VZCZCXRO4991
OO RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHKH #1350/01 3360849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020849Z DEC 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4820
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 001350 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR MGAVIN, LETIM 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SMIG SOCI UN SU
SUBJECT: THE EMERGING STORY ON "SUDANIZATION" OF HUMANITARIAN AID 
 
1.(SBU) Summary: Since the March 16, 2009, announcement by President 
Omar al-Bashir that all humanitarian aid in Sudan would be 
"Sudanized" within one year, international aid agencies, the UN, and 
donors have sought clarity on the extent and nature of this process. 
 As the Sudanese government continues to work to take President 
Bashir's political statement and turn it into policy and procedures, 
recent NGO reports indicate varied enforcement by Sudanese 
government official based on the government's relationship with and 
trust of the international NGO.  However, some NGOs have expressed 
concerns that Government of Sudan (GOS) pressure upon international 
NGOs to partner with certain national organizations has quietly 
intensified, clarifying the possible future direction of GOS 
Sudanization efforts.  The January 31, 2010, expiration of the 
Moratorium on Restrictions for Darfur, which necessitates the 
renewal of all first-tracked bureaucratic procedures for 
international NGO work in Darfur, will be the first true test of GOS 
intentions.  End summary. 
 
---------- 
Background 
---------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Following the International Criminal Court (ICC) indictment 
of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, the GOS reacted immediately on 
March 4 and 5, 2009, by expelling 13 international NGOs and 
dissolving three national NGOs, threatening expulsion for any other 
organizations that the GOS believed did not respect Sudanese law. 
In a subsequent public announcement on March 16, Bashir mandated 
that national organizations would take over all humanitarian 
assistance in Sudan within a year, stating that if any country or 
organization provides assistance, the GOS would only accept it if 
"handed over at ports or airports."  While many government officials 
have assured agencies privately that Bashir's threats to enforce a 
complete Sudanization of humaitaran aid, with no remaining 
presence of international NGOs, will likely not be enforced, these 
officials also acknowledge Bashir's announcement as a presidential 
directive that must be enacted.  The devil is in the details, 
however, and, with the procedures accompanying the Sudanization 
policy not yet public, many of the details remain left to 
interpretation by individual GOS officials. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Since the announcement, international NGOs, the UN, and 
donors have sought clarity on the extent and nature of the 
Sudanization process.  The NGO Steering Committee, in particular, 
has repeatedly stated that aid agencies support the principle of 
Sudanization in terms of capacity-building but has also emphasized 
that Sudanization must not be considered narrowly to only include 
partnership with national NGOs registered with the Government of 
National Unity Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC).  Most 
international NGOs already partner with line ministries and 
community-based organizations (CBOs), while nearly 90 percent of 
international NGO staff members are Sudanese.  International NGOs 
are advocating for a broader understanding of Sudanization to 
include support for these current partnerships.  The NGO Steering 
Committee also has noted that a clear mechanism must be developed 
for determining which of the approximately 3,300 national NGOs 
registered with the HAC are truly working according to humanitarian 
principles and with the necessary standards mandated by donors. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In late and early May, field sources reported that the HAC 
in West Darfur had denied approval of several technical agreements 
(TAs) on the grounds that the NGOs did not have an acceptable 
national NGO partner.  According to the reports, the HAC 
unilaterally wrote the names of national NGOs into TAs and pressured 
the organizations to accept the partners.  Other NGOs received 
signed TAs in May and June without including a national partner, 
while still other international relief agencies were given a 
six-month reprieve with the expectation that the organizations would 
identify a national NGO at the end of that period.  As the 
expiration of the Moratorium on Restrictions for Darfur approaches, 
more international NGOs are facing pressure from the HAC to include 
national NGO partners in TAs.  In addition, the NGO Steering 
Committee reports that the national NGO requirement will begin 
taking effort for programs in the rest of Sudan, excluding Darfur, 
during 2010. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
Varied But Troubling Messages Emerging 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) On November 24 and 26, USAIDoffs met with international NGO 
representatives to discuss the potential impact of Sudanization on 
USAID-funded programs and assess the current political landscape 
vis-a-vis the Sudanization requirement.  One NGO representative 
indicated that the GOS committee working to shape Bashir's political 
statement into finalized policy of Sudanization seemed to be nearing 
 
KHARTOUM 00001350  002 OF 004 
 
 
completion.  However, the NGO representative reported that the GOS 
is keeping the near-complete policy close hold-in his view, to 
minimize the negotiating time between the publishing of the policy 
and implementation.  According to another NGO representative, when 
NGOs questioned the HAC about when the Sudanization policy would be 
made clear, the HAC replied that it would release the finalized 
policy by the end of December.  NGOs have expressed concern 
regarding this timeline, as many are already working to renew TAs in 
advance of the January 31 deadline.  Whether the policy is published 
or not, enforcement of Sudanization during approval for 2010 TAs is 
a litmus test for how rigid the GOS will be on this issue.  Varied 
messages are emerging indicating the direction Sudanization will 
take in the coming months. 
 
