VZCZCXYZ0036
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUB #0755/01 3521839
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181839Z DEC 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5024
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RULSJGA/COMDT COGARD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCA/COMLANTAREA COGARD PORTSMOUTH VA PRIORITY 0144
RHEFHLC/HQ DHS WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/MARINCEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/NAVSTA GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVINTELOFC GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DIRJIATF SOUTH J2 PRIORITY

S E C R E T HAVANA 000755 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2029 
TAGS: SNAR PREL SMIG PGOV CU ASEC
SUBJECT: CUBAN BORDER GUARD'S FEATHERS RUFFLED BY USCG 
RESCUE 
 
Classified By: COM JONATHAN FARRAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Drug 
Interdiction Specialist (DIS) assigned to the U.S. Interests 
Section (USINT) in Havana, Cuba attended a 10 December 2009 
meeting with the Cuban Ministry of Interior's (MININT) 
International Relations Directorate (DRIC) and Border Guard 
(CBG).  The subject of the meeting was a 3 December 2009 
rescue by the USCG of 3 American citizens whose sailing 
vessel (S/V) inadvertently entered Cuban territorial seas 
(TTS) and struck a reef, causing damage to the vessel, and 
creating an imminently dangerous situation for the crew 
onboard.  The meeting also addressed the supposed incursion 
of a USCG aircraft into Cuban airspace during a routine 
patrol.  During the meeting, Cuban officials alleged that the 
USCG had violated Cuban airspace.  The meeting between the 
DIS and Cuba's MININT came at a time of heightened tension in 
and around Havana.  The atmosphere was notably improved in a 
follow-up meeting with the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MINREX) on 17 December.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C/NF) On 10 December 2009, the USCG DIS assigned to 
USINT, attended a meeting with the Cuban MININT at a protocol 
house in Havana.  In attendance were the 2 MININT Directorate 
of International Relations (DRIC) "handlers" who coordinate 
the DIS's meetings with the Cuban Border Guard (CBG) and 
National Anti-Drug Directorate (DNA) personnel.  The total 
number of MININT officers in attendance was 5: 1 Colonel 
(COL) and 4 Lieutenant Colonels (LTCOL).  4 officers, 
including the COL, sat directly across the table from the DIS 
while one of the handlers sat immediately next to the DIS, as 
usual, and read his written notes.  All 5 officers were 
wearing uniforms and ribbons as they normally do when they 
want to appear more imposing and drive home their points. 
 
¶3. (S/NF) COL Samper (COL), who directs CBG's operations 
nation-wide, and is the DIS's primary conduit into the CBG 
when not speaking directly with CBG watchstanders, was the 
primary speaker during this meeting.  He was accompanied by a 
female LTCOL who has taken on more of an active role in CBG 
interactions with the DIS in the past 6 months.  The other 
LTCOL, who the DIS believes directs the MININT's 
international relations division (he rarely attends meetings, 
but is normally visible when DIS is around/working with 
MININT elements), played the role of the second heavy-handed 
speaker who delivered the follow-up to COL Samper's comments. 
 
¶4. (S/NF) COL Samper's 20-minute commentary elaborated on the 
Diplomatic Note received in both Washington, DC and Havana 
earlier this week, protesting the USCG's "gross violation" of 
 Cuban territorial seas (TTS) and airspace, on 3 and 4 
December respectively.  Focusing primarily on the COLUMBINE 
incident, he gave a chronological run-down of the DIS's 
communications with the CBG command center.  He repeatedly 
referred to the entry as "inexcusable, inadmissible, a 
violation without authorization," and repeated much of the 
same language contained in the Diplomatic Note.  The COL 
angrily asserted that throughout the duration of the 
incident, a CBG vessel was standing by to assist the mariners 
onboard the COLUMBINE, the mariners spoke Spanish and were 
able to communicate with the CBG crew.  The latter, he 
alleged, made numerous offers of assistance, and told the 
COLUMBINE crew that a rescue & salvage vessel was enroute to 
assist.  The Colonel asserted that the COLUMBINE was never in 
any imminent danger, and he expressed disbelief that the 
crewmember was suffering from chest pain. 
 
¶5. (S/NF) While the COL's entire commentary was heated and 
extremely pointed, he became visibly and verbally more 
emotional when he brought up the issue of the time the USCG 
took to recover cargo from the S/V and the water after the 
USCG had already pulled the 3 mariners onboard 2 USCG rescue 
vessels.  DIS estimates that this act led the GOC/MININT/CBG 
to question whether or not USCG crews were trying to cover 
something up throughout the rescue phase of the case. 
 
