volume of food aid arriving at port, WFP operates on a 
"direct delivery" mindset in order to avoid extra handling costs in 
Port Sudan warehouses. WFP currently utilizes 12 short-listed 
trucking companies that can provide 100 percent contracted 
long-haul, direct-delivery capability to WFP hubs in El Obeid, 
Khartoum, Kosti, and Nyala. With this strong Sudanese private sector 
long-haul trucking capacity, WFP does not have to maintain its own 
trucking fleet. In addition, WFP has persisted in developing the 
rail delivery modality collaboratively with the Sudan Railways 
Corporation and utilizes rail for direct delivery of 1,200 MT/vessel 
to Nyala, South Darfur. 
 
4. (U) All chartered vessels arrive with a charter party contract 
originating from WFP Rome, and a discharge rate is already 
stipulated. (Note: The discharge rate is the amount of metric 
tonnage that a ship's owners have contracted to discharge from the 
vessel each full day. End Note.) WFP Port Sudan has a history of 
"early dispatch," which indicates that discharge has finished in 
advance of the charter party contracted timeframe. The WFP port bulk 
discharge operation in Port Sudan is very flexible, reacting 
professionally to the discharge limitations, strengths, or other 
characteristics of the vessel chartered. For example, WFP has a 
contract with the SAGYA silo to discharge at an average rate of 
8,500 MT per day if the vessel is transporting more than 30,000 MT, 
and a discharge rate of 6,000 MT is expected if the vessel carries 
less than 30,000 MT. If conventional discharge methods are required, 
then WFP's contract with Portserv is for a rate of 2,800 MT per day. 
The uplift ex-SAYGA Silo output rate for stored grain bagged for 
inland delivery is 2,000 MT/day. 
 
5. (U) The movement of food commodities from the shipping vessel to 
trucks or warehouses results in significant container discharge at 
the South Gate container port. WFP Port Sudan has received more than 
1,500 containers over the past calendar year up to the end of 
 
KHARTOUM 00001474  002 OF 003 
 
 
October. The WFP container discharge system includes four separate 
operations: 1) identification and marshalling of containers at 
quayside in South Gate, 2) shunting of containers from the South 
Gate quayside marshalling area to the WFP container yard at Damadama 
using Port Authority local transport, 3) positioning of WFP 
containers for stripping and management of empty containers, and 4) 
determination of direct delivery to upcountry destination or 
delivery to local WFP warehouse and reporting. WFP can perform 
60-100 container movements during the third shift of the day. 
Shunting then begins in the morning's first shift to the WFP 
container yard in Damadama. WFP maintains two Hyster 44s container 
handlers to facilitate all internal WFP container yard movements. 
Special acknowledgement should be made to the Port Authority for 
providing roughly 100,000 square meters of open, level container 
terminal space within the port confines at Damadama to WFP Port 
Sudan free of charge for container stripping operations. This 
in-kind donation by the Port Authority to WFP is illustrative of the 
close working relationship that WFP has been able to develop over 
time with the Port Authority. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Port Sudan as a Safety-Valve for Ethiopia 
------------------------------------------ 
 
6. (U) Sudanese customs officials consider WFP Ethiopia-bound 
shipments as transit cargo. Two bulk grain discharge shipments to 
Ethiopia--24,255MT and 24,501MT respectively--have been successfully 
conducted during the past year. WFP has negotiated a 50 percent 
reduction in the standard port fees per metric ton for this 
humanitarian transit cargo to Ethiopia. WFP is only required to pay 
5-6 SDG/MT while the cargo is in transit rather than the current 14 
SDG/MT for WFP Sudan cargo. The Government of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (GFDRE) Minister of Agriculture and the WFP 
Ethiopia Head of Logistics visited Port Sudan three months ago to 
review the possibilities of transit cargoes. 
 
