VZCZCXRO4843
RR RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #3845/01 3360637
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 020637Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3675
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KABUL 003845 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, EUR/RPM 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
USFOR-A FOR POLAD 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KDEM PGOV PTER AF
 
SUBJECT:  Ghor: More Development could Prevent Insurgent Threats 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Located in central RC-West, the province of Ghor 
is one of the most isolated and underdeveloped in Afghanistan. 
While not at the center of the insurgency, Ghor suffers from the 
influence of warlords, transient youth who mingle with the 
insurgency in bordering provinces, and lack of capacity.  If not 
addressed now these issues could create a void easily filled by the 
insurgency.   Its current stable security situation makes Ghor a 
good candidate for more innovative assistance programs that will 
build a sustainable future for the province.  END SUMMARY. 
 
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Introduction 
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¶2.  (U) Ghor is an underdeveloped, mountainous, rural province that 
is relatively stable and secure, boasting a mainly Tajik population 
estimated between 600,000 and 800,000. Illiteracy runs at roughly 80 
percent, with the same percentage of the population engaged in 
agriculture, farming and animal husbandry. The absence of paved 
roads increases Ghor's isolation, especially in winter.  Electricity 
in Ghor is limited to four hours a day in the capital of 
Chaghcharan.  Several dozen villages are the beneficiaries of 
micro-hydro projects constructed by the National Solidarity Program 
(NSP) along with the Lithuanian and Icelandic governments. 
 
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Ghor Stable for Now 
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¶3.  (SBU) Ghor's current stability should not be taken for granted. 
Locals attribute the situation and easing of tribal conflicts since 
2005 to the establishment of the PRT and its regular patrols.  Prior 
to 2005, however, armed conflicts between Ghor's three main warlords 
caused the governor's office to change hands four times in two 
years.  In June 2004, local commander Salaam Khan attacked 
Chaghcharan and removed Governor Ibrahim Malekzada and ANA Commander 
General Ahmen Khan Morghabi.  The fighting left almost 20 residents 
of Chaghcharan dead.  These three warlords, who still hold sway in 
their respective regions, profess to support the Government of 
Afghanistan, though it appears this support is contingent on the 
Government's continued non-interference in their local affairs. 
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Current U.S. Assistance to Ghor 
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¶4.  (SBU)  Since 2002, USAID has spent USD 27.03 million in Ghor and 
the U.S. military (mainly building ANP headquarters throughout the 
province) about USD 10 million.  USAID funds have been disbursed 
mainly in agriculture (USD 2.07 Million), alternative development 
(USD 2.35 Million), education (USD 1.51 Million), health (USD 6.14 
Million), PRT (USD 6.17 Million), democracy and governance (USD 8.06 
Million) economic growth (USD 0.24 Million), and program development 
(USD 0.49 Million). 
 
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Innovative Programs Are Needed 
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¶5.  (SBU) Increased development activities in Ghor will build the 
government's capacity; help it penetrate the districts and help 
break the province's isolation.  Areas with potential for increased 
development include the following: 
 
  -- Alternative Livelihood, Agriculture and Livestock Management: 
While Ghor is deemed a "poppy-free province", as recently as 2004 it 
was the fourth largest poppy producer in Afghanistan.  Over 85 
percent of Ghoris make their living in agriculture and livestock, 
but the U.S. has no projects operating to support these areas. 
Ghor's Directorate of Agriculture, Irrigation and Labor (DAIL) has 
been leaderless for the past year and has no capacity or budget to 
provide technical assistance to farmers.  We request an agriculture 
program to be expanded to Ghor such as USAID's Incentives Driving 
Economic Alternatives North, East, West (IDEA NEW) to provide a 
solid livelihood plan for farmers to avoid poppy cultivation 
[Comment:  Poppy cultivation dropped off due more to market forces 
than to efforts by the Government of Afghanistan. End Comment] 
Technical support in farming, alternative livelihood, livestock 
management training, and establishment of small veterinary clinics 
at the district level and development of mobile clinics are also 
needed. 
 