-------------------- 
Threats, But No List 
-------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) One USAID/OFDA partner organization reported that current 
activities and plans to fill post-expulsion gaps left by an expelled 
NGO are currently on hold due to HAC insistence upon inclusion of a 
HAC-approved national NGO partner in the organization's TAs.  The 
HAC reportedly gave the organization a deadline of December 20 by 
which to choose a national NGO or the TAs would not be signed and 
activities would not occur.  A HAC official threatened the 
organization, stating that if the organization does not sign with a 
suitable national NGO, the official will stir up community 
frustration against the international NGO, ensuring that the 
community understands that the project ceased as a result of the 
international NGO's refusal to work.  However, even in seeking to 
comply with the GOS requirement, the organization remains uncertain 
regarding which national NGOs would be acceptable to the GOS, as 
international NGOs have been asking for a list of suitable national 
NGOs for months with no clear response.  Some NGOs have received 
lists of permissible NGOs for partnership based on certain project 
types, but others are left to sift through approximately 3,300 
national NGOs currently registered with the HAC.  In the absence of 
clear guidance, many international NGOs are still hoping that the 
GOS will deem current partner organizations, including CBOs and line 
ministries, suitable and satisfactory to fulfill the Sudanization 
requirement. 
 
¶7. (SBU) When asked about whether certain national NGOs are being 
favored over others, a NGO representative reported that no clear 
pattern has yet emerged on the national NGOs provided.  Thus far, 
the only clear consistency demonstrated is that the HAC will only 
consider organizations registered with the federal HAC as legitimate 
partners.  Some international NGOs are helping CBOs register with 
HAC.  However, registration is a laborious process requiring the 
naming of a 30-person board of directors, which presents a 
substantial obstacle to CBO registration.  In addition, some CBOs 
may want to remain unregistered, as it remains unclear what the 
benefits and liabilities of registration might be for these 
organizations. 
 
------- 
Choice? 
------- 
 
 
¶8. (SBU) In other cases, NGOs conducting interviews of potential 
national partner organizations have been interrupted by HAC 
officials, who insisted that a HAC official must be present during 
all interviews of potential national NGO partners.  Reportedly, the 
HAC 
Officials then stated that the GOS would be choosing the national 
NGO for the international NGOs; thus, interviews of potential 
partners are unnecessary.  NGOs have reported instances of the HAC 
specifically assigning national NGO partners to international NGOs. 
In one case, an international NGO went, in a good faith effort, to 
meet with the assigned national NGO to conduct an initial assessment 
of match and technical capability.  However, the national NGO 
expressed unwillingness to partner with the international NGO, as 
the organization did not see that the two groups shared a common 
objective. 
 
---------------------- 
Variations in Approach 
---------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) One NGO representative reminded USAIDoffs that, "in Sudan, 
relationships are more important than rules," adjuring the USAIDoffs 
not to look for consistency in the GOS approach to various NGOs.  In 
the representative's view, application of the Sudanization policy 
will depend on the GOS relationship with and perception of 
international NGOs, as well as the interest of different national 
 
KHARTOUM 00001350  003 OF 004 
 
 
NGOs to have partnerships.  Particularly without a written policy, 
GOS implementers are interpreting according to these 
relationships-strictly if the GOS considers the international NGO as 
a threat or is suspicious of the organization's activities and more 
leniently in cases which the GOS has trust and confidence in the 
international NGO.  The NGO representative relayed reports of two 
NGOs that have received signed 2010 TAs without national NGO 
partners.  However, according to the NGO staff member, thee 
instances represent exceptions rather than the rule.  In addition, 
the military government does not adhere to this relationship-based 
economy of rules, and, in the NGO representative's view, it remains 
unclear which portion of the government will win out on the issue of 
Sudanization. 
 
¶10. (SBU) While each case varies as to the scope of GOS involvement 
in choosing the national NGO partner, the common theme is GOS 
control of partnerships, something that NGOs, even some national 
NGOs, fear.  In some cases, national NGOs also do not want to lose 
credibility and appear as if the organization is HAC-directed. 
According to one international NGO representative, in most cases, 
national NGOs and the HAC see partnerships as a "checkbook" for 
national NGOs, which have expectations of money and assets out of 
the deal without understanding the many criteria that must be met. 
Another NGO representative reminded USAIDoffs that the Sudanese 
government's annual evaluations of international NGOs do not assess 
the effectiveness of programming but rather document and inventory 
project assets, budget, and staff.  The GOS notes assets for 
possible confiscation at any time, whether from international or 
national NGOs.  Some national NGOs reportedly fear that 
participation in the GOS Sudanization campaign will intensify GOS 
scrutiny of national NGO assets and activities. 
 
