VZCZCXRO7591
PP RUEHLN RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHDBU #1364/01 3381137
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041137Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0999
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0330
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0121
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0006
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0007
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE 2118

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 DUSHANBE 001364 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SCA/CEN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ENRG PREL ECON PGOV TI
SUBJECT: MESSY DIVORCE AS UZBEKS PULL OUT OF ENERGY RELATIONSHIP WITH 
TAJIKISTAN 
 
REF: A. DUSHANBE 1348 
     ¶B. TASHKENT 1904 
     ¶C. DUSHANBE 251 
     ¶D. DUSHANBE 1215 
     ¶E. DUSHANBE 712 
 
DUSHANBE 00001364  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  As of December 1, Uzbekistan has withdrawn 
from the unitary Central Asian power grid, precipitating an 
acrimonious war of words with Tajikistan.  Dushanbe responded by 
promising to hold back as much water as possible from rivers 
feeding downstream Uzbekistan, saying it needed the water to 
generate hydroelectric power lost by the Uzbek pullout. 
President Rahmon convened an extraordinary meeting of 
international donors to request their assistance and to blast 
Tashkent over the power issue (Ref A).  The Uzbek Embassy held a 
packed press conference to air its views, stating somewhat 
implausibly that the action was not directed against Tajikistan. 
 Tajik authorities countered with their own press conference 
hammering Tashkent.  Meanwhile, President Rahmon "recommended" 
that Tajik citizens "volunteer" a portion of their salary to 
help pay for construction of the huge Roghun hydroelectric power 
station, which the government sees as its salvation. 
Post-independence relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 
have never been smooth, but with the latest actions the 
relationship has become even more dysfunctional.  End summary. 
 
UZBEKS CALL FOR A SEPARATION 
 
¶2. (SBU) On December 1, Uzbekistan officially withdrew from the 
Central Asian United Energy System, the Soviet-built grid that 
has balanced regional power production and consumption and 
agricultural water use for four decades (ref B).  The system was 
designed so that when the upstream republics of Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan had a summer surplus of hydroelectric power, they 
would send power to the downstream republics of Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, and, to some extent, Kazakhstan.  In winter, coal- 
and gas-produced power would flow in the opposite direction.  At 
the same time, water flow was regulated to support agricultural 
production.  Since the Soviet Union collapsed, however, the 
independent Central Asian states have not made stable agreements 
on power and water use.  As the always tense relationship 
between the Tajik and Uzbek leadership has soured further, 
energy trade has become increasingly problematic.  Each of the 
past two winters Uzbekistan has delayed transmission of power to 
Tajikistan, making dubious excuses involving technical problems 
(ref C). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Rumors about Uzbekistan's intended withdrawal first 
emerged at the beginning of October, and were followed by a 
flurry of diplomatic correspondence between Dushanbe and 
Tashkent (ref D).  On November 7, Tajikistan's national electric 
company Barqi Tojik issued a press release announcing 
Uzbekistan's withdrawal and reassuring the Tajik public that it 
was taking all necessary steps to ensure "We will be able to 
come out of the situation on our own."  In subsequent statements 
the government said it would be forced to hold water back from 
Uzbekistan to generate more power -- a threat some viewed as 
feeble, since Tajikistan already refills its reservoirs 
annually.  Despite the brave words, it is clear that Tajik 
authorities are deeply rattled by Uzbekistan's withdrawal, which 
they see as a direct attack on Tajikistan.  On November 20, 
President Rahmon convened a meeting of international donors to 
discuss the energy situation, at which he delivered a screed 
against Uzbekistan and requested donor assistance to develop 
Tajikistan's energy infrastructure.  He provided more substance 
to earlier threats, explaining that the Tajiks would begin 
raising the dam at the planned Roghun hydropower station ahead 
of schedule; rather than powering Roghun, which was still many 
years away from completion, the water would be used to power the 
downstream Nurek hydropower station when its own reservoir ran 
low.  He said as well that the much smaller Qairaqqum hydropower 
station in the north would run all winter, leaving little water 
flow for the spring agricultural season (ref A). 
 
TAJIKS: WE'LL GET BY WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM OUR CITIZENS 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Tajik government appears to be banking on Roghun as 
its sole salvation.  Two weeks ago Dushanbe Mayor Ubaydullaev 
called upon all citizens to donate a month's salary to help fund 
construction of the dam.  Since then, media have reported how 
one group or another has contributed to the effort.  Last week, 
for example, teachers in Spitamen District announced that were 
 
DUSHANBE 00001364  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
handing over 20,000 somoni ($4,600) to help build Roghun.  Then 
residents of Ghonchi District who had been on the hajj in 2008 
said they were taking up a collection for Roghun, and called on 
hajjis across the country to do the same.  Not to be outdone, on 
December 2, President Rahmon noted some $600 million was needed 
to bring Roghun's first turbines into operation.  He said "every 
Tajik family, with the exception of vulnerable families, should 
purchase no less than 3,000 somoni ($700) worth of shares" in 
Roghun, which are reportedly going to be made available next 
year.  He added that wealthier Tajiks should spend much more. 
Rahmon played the nationalist card, emphasizing that Roghun 
would be wholly-owned from within Tajikistan, and no foreign 
power could control it.  Every Tajik family with shares in 
Roghun would be assured of a profitable return on their 
investment -- either by cashing in their shares, or enjoying 
dividends. 
 
