VZCZCXRO7008
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #4186/01 3631023
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291023Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4346
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004186 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV AF
SUBJECT: "SHAPING FOR SUCCESS": NANGARHAR, KUNAR, LAGHMAN 
PROVINCES DEVELOPMENT SURVEY 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and comment:  Regional Command East (RC-E) recently 
released the results of its October 2009 development survey 
representing the views of nearly 2,400 residents of the Command's 
critical focus provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman ("NKL"). 
The survey's results can be interpreted in two critical ways: 
ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) operations have begun to set 
conditions in these provinces for more long-term development, but the 
results nonetheless reflect three decades of war.  Afghans in these 
eastern provinces want clean water, level roads and electricity, but 
do not want to pay for them.  As GIRoA expands development in rural 
areas and begins to provide essential services, it will face 
continued public expectation that the costs for these projects and 
services should be borne by the government or outside agencies not 
the residents of the provinces. 
End summary and comment. 
 
DESIRED OUTCOME:  TO DISCOVER "BEST PRACTICES" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶2. (SBU)  Regional Command East recently released the results of its 
latest development survey of the local population in the provinces of 
Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman.  The purpose of this quarterly survey 
was to examine local perceptions and attitudes toward development 
efforts in these provinces, including such issues as satisfaction 
with essential services, the media and attitudes towards GIRoA and 
Afghan security forces.  Nearly 2,400 Afghans were surveyed 
door-to-door in randomly selected villages October 13-19, 2009, by 
the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research, the firm 
used by major international media outlets and the Asia Foundation. 
Roughly an equal number of men and women were surveyed across all age 
and ethnic/tribal groups.  This particular effort attempted to 
investigate the deeper issues of not just satisfaction but how people 
believe developmental efforts are best managed and delivered.  One 
desired outcome of this survey was to offer "best practices" that 
could be applied to local, small-scale development projects at the 
district level. 
 
THINGS MAY NOT BE GOOD, BUT THEY ARE IMPROVING 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Essential Services:  Nearly 50 percent of respondents say 
that basic services improved over the last year.  When asked about 
life in general, the dominant response in Laghman is that it is 
better; the population of Nangarhar 
says it is roughly the same; and 40 percent of the people of Kunar 
complain it has become worse.  Twice as many people have seen the 
roads improve in their area as have seen improvements in the economy 
(58 percent and 26 percent, respectively). 
 
¶4. (SBU)  When asked who is responsible for these changes, 40-50 
percent say that either the district or the provincial government is 
responsible, with another 20-30 percent saying the Afghan police, 
army or Coalition Forces are responsible for bringing better services 
to their area.  When asked who is responsible for declines in 
services, 40-50 percent blame the Taliban, Al Qaeda or insurgents. 
This is a recurring pattern in this and previous polls where the 
authorities, civil or uniformed, are generally given credit for 
positive developments while anti-government elements are perceived as 
culpable for declines of services. 
 
¶5. (SBU)  When asked about the one action GIRoA could take to improve 
the economic situation, resident responses include a somewhat 
balanced mix of better security, more jobs and the availability of 
electricity.  A quarter of the people say they do not have access to 
safe and reliable drinking water.  In Laghman, those drawing their 
water from wells are twice as likely to say this 
situation is not acceptable.  In Kunar and Nangarhar, those drawing 
from a river or stream are three times as likely to assert they do 
not have acceptable access.  Water and irrigation improvement are 
services that respondents 
indicate would be best managed by local leaders. 
 
SENSE THAT AFGHAN SECURITY FORCES CAN PROVIDE SECURITY 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (SBU)  Security:  More than half of Kunar respondents say they do 
not feel safe going about their day-to-day activities, while 
two-thirds of respondents in Nangarhar and Laghman say they do.  The 
data indicate that people think Afghan security forces can provide 
security and have better capacity to do so than local leaders or 
Coalition Forces.  Comment:  security perceptions reflect localized 
sentiment because Coalition Forces do not have a continuous presence 
in many areas.  End comment. 
 
¶7. (SBU)  Respondents were asked if road safety prevents them from 
traveling.  About 20 percent of respondents say that poor security 
prevented them from attending a wedding or family gathering, for 
example.  Kunar citizens registered the most concerns -- 29 percent 
 
KABUL 00004186  002 OF 002 
 
 
-- and Nangarhar the lowest -- 16 percent.  Some 14 percent referred 
to police checkpoints as a hindrance to travel, highlighting an 
apparent paradox:  while perceived as enhancing security on the one 
hand, police are also viewed as a constraint to freedom of movement. 
 
CONTINUING CENTRAL ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Community Management of Development Efforts:  New to this 
survey were questions about who can best manage community 
development.  In all districts, a slight majority preferred outside 
help with drinking water.  Over 61 percent prefer local community 
management of irrigation resources.  This sentiment is reversed when 
considering roads and electricity, as most communities recognize 
these 
projects to be beyond their means. 
 
¶9. (SBU)  Value of Service:  How much are Afghans willing to pay for 
water, power and road improvements?  Residents of the provinces 
surveyed do not generally pay for water or roads.  Asking them to pay 
for something they currently have (or gather) for free will likely 
conflict with a widely held sense of entitlement.  Although 80 
percent of respondents say they do not pay for housing, those who do 
pay an average of only $17 USD monthly.  Reliable cell 
phone coverage has roughly the same value, approximately $18 USD per 
month as a typical rent payment.  Most would only pay about $1.50 USD 
for water, if anything, because at the village level water is 
typically fetched by women at no cost.  Respondents are willing to 
pay more for paved roads to their home than any other additional 
service, about $23 USD. 
 
¶10. (SBU) Comment:  The survey's results can be interpreted in two 
critical ways:  1) ongoing counter-insurgency (COIN) operations have 
begun to set the conditions in these provinces for more long-term 
development; and 2) the results nonetheless reflect the difficult 
conditions residents face after three decades of war.  The survey 
also suggests that the general population of the 
critical NKL provinces in eastern Afghanistan relies increasingly on 
outside actors, including the GIRoA, for a range of essential 
services including security.  Residents, however, generally do not 
want to pay for essential services, which portends challenges when 
and if the authorities attempt to move from what is essentially a 
subsistence economy to a more mixed economy.  U.S. civilians in RC-E 
and elsewhere in the field will need to continue fostering local 
buy-in to governance and development efforts to strengthen prospects 
for long-term sustainability. End comment. 
 
RICCIARDONE