------------------ 
Outstanding Issues 
------------------ 
 
¶11. (SBU) As the international community awaits clarity on the GOS 
Sudanization policy, organizations have identified the following 
non-exhaustive list of urgent issues for consideration prior to 
implementation: 
 
a) Capacity and Quality: International NGOs and donors question how 
many capable national NGOs are present in Sudan?  With international 
NGOs descending upon the most capable and trustworthy national NGOs, 
the demands upon these organizations could exceed their capacity. 
The most capable national NGOs could become spread too thin or 
become bloated with bureaucracy if forced to grow too quickly.  In 
addition, international NGOs are unwilling to accept the forced 
provision of an unqualified national NGO partner, which would risk 
the international NGO's reputation and the quality and integrity of 
the organization's work.  NGOs have expressed significant concern 
regarding the potential of forced partnership, as any partner must 
adhere to humanitarian principles, demonstrate fiscal 
responsibility, commit to protection of beneficiaries, and 
demonstrate sufficient technical capacity for the activity.  Without 
free choice of partners, the international NGO would be unable to 
determine these issues. 
 
b) Donor Requirements: Under U.S. Government (USG) guidelines, any 
movement of U.S.-provided grant funds from the primary implementer 
to a partner organization as a separate legal entity requires a 
sub-award.  This requirement will necessitate modification of all 
U.S.-funded awards to include the sub-awardee prior to the signing 
of TAs, potentially delaying the provision of humanitarian 
assistance.  In addition, receipt of USAID funds requires that the 
sub-awardee meet the basic requirements of demonstrating fiscal 
transparency, neutrality, lack of terrorism ties, accountability, 
and protection of beneficiaries.  For funding from the European 
Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the sub-awardee must be 
registered with the European Commission, a requirement that could 
significantly delay any action on ECHO-funded grants with new 
sub-awards. 
 
c) Acceptance by Beneficiary Community/Neutrality: Beneficiaries in 
Darfur have long expressed reluctance to accept national NGOs chosen 
by the GOS into project sites, particularly in the most politicized 
IDP camps.  IDPs have not generally accepted national NGOs in camps 
since the NGO expulsions.  Full support for only GOS-registered NGOs 
would compromise neutrality in an already politicized aid 
operation. 
 
d) Elections: International NGOs question how the GOS will view any 
national NGO perceived to be supporting opposition groups, 
particularly given the ongoing electoral registration and the 
upcoming election.  Even if these organizations are preliminarily 
accepted by the GOS as partners for international NGO TAs, the 
 
KHARTOUM 00001350  004 OF 004 
 
 
scrutiny upon the organizations during this 18-month period 
containing election and referendum could make it very difficult to 
conduct work. 
 
---------------------------- 
Key Messages on Sudanization 
---------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The following key messages on Sudanization are for 
delivery during meetings with GOS representatives on humanitarian 
issues, including the upcoming November 30 Geneva Humanitarian 
Meeting: 
 
a) Sudanization must be more broadly defined to include work with 
non-HAC registered Sudanese organizations and line ministries.  The 
philosophy of partnership is already at the foundation of many NGOs' 
work in Sudan.  Any newly defined process should not subvert the 
current partnerships that are working well. 
 
b) Sudanization must not be forced.  The Sudanese government should 
ensure that Sudanization procedures enable international NGOs and 
national NGOs to enter into partnerships voluntarily, without force 
or coercion.  Any new arrangement should ensure that critical 
services are not disrupted and are accepted by the beneficiary 
community so that aid can reach vulnerable populations. 
 
c) Sudanization procedures must bear in mind donor requirements for 
accountability, impartiality, and independence in humanitarian 
assistance.  Sudanization must allow international NGOs to choose 
partner organizations demonstrating fiscal transparency, neutrality, 
lack of terrorism ties, accountability, and protection of 
beneficiaries, in accordance with donor guidelines. 
 
d) Capacity-building is a natural by-product, but not the primary 
objective of humanitarian assistance.  Donors support greater 
Sudanese NGO involvement in the humanitarian response but caution 
that this approach should not become the main objective of a 
humanitarian response, the objective of which is to save lives and 
reduce suffering. 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) While USAID supports capacity-building in principle, USAID 
has concerns regarding any use of force or coercion during 
Sudanization of humanitarian aid.  This includes GOS threats to 
unilaterally choose national partners, avoid signing TAs in the 
absence of a GOS-accepted or mandated partner, create dissension 
among beneficiary populations by blaming international NGOs for gaps 
in project activity, and, at worst, expel "intransigent" 
international NGOs for not following Sudanese law on national 
partnership.  NGOs remaining following the expulsions are in a 
precarious position: as on international NGO representative state, 
the organizations are left with little to no leverage to negotiate a 
compromise on Sudanization or any other substantive issue.  USAID 
will continue to advocate for a rational approach to Sudanization 
and unequivocally support international NGO partners in continuing 
to save lives and reduce suffering in Sudan in coordination with 
freely chosen and appropriate Sudanese partners. 
 
WHITEHEAD