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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1455, VOTER REGISTRATION CONCLUDES IN SUDAN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1455 2009-12-28 06:52 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6141
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1455/01 3620652
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 280652Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4949
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 001455 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM KPKO SU
SUBJECT: VOTER REGISTRATION CONCLUDES IN SUDAN 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1323 B) KHARTOUM 1281 C) KHARTOUM 1165 
D) KHARTOUM 1262 E) KHARTOUM 1172 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Voter registration concluded in Sudan on December 
7. According to election advisors, and based on the National 
Elections Commission's (NEC) preliminary, unverified results, voter 
registration turned out significantly better than anyone might have 
expected, although problems were evident, including allegations of 
fraud.  Voter registration recovered from a slow start after 
political parties ramped-up activities and voter education got fully 
underway. The broad and generally peaceful voter registration 
process has raised expectations higher for potentially-credible 
April 2010 elections. END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (SBU) On November 23, the NEC announced a seven-day voter 
registration extension from November 30 to December 7 to promote 
greater participation and to make up for registration delays in some 
areas.  Despite a slow start(ref B) throughout Sudan, and especially 
in the South, the NEC claims that approximately 16,246,486 voters 
turned out to register, which would be 80% of the eligible voter 
population as determined by the 2007 national census. Election 
advisors were impressed by the high-turnout, but concerned about the 
authenticity of the reported registration numbers. 
 
----------------------- 
CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH 
----------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) The slow start in the South was mostly due to logistical 
issues, including lack of registration materials and transportation. 
Poor voter education especially plagued the South. Inadequate 
political will of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and 
southern political parties also hindered voter education about 
registration. Observers from the U.S. Consulate in Juba heard from 
State Elections High Committee officials in Juba, Torit, Yambio and 
Bor. They noted their work was hindered by communication issues with 
the NEC, delayed financial transfers and resource and staffing 
shortages that delayed the registration process in some locations. 
(ref A) 
 
--------------------------------- 
REGISTRATION FIGURES RAISE DOUBTS 
--------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Based on official, but unverified, NEC-released figures 
following the end of voter registration, the registration numbers in 
Sudan showed marked and unexpected improvements in the final weeks 
of the registration period.  In Southern Sudan, election advisors 
attribute at least some of this upsurge to the deployment of GOSS 
officials from all branches of the government to their home 
constituencies across the South.  The latter led a massive 
registration drive that began in late November and lasted until the 
rolls were closed on December 7.  Suspiciously, however, final 
registration numbers in five southern states and Southern Kordofan 
actually exceeded 100 percent of eligible voters (as calculated 
using 2007 census data.) 
 
5. (SBU) There are several possible explanations for this 
discrepancy:  GOSS officials, including President Kiir, argue that 
it indicates undercounting during the disputed national census of 
2007; some election advisors suggest that it points to registration 
fraud; and yet others suggest that such a discrepancy is the result 
of population movement, including the return of displaced persons, 
which may have occurred since the census. It is impossible to know 
exactly the reason for registration numbers exceeding 100% of 
eligible voters in these states as data will not be available to be 
analyzed due to the NEC's refusal to conduct a voter roll audit. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
HEAVY SECURITY FOR DARFUR REGISTRATION 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Voter registration in Darfur took place with few security 
incidents and moderate turnout according to domestic and 
international observer reporting.   The Carter Center reports that 
not all Internally Displaced People's (IDP) camps could be reached 
by the State Election High Committees.  IDP participation was 
marginal due to their political disenfranchisement and calls for an 
electoral boycott by many IDP leaders (ref E).   According to 
domestic and international election observers, there was a very 
heavy security presence at all registration sites in Darfur.  While 
registration was largely peaceful in Darfur, observers believe such 
an intense presence of National Intelligence and Security Service 
(NISS) and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) for security was not 
conducive to an environment for a free and fair election in Darfur. 
 
 
KHARTOUM 00001455  002 OF 002 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
OBSERVERS NOTE PEACEFUL REGISTRATION PROCESS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) Domestic and international observers did not report 
intimidation, violence or obvious fraud at and around registration 
centers.  The Carter Center notes in its statement that "Security 
forces played a generally positive role in ensuring the security of 
registration centers." Only two incidents of violence were reported: 
an assassination attempt on the GOSS Minister of Agriculture and 
Forestry and a gun fight between the Southern Sudan Police Service 
(SSPS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) while the 
SSPS was transporting voter registration materials. (ref A) 
 
8. (SBU) The following are the state-by-state voter registration 
figures released by the NEC. Percentages are based on census 
estimates of eligible voters per state. These figures have not been 
independently verified, and elections experts have expressed concern 
about the accuracy of the figures countrywide: 
 
--Northern Sudan 
 
-Blue Nile (Ed Damazin)         350,618 (87 percent) 
-Northern Kordofan (El Obeid)   900,573 (62 percent) 
-Southern Kordofan (Kadugli)    749,232 (112 percent) 
-Al Gezira State (Wad Medani) 1,543,340 (79 percent) 
-Northern State (Dongola)       269,538 (64 percent) 
-Al-Gadarif (Gedaref)           495,520 (75 percent) 
-Khartoum (Khartoum)          1,932,783 (59 percent) 
-White Nile (Rabak)              640,835 (70 percent) 
-Sinnar State (Singa)           516,566 (78 percent) 
-Kassala State (Kassala)        755,111 (78 percent) 
-River Nile (Ed Damer)          435,659 (65 percent) 
-Red Sea (Port Sudan)           687,181 (86 percent) 
-Western Darfur (El Genina)     424,958 (69 percent) 
-Southern Darfur (Nyala)      1,318,858 (67 percent) 
-Northern Darfur (El Fasher)    685,879 (65 percent) 
--Total Northern Sudan       11,706,651 (71 percent) 
 
--Southern Sudan 
 
-Upper Nile (Malakal)           416,471 (85 percent) 
-Jonglei (Bor)                  595,901 (86 percent) 
-Alwihda-Unity (Bentiu)         522,196 (190 percent) 
-Warrap (Kwajoc)                669,053 (140 percent) 
-Western Bahar Al-Gazal (Wau)   249,848 (140 percent) 
-Northern Bahar Al-Gazal (Aweil)451,789 (129 percent) 
-Albuhirat-Lakes (Rumbek)       386,621 (107 percent) 
-Western Equatoria (Yambio)     322,801 (92 percent) 
-Central Equatoria (Juba)       532,031 (91 percent) 
-Eastern Equatoria (Torit)      393,124 (87 percent) 
--Total Southern Sudan        4,539,835 (108 percent) 
 
-Total Registrations In Sudan 16,246,486 (79 percent) 
 
-Total Out of Country Voter Registration 104,345 
 
--Grand Total                16,350,831 
 
9. (SBU) COMMENT:  There is agreemenbt among both domestic and 
international election advisors and observers that the registration 
process went better than anyone had expected and produced a 
surprisingly high turnout.  Nevertheless, the process revealed 
serious problems.  For example, registration did not allow equal 
access throughout the country for eligible voters to register and 
take part in the political process. Verification of final voter 
registration numbers is necessary to better gauge the overall 
success of the process, but the NEC has refused to allow a donor 
audit of the voter rolls.  Despite these shortcomings, the voter 
registration process has set the stage for potentially-credible 
April 2010 elections in Sudan.  END COMMENT 
 
 
ASQUINO