  -- Local Economic Development:  The overstretched Line Directorate 
of Economy (LDoEc) currently has no local development plan to 
promote economic growth in Ghor.  The Afghan Small and Medium 
Enterprise Development program (ASMED) traveled to Chaghcharan for 
discussions with local officials who work closely with the DOE. 
ASMED can be more effective if properly staged to provide business 
 
KABUL 00003845  002 OF 002 
 
 
development and tools to small enterprises to promote local economic 
growth.  We believe an ASMED program providing technical assistance 
to help the LDoEc craft a five year economic development plan is an 
essential initial step.   We would also encourage assistance in 
establishing a processing center to wash, dry, and cut camel wool 
rugs.  There is a tremendous potential to produce camel wool rugs 
for export to neighboring provinces. 
 
  -- Youth Development:  A prospective concept by USAID to create a 
youth development program appears to be concentrating on the south 
and east rather than the north and west.  Programs to engage the 
youth of Ghor are needed because many uneducated and unemployed 
youth travel to the bordering provinces of Herat, Farah and Helmand 
for work where they face the prospect of being recruited into the 
insurgency.  It is estimated that 10 percent of the poppy labor 
force - an estimated 34,000 young men of ages 16 to 25 - comes from 
Ghor to work on poppy fields in Helmand and Kandahar.  This seasonal 
employment lasts for about two months, during which they could make 
about USD 10 per day, or USD 420 over the harvest season, according 
to UN figures. 
 
  -- Energy:  Ghor's electricity is limited to four hours a day in 
Chaghcharan and in roughly 30 villages that benefit from micro-hydro 
projects along the Hari Rud river.  USAID's Afghan Clean Energy 
Program (ACEP) will soon begin in all provinces in Afghanistan. 
While this project will concentrate mainly to South and SE, we urge 
that proper attention be given to Ghor due to its desperate need for 
energy. 
 
  -- Infrastructure:  Ghor's highest priority large infrastructure 
project need is a paved road to Herat.  Herat serves as Ghor's 
lifeline, providing Ghor with access to markets, health care and 
education.  A road would link youth to vocational training schools 
to learn new trades.  While the Lithuanians are paving the city 
streets of Chaghcharan and the Japanese are building schools, this 
signature infrastructure project would be a "game changer" in Ghor's 
development. 
 
¶6. (U) USG civilians working at Ghor's non-US led PRT need a 
flexible mechanism to take advantage of targets of opportunity.  We 
have little access to US military CERP funds and coalition partners' 
funding and flexibility to respond on short notice is limited.  The 
PRT has requested quick reaction funds (QRF) controlled by USG 
civilians allowing a quick response to: 1) urgent needs which do not 
fit into any USAID or other donor's program, and 2) requests for 
support for high priority projects in the Provincial Development 
Plan (PDP) not funded by others.  For example, USAID has donated 
almost one million books for schools in Ghor but due to lack of 
funds for distribution, it took over four months to deliver the 
books to the district level.  In addition, the Department of Water 
and Irrigation has been looking for funding for three projects in 
the PDP that cost only USD 3500 each, yet cannot get donor funding. 
(Comment: A QRF could quickly and efficiently address some, though 
not all, of these types of requests, strengthening support for the 
local government and providing much needed assistance.  The Embassy 
plans to launch its QRF in early 2009.  End Comment.) 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Comment: The USD 27.03 Million in USAID funding Ghor 
received between 2002 and April 2009, is small compared to roughly 
USD 237.3 Million received by neighboring Herat Province in the same 
period.  Ghor would be unable to absorb a huge aid increase.  With 
some additional funding, however, there is an opportunity to build 
sustainable stability in an area not yet under pressure from the 
insurgency.  Local officials often half-joke that they would attract 
more assistance if somebody showered Chaghcharan with rockets. 
Without increased development and good governance this province 
could fall into the wrong hands and would likely experience many of 
the same problems it had before we arrived.  End comment.