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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ISTANBUL 000456 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OSCE PGOV PHUM PREL TU
SUBJECT: ALEVIS WITHOUT A PARTY 
 
REF: A. 08 ANKARA 1599 
     ¶B. 08 ANKARA 1696 
 
ISTANBUL 00000456  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  The definition of Turkish Alevism varies 
greatly, as do the cultural and political objectives of the 
rainbow of Alevi organizations in the country.  Three 
significant Alevi organizations/federations share only two 
demands: official GOT recognition of Alevi places of worship 
("cem evler") and the abolition of compulsory religion 
courses. The same organizations do not have a common 
definition for their own religion, much less their political 
perspectives. In light of the recent uptick in perceived 
nationalistic statements by members of the traditional Alevi 
fallback party - the Republican People's Party (CHP) - the 
political community is closely watching how the 10 - 20 
million Alevis choose to use their votes, if not with CHP. 
The search is on for a suitable bride for the diverse Alevi 
community's rather schizophrenic groom. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) An estimated 10-20 million Alevis live in Turkey but 
their definition of Alevism varies widely. Turkish Alevism is 
commonly characterized by Turkish Sunni Muslims as a 
heterodox Muslim faith, more closely aligned with Shiism than 
Sunnism. However, some Alevi groups, namely those belonging 
to the five associations of the umbrella Alevi Bektasi 
Federation, consider Alevism to be a religion independent of 
Islam.  According to Federation Vice President Ali Kenanoglu, 
Alevis do not consult just one book as a guide for life and 
instead follow a general ideology outlined by Bektas Veli of 
the 13th century. While the Koran is "holy" to Alevis, so are 
many other texts and works, Kenanoglu noted.  Conversely, two 
other prominent Alevi groups, the Cem Foundation (Vakfi) and 
Ehli-Beyt Foundation (Vakfi) -- distinct from one another and 
not under the Bektasi Federation's umbrella -- consider 
Alevism to be a third branch of Islam, separate from Sunnism 
and Shiism.  Of the three organizations, the Cem Foundation 
and Alevi Bektasi Federation have relatively strong ties with 
one another, neither has ties with the Ehli-Beyt Foundation. 
Conversely, the Alevi Bektasi Federation considers the 
Ehli-Beyt Foundation to be a "Shia establishment, which is in 
bed with the AKP and receives support from Iran."  No other 
Alevi organizations with which poloffs have met had favorable 
views of the Ehli-Beyt Foundation, and other than those 
organizations under the umbrella of the Bektasi Federation, 
few work together on mutual interests. 
 
Reactions to the AKP 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (U) At the Justice and Development Party (AKP)'s annual 
winter meeting in Kizilcahamam, PM Erdogan voiced his support 
for Turkey's Alevi community, perhaps as a reaction to a main 
opposition party (CHP) deputy who made contentious comments 
regarding a government attack on the Alevi/Kurdish city of 
Dersim (now Tunceli) during a revolt in 1938. Erdogan also 
stressed the importance of all ethnic groups in Turkey, 
stating once again that the AKP is against religious, ethnic 
and regional nationalism. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In 2008, the AKP began a series of Alevi workshops 
intended to provide a platform from which the GOT could 
address the problems of the Alevi population.  Viewing these 
platforms as useless, all Alevi organizations except for the 
Ehli-Beyt Foundation have chosen not to participate in the 
bimonthly gatherings. Kenanoglu said that members of the 
Alevi Bektasi Federation considered the workshops to be an 
insult when so many other more substantial demands-such as 
official recognition of Alevi places of worship ("cem evler") 
and abolishing compulsory religious courses--are left 
unaddressed.  For this reason, he said, the Federation 
organized a march in Istanbul on November 8th in which 
300,000 Alevis and sympathetic "leftist Sunnis" participated. 
  According to Kenanoglu, members of the Alevi Bektasi 
Federation would never vote for the AKP for fear that its 
ultimate goal is the imposition of Sharia law.  Alevis would 
instead continue voting for CHP until a viable left of center 
party appeared, he said.  (Note: Alevis in general have 
tended to vote for leftist parties since the 1960s, attracted 
by secular policies that they believe would keep Sunni 
Islamic values out of politics. End Note.) 
 
