VZCZCXRO7315
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #4023/01 3500518
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 160518Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4006
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 004023 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM, INL/AP, L 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PINS PHUM AF UK
 
SUBJECT: HELMAND: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INFORMAL JUSTICE SECTOR 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary:  The absence of any formal Afghan government 
(GIRoA) justice infrastructure in many districts of Helmand province 
has created a legal vacuum that enables "insurgent justice" to hold 
sway.  In order to help the Afghan government (GIRoA) compete with 
the Taliban's shadow justice system, the UK-led Provisional 
Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Helmand has initiated a program to 
develop informal, local justice systems that draw on local Afghan 
traditions.  As part of this effort, the UK-led PRT based in Lashkar 
Gah has facilitated the establishment of Community Councils (CC), 
Prisoner Review Shuras (PRS), and Justice Sub-Committees (JSC) to 
take up minor criminal and civil cases at the district level. This 
cable outlines activities relating to the informal justice system 
that are being spear-headed by the UK as part of its PRT activities 
in Helmand. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Formal sector capacity building efforts have not been as 
robust, but the PRT is working with the Provincial Prosecutor to get 
GIRoA prosecutors to some key districts on a rotating basis.  An 
increase in formal GIRoA prosecutors and judges should help lessen 
the need to rely upon the informal mechanisms, which in some cases 
are not consistent with GIRoA legal requirements.  To combat police 
corruption, the PRT is mentoring an outreach campaign to deter 
abuses and highlight prosecutions of corrupt police.  The PRT has 
ambitious plans to facilitate more intelligence-led policing to 
improve investigations and minimize forced confessions.  To 
"criminalize the insurgency," the PRT also is working with National 
Directorate of Security (NDS) officials to enhance their ability to 
coordinate efforts with the military in kinetic environments.  End 
Summary. 
 
Informal Judicial Mechanisms Introduced in Districts 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) As part of the Afghan Social Outreach Program (ASOP), the 
UK-led PRT in Helmand Province, in coordination with the Provincial 
Governor's office, has established Community Councils, Prison Review 
Shuras and Justice Sub-Committees (JSCs are subsets of the CCs) in 
several districts to perform some judicial functions where there is 
not a court and prosecutor.    (Note: Garmsir and Nad-Ali districts 
have both PRSs and JSCs in place; there is a JSC in Gereshk district 
and a PRS in Sangin district.)  The components of these mechanisms 
are all local - CC members are selected by a locally-chosen 
electorate of community elders, and the PRSs are chaired by the 
District Governor (DG) and composed of the local heads of the Afghan 
National Police (ANP), Afghan National Army (ANA), National Security 
Directorate (NDS), and one member of the CC.  It should be noted, 
however, that these traditional, informal justice mechanisms are not 
designed to deal with major crimes.  The draft GIRoA policy 
concerning traditional justice considers only petty crime where no 
prison time is contemplated to be appropriate for referral to the 
local, traditional bodies.    The decisions of these bodies will 
then be deemed valid if not in contravention of Afghan law and 
international human rights standards. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) In districts where there is no prosecutor, the following 
procedures are in place:  Persons arrested and detained by the 
security forces in a given district are brought before the PRS 
within 72 hours of arrest, where a determination by a majority of 
the members is made on whether there is evidence of a crime.  If 
there is no evidence of a crime, the detainee must be released.  If 
evidence exists, the PRS determines whether the case constitutes a 
serious or minor offense, and in serious cases, it is then 
transferred to the formal court system in the provincial capital, 
Lashkar Gah. If the offense is minor, the case is transferred to the 
JSC for resolution. 
 
¶5. (SBU) According to an agreed framework, international mentors 
(typically DST officers) must be informed about, and permitted to 
attend PRSs, but no similar provision exists for international 
oversight of the determinations of the JSC.  JSCs have no authority 
to order imprisonment and its decisions are to be based on 
restorative justice and conflict prevention principles.  Decisions 
do not require authorization from an outside authority prior to 
implementation.  The PRT was recently given access to books 
containing recorded prior decisions.  Although there is a right to 
take matters to the formal sector, the manner or extent to which 
this occurs once a case has entered the informal sector is not fully 
known.  The system was set up to construct an alternative to 
insurgent justice systems in districts where there is not a fully 
functioning formal system.  It is difficult, however, if not 
impossible, to be aware of or monitor all of its functions or the 
disposition of detainees arrested by security forces. 
 
