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Viewing cable 09KABUL3854, MIXED INITIAL REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT OBAMA'S

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09KABUL3854 2009-12-02 16:45 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Kabul
VZCZCXRO5509
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3854/01 3361645
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 021645Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3693
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003854 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM AF
SUBJECT: MIXED INITIAL REACTIONS TO PRESIDENT OBAMA'S 
AFGHANISTAN STRATEGY SPEECH 
 
1.  (U) Summary:  President Obama's Afghanistan strategy 
speech aired early the morning of December 2 in Kabul, 
leaving Afghan politicians, political analysts, and 
government officials the day to both praise and criticize the 
President's strategy.  While some commentators praised 
Obama's renewed focus on Afghanistan, others questioned 
whether the strategy was any different from what they had 
seen in the past.  Similarly, some praised Obama's resolve to 
begin removing troops in 2011, while voicing concern that the 
announcement of a timeframe was premature.  Most analysts 
lauded the President's inclusion of Pakistan in his strategy, 
but questioned that country's resolve to eradicate terrorism 
within its own borders.  End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
The Same Ol' Strategy? 
---------------------- 
 
2.  (U) During a December 2 roundtable discussion at the 
Afghan Government Media and Information Center (GMIC), 
political analysts praised President Obama's renewed focus on 
Afghanistan.  Kabul University Professor Ahmad Zia Rafhat 
told journalists he is optimistic that, after eight years, 
the international community has a better understanding of 
Afghanistan and will employ lessons learned from past 
mistakes.  Daoud Muradian, Director of the Foreign Ministry's 
Strategic Studies Office, called Obama's emphasis of 
Afghanization "a very good point" and commented favorably on 
the international community's realization that terrorist safe 
havens lie across the border" in Pakistan. 
 
3.  (U) However, other analysts saw little new in President 
Obama's strategy and questioned whether the United States 
possesses the resolve to win in Afghanistan.  Although Kabul 
University Professor Stanekzai assessed the strategy 
positively in the GMIC discussion, in a separate interview 
with Radio Azadi, he criticized the international community 
for its lack of coordination in their activities and strategy 
over the past eight years.  Karzai supporter MP Shukria 
Barakzai questioned the expectation that Afghans will assume 
security responsibility in two years, commenting during a 
Tolo TV roundtable aired the same day that the United States 
and the international community had not trained and equipped 
the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) over the past 
eight years.  Also at the GMIC event, a journalist from 
Bakhtar News Agency questioned whether the United States 
would now choose to sufficiently equip the Afghan Army when, 
over the last eight years, they had been given barely any 
equipment "besides three broken planes." 
 
---------------------------------- 
Transferring Power Or Pulling Out? 
---------------------------------- 
 
4.  (U) Some political pundits interpreted our summer 2011 
time line to begin withdrawing our combat troops as part of 
our strategy to build Afghan capacity and then transfer 
security leadership to the rightful owners - the Afghans. 
Referencing the goal to begin decreasing combat forces in 
2011, Professor Stanekzai reassured the GMIC audience that 
the United States "is not here to occupy Afghanistan." 
Professor Ahmad Zia Rafhat told the journalists that while 
discussing a troop increase and exit strategy simultaneously 
may sound paradoxical, it in fact impresses upon senior 
Afghan government officials that they need to be prepared to 
take more responsibility quickly.  He stated confidently that 
while one to two years is insufficient time to end terrorism, 
it should be enough to root out Al-Qaeda and weaken the 
Taliban.  UNAMA Spokesperson Nelab Mobarez, among others, 
emphasized the importance of strengthening the Afghan 
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) in order 
to successfully transfer security responsibility in 2011. 
Some analysts also stressed the need for improved governance 
and more efficient reconstruction to ensure a smooth transfer 
of responsibility. 
 
5.  (U) Other Afghans viewed the 2011 timeline as evidence of 
our unwillingness to commit long-term to Afghanistan.  Former 
Deputy Defense Minister General Attequllah Baryali told Radio 
VOA Dari that setting a timeline for troop withdrawal will 
cause Afghans to worry the United States is not truly 
committed to the country, comparing the situation to when the 
Soviet Union withdrew and Afghanistan collapsed into civil 
war.  He also worried that sufficiently building ANSF 
capacity could take 5-10 years, not 18 months.  A journalism 
student from the American University in Afghanistan (AUAF) 
warned that setting an 18-month timeline would embolden 
insurgents. 
 
----------------------- 
 
KABUL 00003854  002 OF 002 
 
 
Afghanistan's Neighbors 
----------------------- 
 
6.  (U) Most political commentators and analysts emphasized 
the important role Afghanistan's neighbors play in securing 
the country.  MP Dawood Sultanzai told Tolo TV that the new 
strategy will fail unless the international community takes 
Afghanistan's neighbors into serious account.  In the GMIC 
meeting, Professor Stanekzai stipulated that "America must 
assert pressure on Pakistan," while MFA official Muradian 
praised President Obama and Gordon Brown for "pointing out 
that Taliban leadership now resides in Pakistan." 
 
7.  (U) While analysts were pleased to see President Obama's 
continued emphasis on Pakistan, many were skeptical that 
Pakistan would do its part in eradicating terrorism within 
its borders.  At the GMIC event, Professor Stanekzai told 
journalists it would be a big achievement "if Pakistan 
focused on itself," but then qualified his statement by 
saying "it is no doubt that Pakistan will never want 
stability in Afghanistan".  At the same event, an AUAF 
student questioned why the United States "is sending 30,000 
new troops to Afghanistan and only money to Pakistan, despite 
acknowledging that the terrorists are in Pakistan." 
Eikenberry