VZCZCXRO5716
PP RUEHIK
DE RUEHUB #0738/01 3481749
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141749Z DEC 09
FM USINT HAVANA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4990
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUCOWCV/CCGDSEVEN MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCOGCA/COMNAVBASE GUANTANAMO BAY CU PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCE/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 000738 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CCA AND WHA/PD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV CU
SUBJECT: WHY ALL THE FUSS ABOUT THE "CUBAN FIVE"? 
 
REF: A. HAVANA 592 ("GOC SIGNALS READINESS TO MOVE 
        FORWARD") 
     ¶B. HAVANA 721 ("MILITARY EXERCISES FAIL TO ROUSE 
        CUBANS") 
     ¶C. HAVANA 594 (CUBA CHAMPIONS HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
        DEMOCRACY IN HONDURAS) 
 
HAVANA 00000738  001.3 OF 002 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Despite mammoth efforts by the GOC in pressing the 
case of the five Cuban and Cuban-American spies in U.S. 
jails, most Cubans don't really know or even care about their 
fate.  The spies' value to the GOC is mostly for propaganda 
and, domestically at least, it has not returned the huge 
investment that the government has staked in the case. 
 
CUBAN FIVE EVERYWHERE YOU GO 
---------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The lengths to which the Cuban Government (GOC) has 
gone in making a public issue of the five Cubans and 
Cuban-Americans convicted in 2001 for spying in the United 
States are significant.  The "Cuban Five" (also known in 
Havana as the "Five Heroes") are omnipresent on the island: 
on the covers of all newspapers, on billboards and walls in 
the streets, on the radio and TV, on every government 
reception hall, in cultural and academic centers, and in all 
schools, including the Latin American School of Medicine 
sitting room where WHA DAS Williams met with American 
students (Ref A). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Former President Fidel Castro has written several 
Reflections about the Five, while brother and current 
President Raul attended the funeral of the mother of one of 
the spies last month.  National Assembly President Ricardo 
Alarcon has serialized no less than 14 episodes, and still 
counting, on the court proceedings of the Five.  Cuban 
students, a father of one told us, are made to write essays 
about the Five in grade school. 
 
PRESSING THE CASE INTERNATIONALLY 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) Cuba has also unleashed a tenacious international 
campaign.  The GOC has engineered or successfully lobbied for 
international petitions and demonstrations on behalf of the 
Five, and even got Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos to meet 
with wives of the Five in Madrid last November.  EU 
Cooperation Commissioner Karel de Gucht went as far to state 
that he saw an "obvious link" between the release of the Five 
in the United States and of the hundreds of prisoners of 
conscience that the GOC holds.  Indeed, the GOC has publicly 
stated that it would be willing to consider releasing 
political prisoners if the Five are "returned" (two of the 
five spies are American citizens). 
 
GENERAL INDIFFERENCE TO THE FIVE IN CUBA 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Despite the unrelenting domestic and international 
campaign on behalf of its "Five Heroes," Cubans appear mostly 
indifferent to their fate.  "Oh, God, I can't stand it, 
everywhere you turn, it's the Five this and the Five that," 
the wife of a noted jailed dissident told us.  But when 
Polcouns asked her to name them, she couldn't.  In fact, 
USINT officers have asked several dozen  Cubans at random to 
name the Five and no one has been able to name even four of 
them.  "Jose... Roberto, or is it Ramon?... I don't know, I 
don't get involved in politics," a medical technician told 
PolCouns, before giving up.  "Hell if I know, who are these 
people anyway?" a bookseller of revolutionary materials in 
Old Havana told us.  Ironically, the only person in Cuba who 
knew the names of all the spies was an activist for prisoners 
of conscience in Cuba.  "But I have to know! My whole life 
revolves around people in jail," he replied with a smile. 
 
AS A RALLYING CRY THE FIVE ARE NO ELIAN 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Most observers in Cuba believe that the GOC's 
campaign is primarily aimed to motivate people on the island 
 
HAVANA 00000738  002.3 OF 002 
 
 
to rally behind the government.  "They want to make this into 
another Elian," a contact told us, in reference to the 1999 
campaign to seek the return from the United States of a child 
who was the sole survivor of an escape by raft from Cuba. 
"But it's not catching on."  As a dissident political 
observer explained, the level of mass participation in Cuba 
has fallen dramatically, and most people are exhausted of 
political mongering.  Like the military exercises to prepare 
against a U.S. invasion (Ref B), the "outcry" over elections 
in Honduras (Ref C) and countless other manufactured 
campaigns, GOC efforts to energize an apathetic populace seem 
to be failing. 
 
A PROPAGANDA FAILURE 
-------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) The GOC, it seems, has seen scant return on its 
massive investment in trying to raise the profile of the five 
spies.  Many international partners have obliged, but their 
public support is as much for domestic audiences in Cuba as 
for the international community. "Nobody cares outside Cuba, 
and it's important to (the GOC), so why not?" was how an EU 
diplomat explained his Foreign Minister's public solidarity 
with the Five.  Some in Cuba, perhaps their former handlers 
or colleagues, may truly care about the fate of the Five, but 
it seems clear that the main value of the spies to the GOC is 
as a propaganda tool for Cubans on the island.  In that 
sense, it has been a failure.  Even it the Cuban government 
were to successfully position the Five as bargaining chips 
for prisoner exchanges, it would gain little more than the 
minor "vindication" of seeing its political prisoners equated 
with spies. 
FARRAR