UZBEKS EXPLAIN WITHDRAWAL METHOD 
 
¶5. (U) At a standing-room-only press conference at the Uzbek 
Embassy on November 23, Uzbek Ambassador to Tajikistan Shokasym 
Shoislamov officially confirmed that Uzbekistan was pulling out 
of the unified energy system, effective December 1.  Shoislamav, 
who read from a prepared statement, complained that there had 
been a good deal of misinformation about the pullout, which he 
said was not directed at Tajikistan or any other country, but 
was a logical step in building Uzbekistan's energy independence. 
 The unified system was appropriate for a unitary state but was 
not effective for independent countries, which relied on stable 
and organized power generation.  He said, for example, that a 
system crash at the Nurek hydropower station on November 9 was 
the result of inappropriately high consumption.  The crash 
knocked out power not only throughout most of Tajikistan, but in 
southern Uzbekistan as well, disrupting power exports to 
Afghanistan.  He said corruption in Tajikistan's energy sector 
was worrying.  He said a foreign embassy in Dushanbe, which he 
declined to name, had been told by inspectors from Barqi Tojik 
that if it provided illegal payoffs to the inspectors 
(presumably in lieu of official payments to the utility), the 
inspectors would make sure that its electricity stayed on. 
Finally, the Tajik part of the grid was rife with illegal 
tapping that reduced the flow of electricity throughout the 
system.  Shoislamov said Uzbekistan needed to insulate itself 
from such potential problems.  He noted that Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan already had withdrawn from the system in March 2009 
and July 2003, respectively.  The completion of the 
Guzar-Surkhan line linking the southern Uzbek grid with the rest 
of the country made it possible for Uzbekistan to go its own way 
as well. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Shoislamov professed surprise at Tajikistan's alarmed 
reaction to the Uzbek withdrawal.  He said Tajikistan had 
embarked on a series of new initiatives that had brought it 
closer to energy independence.  Noting that Tajikistan's annual 
energy deficit was some 4 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh), he said 
the completion of Sangtuda-1 alone would halve that amount. 
(Note: Sangtuda-1 is theoretically capable of producing 2.73 
billion kWh per year, but low winter water flows reduce actual 
generation.  End note.)  A number of other, smaller hydropower 
stations had also recently come online.  Finally, Shoislamov 
noted (and with a straight face) that President Rahmon's recent 
decree banning incandescent lightbulbs throughout Tajikistan 
(ref E) was supposed to save as much as 3 billion kWh annually. 
Together these initiatives not only met but surpassed the annual 
deficit.  Shoislamov said Uzbekistan would continue to supply 
electricity to Tajikistan's Sughd Oblast, which still had not 
been connected to the main grid in the southern part of the 
country.  According to the latest reports, however, the 
so-called South-North transmission line is now complete, 
possibly obviating this offer.  The Uzbek press conference was 
well-attended by international organizations and diplomatic 
representatives, in addition to the media.  A few foreign 
attendees expressed frustration that the ambassador refused to 
take questions; one called the meeting a waste of time. 
 
TAJIKS SAY THEY'LL KEEP THE ASSETS 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Tajik government called its own press conference 
the following day to respond to the Uzbek Embassy, but almost no 
foreign representatives attended.  Officials spoke mostly in 
Tajik rather than Russian, apparently to demonstrate adherence 
 
DUSHANBE 00001364  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
to the new language law.  Government officials began by noting 
the Uzbek Ambassador had refused to answer any questions at his 
press conference and assuring that the Tajik government, in 
contrast, would answer any questions posed.  In prepared 
statements they cited the "thousand-year" history of cooperation 
between the Tajik and Uzbek peoples, and said they would 
continue to work with Uzbekistan in that spirit of cooperation. 
They took umbrage, however, at the Uzbek ambassador's charges 
against Barqi Tojik for lack of professionalism, unauthorized 
energy losses, and other incidents. 
 
¶8. (U) Representatives from Barqi Tojik said although Uzbekistan 
claimed its withdrawal from the unified energy system would 
happen on December 1, it had in fact unilaterally withdrawn on 
October 30, 2009, at 4 a.m., without any prior notification 
provided to Tajikistan.  This statement appeared to belie the 
Uzbek claim that the November 9 power failure in Tajikistan 
disrupted the Uzbek electrical grid.  Barqi Tojik acknowledged 
owing $1 million to the Uzbek energy company, but said this was 
offset by a $3.5 million debt owed by Uzbekenergo to Barqi 
Tojik.  A separate $14 million debt owed by Tajikistan to 
Kazakhstan had already been resolved.  After the completion of 
the South-North transmission line, 70% of Sughd Oblast was now 
connected to the national grid, but the districts of Penjakent 
and Ayni remained isolated and must continue to receive power 
from Uzbekistan.  Resolving this issue would take longer than 
"two days," officials said. 
 