7.  (U) The use of Port Sudan for delivery of WFP food aid into 
Ethiopia through Gedaref/Metama is officially supported by both the 
Sudanese and Ethiopian governments, and WFP continues to work with 
both governments to resolve remaining logistical challenges, 
including the below-mentioned examples, for future transit cargo 
shipments. As Ethiopia is a land-locked country, the strategic 
importance of cultivating a positive relationship with the 
Government of Sudan (GOS) and gaining access to the use of Port 
Sudan cannot be overstated. The food aid program in Ethiopia is 
consistently one of the largest programs for both USAID and WFP each 
year, and the problems with the Djibouti port capacity are 
longstanding. With the improvement of the relationship between GDFRE 
and GOS, Port Sudan is emerging as a more seriously viable 
alternative. 
 
a) Customs Issues/Fees: From Port Sudan to Gedaref, the transit 
cargo remains under customs bond. During the first movement of more 
than 24,000 MT of food aid destined for Ethiopia, individual trucks 
could not be processed at Gedaref customs yard as Sudanese customs 
officials had to wait for the larger numbers of the convoy to 
arrive. If one truck had broken down on the road from Port Sudan, it 
would have delayed the entire convoy's movement. The WFP 
Ethiopia-contracted Sudanese transporter, Rayba, has now arranged 
that customs staff be assigned specifically to the Ethiopia 
transshipment operation at Gedaref. WFP Ethiopia is working closely 
with the GFDRE through their channels with the Sudanese government 
and is negotiating the complete waiver of the 15 percent VAT on 
transporter's invoices. This waiver is expected soon. 
 
b) Damage/Infestation within Sudan: At Gedaref, the transit cargo 
remains under customs control. If infestation is found, a separate 
customs-bonded warehouse has to then be established to separate and 
treat that cargo. Supervision fees must be paid to customs for that 
additional warehousing. In Gedaref, state authorities have 
established local fees 6 SDG/MT paid for any tonnage stored in 
Gedaref. During the first shipment bound for Ethiopia, WFP informed 
Gedaref authorities that the cargo was in transit to Ethiopia and 
asked for the fees to be waived. While authorities originally 
rejected the request, the cargo was eventually dispatched without 
paying these fees. 
 
c) Damage Resulting in GDFRE Rejection: Another example of the 
details that have to be worked out could be seen in the second 
shipment. Wet bags rejected by the Ethiopian EFSRA warehouse in 
Woreta were sent back to the Sudan border where Sudanese customs 
refused to allow entry of the trucks. WFP advised Woreta not to send 
any rejected cargo back to Sudan as this raises many complications 
 
KHARTOUM 00001474  003 OF 003 
 
 
with authorities. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Logistical, Customs Challenges Lessening 
---------------------------------------- 
 
8. (U) The past two transit difficulties were in April-May 2009 and 
again in July-August 2009. Both instances were wheat cargoes with 
non-USG food aid. Each cargo of approximately 24,000 MT required 25 
to 30 convoys traveling 600 km from Port Sudan to Gedaref, 150 km 
from Gedaref to Metama, 40 km from Metama to Shehady, and then a 
final 100 km from Shehady for final delivery to Woreta, Ethiopia. 
The first transit delivery required intensive customs negotiations 
and explanations. The second instance required considerably less 
money and less administrative time invested. The first instance took 
about one month to complete. The second instance took roughly 45 
days, but the delays were attributed to the rainy season. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Port Sudan Capacity, Smooth Operations 
Strategic for Horn of Africa 
-------------------------------------- 
 
9. (U) As long as WFP Ethiopia shipments are conducted on a 
case-by-case, emergency basis and particularly for bulk cargoes, no 
negative impact is anticipated on the ongoing WFP Sudan program, due 
to the already established procedures in place and large capacity at 
Port Sudan.  Port Sudan has a sustainable bulk grain discharge rate 
at quayside effectively allowing a vessel's discharge at Port Sudan 
to be completed in a matter of hours rather than the days/weeks seen 
at other ports in the region.  Port Sudan has no history of vessel 
laytime at anchorage and no resulting demurrage charges. SAYGA's 
food-quality silo capacity inside the port is expanding. Port Sudan 
has a demonstrated off-take capability and enjoys strategic 
proximity to the two largest, by metric tonnage, WFP country 
programs (Sudan and Ethiopia). 
ASQUINO