¶5. (SBU) On November 6, President Gul visited the central 
province of Tunceli, where he also attended a cem evi service 
in an effort to reach out to Tunceli's largely Alevi Kurdish 
population.  Gul extended an invitation to the Cem 
Foundation's Dogan, who told us he "didn't want to refuse." 
While there, Dogan - whose mother's family settled in Tunceli 
 
ISTANBUL 00000456  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
"over 1000 years ago" - gave the opening lecture to the local 
university about EU accession and Turkey with a sprinkling of 
Alevi lore from the region. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Ehli-Beyt's close relationship with AKP was apparent 
with Altun's very public meeting with President Gul on 
November 11th. Additionally, several leading members of the 
Ehli-Beyt Foundation are AKP representatives on the Istanbul 
municipal board.  Altun contended he is the only Alevi leader 
with whom the government will meet because he is the only 
true representative of Turkish Alevis, having established the 
first Alevi foundation in the 1960s.  (Comment: Gul's 
invitation to Dogan would appear to counter Altun's 
assertion. End Comment.) 
 
Dersim and the Cost to CHP 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7. (U) Alevi members of the CHP have been defecting from the 
party in increasing numbers following Deputy Chairman Onur 
Oymen's comparison of the Dersim massacres of 1938 to the 
struggle against the PKK.  The defections have been most 
striking in the province of Tunceli (previously known as 
Dersim), where 300 CHP Members -- including the mayors of the 
sub-provinces of Pulumur, Nazmiye, and Ovacik -- resigned as 
part of a mass demonstration.  Although Tunceli is Turkey's 
least populous province, its population contains a relatively 
high percentage of Alevis, Kurds and Armenians.  It 
traditionally bucks national trends, electing unusually high 
numbers of independents and leftists to prominent offices. 
Many newspapers, including Radikal, Zaman, and Taraf, are 
speculating that CHP's unwillingness to disown Oymen's 
statements will cost them Alevi votes in national elections 
to be held no later than 2011. 
 
Alternatives to CHP? 
-------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Kenanoglu said that Alevis have no other option than 
to stick with CHP, even after Oymen's fumble, because they 
certainly would never vote for AKP. However, a late November 
interview with the Federation's president in daily Milliyet 
charted the potential of a new leftist party created by the 
Federation and various labor unions as an alternative to the 
CHP by January 2010. Cem Foundation's Dogan suggested that 
the newly re-founded Demokrat Partisi (DP) would attract some 
Alevis from CHP and may garner as much as 15 to 20 percent of 
the popular vote in 2011. Altun, on the other hand, sees no 
incompatibility with Alevism and the AKP and dismisses the 
CHP as a party past its prime. None of the three Alevi groups 
suggested Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul's Turkish Change 
Movement (TDH) as an alternative to the CHP.  Kenanoglu 
instead decried Sarigul's stance as "two-faced and 
hypocritical." He contended that because Sarigul publicly 
supports all religions in Sisli but has yet to appoint an 
Alevi to his staff, Alevis in Sisli did not vote for him in 
the last municipal elections. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Comment: For now, the Alevis constitute a 
secularist-oriented, liberal constituency that remains 
disenchanted with Turkey's choice of political parties and 
that may be up for grabs in the run-up to the next election. 
By failing to unite under a single banner with a common 
strategy, however, the disparate Alevi community appears 
incapable of mustering significant political capital. 
Indeed, because the Alevis are so disparate and 
uncoordinated, Turkish political parties may continue to 
judge that specific campaign promises and outreach to Alevis 
beyond general lip service are not worth the risk of 
alienating other, more coordinated constituencies in Turkey's 
polarized political arena.  End Comment. 
 
WIENER