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Viewing cable 09KHARTOUM1410, ABYEI JIU INTEGRATED BUT INEFFECTIVE

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KHARTOUM1410 2009-12-15 11:33 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Khartoum
VZCZCXRO6397
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1410 3491133
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151133Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4898
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS KHARTOUM 001410 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PBTS KDEM KPKO MOPS SU
SUBJECT: ABYEI JIU INTEGRATED BUT INEFFECTIVE 
 
REF: A) KHARTOUM 1135 B) KHARTOUM 1174 C) KHARTOUM 1263 
 
1. (SBU) Summary.  On December 8 Poloff met with Colonel Zakaria 
Akoi Yak (SPLM), Deputy Commander of the Abyei Joint Integrated Unit 
(JIU), who told Poloff that his JIU forces, tasked with providing 
security for the Abyei boundary demarcation team, had never been 
confronted by Misseriya tribesmen or militia forces. Colonel Yak did 
note one incident in which Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) forced the 
demarcation team and its JIU protection force to abandon work on the 
eastern end of Abyei's northern boundary.  Colonel Yak also noted 
that, while his JIU is fully integrated, it currently has no 
vehicles and almost no radios.  Colonel Yak appears well-intentioned 
but does not inspire confidence.  End Summary. 
 
------------------------------------------ 
Misseriya Not Threatening Demarcation Team 
------------------------------------------ 
 
2. (SBU) Colonel Yak told Poloff that Abyei's JIU forces, tasked 
with providing security for the Abyei boundary demarcation team, had 
never been confronted or threatened by Misseriya tribesmen or 
militia forces.  (Note: This contradicts repeated statements by Kwol 
Biyong (SPLM), Deputy Chair of the Abyei Boundary Demarcation 
Committee (Ref A, B, and C).  End Note.)   When asked why the 
demarcation team is unwilling to demarcate Abyei's northern 
boundary, Colonel Yak explained that the Misseriya had written a 
letter stating that they were opposed to demarcation and that the 
demarcation team feels threatened.  (Note: Presumably this is a 
reference to the October 6 resolutions issued by the Misseriya 
conference in opposition to the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
decision on Abyei.  End Note.)  Colonel Yak did, however, note the 
presence of significant numbers of armed Misseriya tribesmen and 
Popular Defense Forces near Abyei's northern boundary.  He stated 
that his JIU remained ready and willing to provide protection to the 
demarcation team whenever and wherever called upon to do so. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Confrontation with SAF Confirmed 
-------------------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) Colonel Yak did note one incident in which the demarcation 
team and its JIU protection force was threatened and forced to 
abandon work on the eastern end of Abyei's northern boundary by SAF 
forces.  He stated that in September, SAF forces under the command 
of General Ahmed Mohammed El Amin operating out of Heglig oil field 
confronted the JIU protection forces with mounted weapons and forced 
the JIU protection team to withdraw to Abyei town.  (Note: This 
incident was reported in local media and confirmed by Biyong. (Ref 
B) End Note.) 
 
------------------------------------------- 
JIU Integrated, but Technically Ineffective 
------------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Colonel Yak proudly noted that the Abyei JIU is the only 
JIU in Sudan that is fully integrated.  (Note: This success is a 
legacy of Colonel Valentino Tokmac, the effective former Abyei JIU 
Commander, whom Colonel Yak replaced in August.  End Note.)  He 
stated that the men live in the same barracks, train together, and 
will fight together in a crisis.  Colonel Yak did, however, note 
numerous hurdles facing the Abyei JIU, including the fact that all 
of its vehicles and almost all of its radios are out of service, 
creating an almost complete lack of mobility and communications.  He 
also noted that given the size of the Abyei district, the one 
battalion of JIU assigned to secure it is insufficient and said that 
he has requested an additional two companies from his commanders to 
strengthen the forces in Abyei. 
 
5. (SBU) Comment.  The Abyei JIU, with no mobility and limited 
communications, is currently ineffective as a military force. 
Furthermore, the SAF commander of the JIU was absent from the 
meeting, reportedly sick in Khartoum.  Colonel Yak's performance in 
the meeting did not inspire confidence.  He appeared disorganized in 
his thoughts and spent uncomfortably long periods leafing through 
his notebook trying to find answers to questions asked by Poloff. 
Perhaps the best that can currently be said about the Abyei JIU is 
that its SAF and Sudan People's Liberation Army components are less 
likely to fight each other than they were in 2008.  End Comment. 
 
WHITEHEAD