Deploying Prosecutors to Districts 
 
KABUL 00004023  002 OF 002 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) The PRT recently began working with the Chief Provincial 
Prosecutor (CPP) to facilitate the deployment of prosecutors to more 
districts, on a 30-day rotating basis.  This approach was designed 
to minimize the time spent by prosecutors away from their homes and 
mitigate potential corruption from working in one area too long.  In 
Gereshk district, a prosecutor replaced an ineffective predecessor 
in October, along with an investigative police officer from Lashkar 
Gah.  These moves, coupled with greater support from police mentors, 
have resulted in the prosecutor functioning effectively. 
Additionally, in Sangin district, the recent arrival of a prosecutor 
ended a long vacancy.  Although the District Governor has intervened 
to influence some cases, the prosecutor has been reasonably 
effective.  (Note:  The District Governor had previously served as 
the chairman of the PRS, and is clearly unwilling to relinquish that 
influence. End Note)  Sustained attention by police advisors, 
frequent communication with the CPP, and coordination with other PRT 
thematic strands to identify political remedies to the problems of 
third party influence should help to ensure the continued 
effectiveness of these prosecutors. 
 
Developing an Anti-corruption Campaign 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Police corruption is perhaps the greatest impediment to the 
implementation of rule of law in Helmand.  The PRT, in conjunction 
with the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), has developed an 
anti-corruption campaign with input from the Major Crimes Task Force 
in Kabul.  If approved by GIRoA, the campaign will focus on 
messaging to the general public about the illegality of police 
corruption and its damaging effects.  The program will be Afghan led 
and internationally mentored, and will target areas known for a 
prevalence of corruption.  Prior to implementation, the plan must be 
approved by the Anti-Corruption Task Force, as well as the 
Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior General who leads the Major 
Crimes Task Force.  The anti-corruption campaign will also be 
coordinated with the Attorney General's Office (AGO).  Any 
successful corruption prosecutions will be highlighted in hopes of 
deterring such activity. 
 
Developing Intelligence-led Policing 
------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Intelligence-led policing is critical for effective 
investigations.  Increasing the ANSF's ability to collect objective 
probative evidence will also be a critical step towards eliminating 
coerced confessions.  The UK-led PRT's Rule of Law cell has 
ambitious plans in this regard, and recently has identified criminal 
investigators who are able to deploy to districts on short notice to 
address complex or politically sensitive cases, and respond to 
surges in criminal activity.  These special task forces will be 
trained in interview techniques, evidence collection, and case 
preparation, with similar training regiments planned for 
prosecutors.  The PRT is also focusing on building NDS capacity to 
function effectively in a manner consistent with the rule of law. 
In this vein, the UK PRT's Security Sector Reform cell is training a 
small group of NDS personnel to be more effective as a task force to 
deploy to more kinetic areas to coordinate with the military to 
"criminalize the insurgency."  The UK is also funding construction 
of an NDS detention facility. 
 
Comment 
---- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Over the medium term, informal justice mechanisms in 
Helmand will continue to play a vital role in resolving minor 
criminal disputes.  If, by virtue of District Governor and CC 
participation, PRSs and JSCs are seen by Afghans as GIRoA processes 
(as we believe they are), these informal mechanisms can be viable 
alternatives to insurgent justice, and will allow GIRoA to compete 
directly with the Taliban in the justice sector.  We must be 
careful, however, not to support the development of the informal 
justice sector in ways that contravene Afghan law or undermine the 
formal sector; to this end, we should continue our efforts to 
facilitate the placement of prosecutors at the district level and 
build up formal mechanisms with an aim to transitioning from 
informal to formal processes when possible.  While corruption, 
insecurity, and underdeveloped law enforcement remain impediments to 
the advancement of the rule of law, targeted use of informal 
mechanisms can begin to erode the Taliban grip on justice delivery 
in Helmand's districts.  With proper mentoring and facilitation, 
facilitation of GIRoA prosecutors at the district level in Helmand 
shows considerable promise in providing an alternative to Taliban 
justice. 
 
EIKENBERRY