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Viewing cable 09KABUL4121, RESIDENTS OF KHOST PROVINCE WELCOME 2011 TIMING,

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL4121 2009-12-22 04:36 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO2321
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #4121/01 3560436
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 220436Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4285
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004121 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INR/B 
STATE PASS USAID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: RESIDENTS OF KHOST PROVINCE WELCOME 2011 TIMING, 
IF SECURITY IMPROVES 
 
1.    (SBU) SUMMARY:  While the President's December 1 speech 
on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan registered with some GIRoA 
officials and the media in Khost province, many residents and 
other government officials were not aware of it until 
informed by Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
representatives.  Residents generally welcomed the 
announcement of the 2011 date to begin withdrawing troops, 
saying they do not want foreign forces in their country 
indefinitely; however, they said U.S. forces should only 
leave if security has improved.  Some residents applauded 
news of a temporary increase of 30,000 troops; others 
believed the resources for these troops could be better spent 
on Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and reconstruction 
projects.  End summary. 
 
KHOST ACTING GOVERNOR:  ANSF CAPACITY AND PRESSURE ON 
PAKISTAN ARE KEY 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (SBU)  In a meeting on December 4, Acting Governor Tahir 
Khan Sabari said he viewed part of the speech on television 
but had not heard much comment about its content (he does not 
speak English).  PRT representatives outlined main points of 
the speech and provided the Pashto language fact sheet 
cleared by Embassy.  Sabari responded that Afghans would 
welcome the announced 2011 date for beginning troop 
withdrawal, on the condition that security and ANSF capacity 
improve.  He said anti-government forces use U.S. troop 
presence as a rallying cry, thus announcing a withdrawal date 
removes a key propaganda point.  He opined that sending more 
U.S. troops is not as important as upgrading ANSF capacity. 
Sabari stressed the importance of Pakistan as a matter of 
regional strategy, asserting that Pakistanis need to stop 
paying lip service to eliminating Afghan insurgent safe 
havens and guarantee they will not be allowed sanctuary in 
Pakistan. 
 
LINCOLN CENTER ROUNDTABLE:  2011 DATE GOOD AS LONG AS 
SECURITY ALLOWS 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
3. (SBU)  The Embassy-funded Lincoln Center in Khost, which 
since its establishment in April 2009 has become a hub for 
&roshan fekr8*enlightened thinkers/educated 
people*convened a roundtable among seven local Afghan 
journalists, shura leaders, and a teacher to discuss the 
President's speech and the new U.S. strategy.  The common 
theme:  Afghans will welcome the proposed 2011 withdrawal 
date, but only if the security situation improves and ANSF 
capacity increases significantly.  Beyond that, some 
participants applauded the strategy's focus on partnership 
with the ANSF and improving agriculture.  Others decried 
corruption draining development dollars; some expressed doubt 
that the U.S. and its partners can accomplish in 18 months 
what they have been unable to do in eight years.  Media 
participants included the local BBC stringer, Azadi 
Radio,Khost Radio, Peace Radio, Caravan of Hope Radio, and 
Saba TV. 
 
4.    (SBU)  Khost TV, the polished and pro-government local 
Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) affiliate, carried 
interviews on the speech with Khost Chamber of Commerce head 
Amirzai Sangeen, head of the Khost Ulema Shura Muhammad Ayoub 
Hashimi, director of the Khost MedioThek office (a 
German-backed educational center similar to the Lincoln 
Center) Najibullah Alukhel, and writer/analyst Amirshah 
Kargar.  Kargar repeated an argument heard often in Khost: 
the staggering sum of money spent to field U.S. troops would 
be better spent raising ANSF salaries to a livable and 
competitive rate, and recruiting additional ANSF.  He claimed 
that for the cost of sending 30,000 
additional U.S. troops, the U.S. could pay to field 1.25 
million ANSF, an opaque calculation that nonetheless 
resonates in Khost.  He also pointed out that the 2011 
deadline should satisfy one of the main requirements 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has set before he will join the Afghan 
government. 
 
CONCERNS ABOUT CORRUPTION 
------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU)  Colonel Sher Ahmad Kuchi, Khost commander of the 
Afghan Border Police (ABP) told PRTOFFs that, while the U.S. 
troop increase was all well and good, the real problem in 
Afghanistan is corruption within both GIRoA and international 
organizations responsible for reconstruction.  Without 
changing the culture of corruption, he said, people will not 
 
KABUL 00004121  002 OF 002 
 
 
trust government regardless of security efforts underway. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
6. (SBU) Concerns about security are not new to Khost 
Province.  However, U.S. forces are making progress improving 
the ANSF through combined action programs that place U.S. and 
Afghan forces together at every level.  In addition, 
corruption activities are being reported and local media 
continue to bring instances of these activities to light. 
The next step in the corruption fight will be successful 
prosecution of a high-level case.  U.S. civilians in Khost 
will continue to underscore to local officials the importance 
of escalating this fight, and seek opportunities to 
demonstrate U.S. commitment to addressing issues that most 
concern the Afghan people.  End comment. 
RICCIARDONE