¶9. (U) According to Tajik officials, the real reason behind the 
Uzbek withdrawal from the unified grid is the desire to pressure 
Tajikistan to stop building Roghun.  One speaker said the Uzbeks 
were bent on doing whatever it took to harm Tajikistan, even if 
it also damaged Uzbekistan's own interests.  For its part, 
Tajikistan did not seek to harm Uzbekistan in return, but it 
would be forced to use all available water for energy 
production, thus endangering Uzbek agriculture.  The Tajiks 
emphasized that it was not their choice to divide the grid into 
separate national systems. 
 
OUTSIDE MEDIATION FAILS; CAN TAJIKS GO IT ALONE? 
 
¶10. (SBU) On November 25, USAID representatives met with Asian 
Development Bank energy specialists Roka Sanda and Levan 
Mtchelishvili, who said there were some overall risks to the 
electricity system in Tajikistan because it had never before 
operated as an "island," separated from the outside grid.  A 
failed substation could disrupt power for days or weeks.  They 
said the ADB was supporting a variety of energy infrastructure 
projects, including the 220 kV line from Sangtuda-1 to 
Afghanistan (ref D).  While Tajikistan hopes this will be 
completed by June 2010 (the ADB representatives thought it might 
slip a couple months), the Afghan side is not expected to finish 
its side until December, so regardless, energy is not likely to 
flow as soon as President Rahmon had hoped.  Sanda and 
Mtchelishvili denied Rahmon's insinuation that the ADB had 
withdrawn from the $1 billion CASA 1000 project at Uzbekistan's 
behest, saying the Bank's decision was entirely a financial one: 
the project is too expensive.  They believed the World Bank's 
support would dry up this year as well. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The ADB is completing its current project to 
restructure Barqi Tojik, and a new project is under review by 
the Presidential administration.  Barqi Tojik has been negative 
toward the plan, but the Ministry of Energy supports it.  The 
ADB believes the President will approve it by the end of this 
year.  Sanda and Mtchelishvili said future ADB funding would 
likely be contingent on the government's agreement to institute 
reforms, and they advocated that other international financial 
institutions (IFIs) require similar conditions.  After the 
plan's approval, the ADB plans to finance phase 2 of its Barqi 
Tojik project to fully implement the restructuring, perhaps 
through a management contract or a similar mechanism.  The ADB 
representatives suggested additional assistance was needed in 
energy regulatory reform and helping Tajikistan develop a 
strategy for infrastructure investment.  These areas are within 
the scope of a USAID regional energy project contract currently 
in procurement. 
 
THE CURRENT SITUATION: A ROUGH WINTER AHEAD? 
 
¶12. (U) According to the latest information, the water level at 
 
DUSHANBE 00001364  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
the Nurek reservoir, which is responsible for just under 75% of 
Tajikistan's entire energy production, stands at 901.8 meters 
above sea level.  This is 8.2 meters below the maximum water 
level, and 12 meters above the level at this time last year. 
The minimum water level, below which electricity cannot be 
generated without risk of damaging the turbines, is 856 meters 
above sea level.  Based on anticipated inflow and outflow levels 
(currently 209 and 521 cubic meters per second, respectively), 
officials have determined that Nurek levels must not decrease by 
more than 27 centimeters a day.  Rationing has been introduced 
throughout most of the country.  Although electricity is still 
supplied 24 hours a day in Dushanbe, significant voltage drops 
during peak periods in the morning and evening indicates that 
supply is not meeting demand. 
 
COMMENT: THEY'VE BEEN SLEEPING APART FOR A LONG TIME ANYWAY 
 
¶13. (SBU) Although some of the arguments on both sides hold 
water, it is difficult to see the Uzbek withdrawal and the Tajik 
response as anything other than an escalation in the continuing 
political clash between the two countries.  Energy independence 
is a worthwhile and understandable goal, but countries 
throughout the world trade power on an amicable basis, and, 
especially considering the history, infrastructure, and 
experience, there is no reason Tajikistan and Uzbekistan should 
not do the same.  Despite the harsh words and hasty actions, it 
is not clear how much the Uzbek withdrawal changes the status 
quo here.  Tajikistan experienced serious energy shortages with 
only intermittent supplies from Uzbekistan during the last two 
winters anyway, and Tajikistan has a limited ability to hoard 
water, since it can only generate power by letting the water 
flow.  The more important question is whether the amped up war 
of words will make cooperation more difficult across the board. 
End comment. 
QUAST