¶6. (S/NF) Following COL Samper's comments, the LTCOL 
(presumably the head of  MININT's DRIC) began to calmly 
explain that he was not going to repeat the COL's comments, 
but did want to underscore additional points.  He likened the 
supposed USCG HC-130 incursion on 4 December 2009 to the 
"incident on February 24th, 1996," (referencing the Brothers 
to the Rescue shoot-down case).  Turning his attention to the 
COLUMBINE incident, he reiterated that the entry of both USCG 
"auxiliary vessels" was a gross violation of Cuban 
sovereignty, and challenged the USG to look at this issue "as 
if the tables were turned."  If Cuban assets had entered U.S. 
TTS, he forcefully stressed, the USG would be equally upset 
and angry.  He then asked why the USCG decided to violate 
Cuban TTS when we (CBG) and the USCG (specifically USCG 
District Seven in Miami) have worked similar cases in the 
past, in which the  Cubans have provided quick and capable 
assistance. 
 
¶7. (S/NF) The LTCOL's commentary became more and more 
adversarial as he continued to speak, but he stuck to the 
"command message" that both he and the COL relayed at various 
points during the meeting:  "The United States Government 
owes the Government of Cuba an explanation as to why it took 
the actions it did, and what measures we plan to prevent this 
kind of violation from occurring again." 
 
¶8. (S/NF) In tag-team fashion, towards the end of the 
meeting, the COL and LTCOL asked for clarification on the 
role of the USCG DIS in Cuba, and questioned whether the DIS 
has the necessary influence with his bosses at USCG District 
Seven to mitigate these kinds of incidents.  Both MININT 
officers seemed to be saying that as the USCG's designated 
liaison to Havana, the DIS should be able to prevent these 
kinds of "violations" by informing his headquarters in Miami. 
 
¶9. (S/NF) DIS informed the group of officers that he was not 
going to make any comments.  Instead, he assured them he 
would take all of the information that they passed and 
forward it to USINT and District Seven, as well as ensure 
that our response Diplomatic Note address the issues they 
raised.  Moreover, the DIS assured everyone in attendance 
that there was no contraband in the bags recovered from the 
S/V, and they were only the crew's personal belongings. 
 
¶10. (S/NF) The meeting closed when the COL showed the DIS a 
list of the items recovered from the S/V COLUMBINE, making 
sure to point out the length of the list (100  items) that 
included radar and radios.  He was adamant that each item was 
dry and in good condition when it was recovered.  He then 
showed the DIS 3 photos of COLUMBINE, "the day after the 
incident," in good condition, with a Cuban salvage operator 
climbing its mast.  In the photos, the vessel is listing 
approximately 20-30 degrees, and looks to be high and dry out 
of the water (assuming low-tide).  One of the color photos 
depicted the name of the vessel (of note was the COL's 
comment that "none of these photos has been doctored by Cuban 
officials").  When the DIS asked the COL if his office could 
send the DIS copies of the photos via email, he stated "we 
have the photos and all the other information, but we're not 
sending anything."  That concluded the meeting. 
 
¶11. (S/NF) Observations: 10 December is International Human 
Rights Day.  There was undoubtedly a lot of tension in Havana 
as there were numerous crackdowns on peaceful human rights 
marchers as well as on one British Diplomat who was passively 
observing the protests as part of his work portfolio. 
Besides MININT's follow-up to the go-fast "hijacking" case 
prior to the Migration Talks in July 2009, this was the most 
heated meeting the DIS has had since his arrival in-country. 
Both officers were doing their best to make a point, angrily, 
but the DIS gauges that both were genuinely upset. 
 
 
¶12. (S/NF) Comment:  While the relationship that exists 
between the USCG and Cuba's MININT, specifically the CBG and 
DNA, is generally viewed as one of the more fruitful and 
positive USG-GOC interactions, this relationship is by no 
means immune to the periodic bursts of anger at the U.S. by 
the GOC.  Separately, Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MINREX) representative, Armando Bencomo, took a softer line 
and opined that the case demonstrates that both the U.S. and 
Cuba could stand to improve the flow of information between 
both sides.  The DIS gauges confidently that MINREX, via 
MININT, is attempting to elicit a response from the USG in 
order to maximize its interaction with USINT and the USG writ 
large.  The DIS accompanied the Chief of Mission to a meeting 
at MINREX on 17 December to present the USG response to the 
GOC Diplomatic Note on this issue.  The tone of that meeting 
was much more calm as the MINREX side appeared to take well 
the news that the USCG was reviewing the incident and 
information would be forthcoming. 
FARRAR