VZCZCXRO1271
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0871/01 3541013
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201013Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7135
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000871 
 
SIPDIS 
 
LONDON FOR LORD; PARIS FOR NOBLES; DESK PLEASE PASS TO S/CT 
RHONDA SHORE; NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC SY
SUBJECT: SYRIA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
¶1. (SBU) Junaid Munir is the Embassy POC.  Unclassified 
e-mail: MunirJM@state.gov.  Tel: (963) 11-3391-3785. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, 
Syria in 2009 continued political support to Palestinian 
terrorist groups.  It also provided political and material 
support to Hizballah in Lebanon and allowed Iran to resupply 
this organization with weapons.  Hamas, Palestinian Islamic 
Jihad (PIJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PLFP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), among others, base their 
external leadership in Damascus and operate within Syria's 
borders.  Statements supporting terrorist groups like Hamas 
and Hizballah permeate government speeches and official 
statements on a regular basis.  The Syrian government insists 
the Damascus-based groups are confined to political and 
informational activities, but groups with leaders in Syria 
have in the past claimed responsibility for anti-Israeli 
terrorist attacks. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Over the course of the year, President Bashar 
al-Asad continued to express public support for 
Palestinian terrorist groups.  Hamas Politburo head and 
defacto leader Khalid Mesh'al and his deputies continued to 
reside in Syria.  Syria provided a safe haven for Mesh'al and 
security escorts for his motorcades.  Mesh,al freely travels 
around Damascus, attending numerous public events such as 
national day celebrations for Arab states.  Mesh'al's use of 
the Syrian Ministry of Information as the venue for press 
conferences can be taken as an endorsement of Hamas's 
message.  Media reports indicate Hamas used Syrian soil as 
training grounds for its militant fighters.  Though the 
Syrian government claimed periodically that it used its 
influence to restrain the rhetoric and activities of 
Palestinian groups, it allowed rejectionist conferences 
organized by Hamas to take place over the course of the year. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Highlighting Syria's ties to the world's most 
notorious terrorists, Hizballah Operations Chief Imad 
Mugniyah perished in a car bomb that exploded near Syrian 
Military Intelligence (SMI) headquarters in the Damascus 
neighborhood of Kafr Soussa on February 12, 2008.  Among 
other atrocities, Mugniyah was wanted in connection with the 
1983 bombings of the Marine barracks and U.S. Embassy in 
Beirut, which killed over 350.  Despite initial attempts to 
cover up the incident, the Syrian government reluctantly 
acknowledged some days later that one of the world's most 
wanted terrorists had been present and died on Syrian soil. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Syrian officials publicly condemned some acts of 
terrorism while continuing to defend what they considered to 
be legitimate armed resistance by Palestinians and Hizballah 
against Israeli occupation of Arab territory, and by the 
Iraqi opposition against the "occupation of Iraq." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Underscoring links between the Syrian government 
and Hizballah, Israeli naval commandos intercepted a large 
cache of arms on November 3 on its way from Iran to Hizballah 
by way of the Syrian port of Latakia.  The arms shipment, 
which was found amidst civilian cargo on the Antiguan-flagged 
ship MV Francop, weighed over 500 tons.  Press reports quoted 
Israeli officials stating the quantity of arms seized would 
have been enough to equip the terrorist group for more than 
one month of attacks on Israeli cities.  While the Syrian 
government denied involvement in the shipment, Israeli 
officials stressed the incident illustrates Syria,s 
continued efforts to fight a proxy war with Israel through 
terrorist groups like Hizballah.  Official Syrian statements 
are peppered with references to "the Israeli enemy," 
bolstering Israeli concerns. 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Syria continued to strengthen ties with fellow 
state sponsor of terrorism Iran.  Throughout the year, the 
countries exchanged high-level visitors.  In August, 
President al-Asad visited Tehran.  On December 3, the Syrian 
president met the Iranian National Security Advisor Said 
Jalili in Damascus.  On December 8, Iranian Defense Minister 
Ahmed Vahidi began a three-day visit to Syria during which he 
met with political and military leaders.  Vahidi and his 
Syrian counterpart announced agreement on a Syrian-Iranian 
defense cooperation agreement on December 11.  Frequent 
working-level visits between Iranian and Syrian officials 
took place throughout 2009.  Syria also allowed leaders of 
Hamas and other Palestinian groups to visit Tehran.  Al-Asad 
continued to be a staunch defender of Iran's policies, 
including Iran's nuclear ambitions. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Syria increased border monitoring activities, 
instituted tighter screening practices on military-age Arab 
 
DAMASCUS 00000871  002 OF 002 
 
 
males entering its borders, and expressed a desire to 
increase security cooperation with Iraq.  At the same time, 
Syria remained a key hub for foreign fighters en route to 
Iraq.  The Syrian government continued to harbor former Iraqi 
regime elements.  In September, General Ray Odierno, the U.S. 
commander in Iraq, stated to the press: "Syria continues to 
allow the facilitation of foreign fighters through Syria that 
come both to Iraq as well as, I believe, Afghanistan.  We do 
know that there are some ex-Baathist elements that are 
funding operations in Iraq, and we also know that they are 
operating websites that encourage attacks inside Iraq." 
 
¶9. (SBU) Following August 19 bombing attacks in Baghdad that 
killed and wounded hundreds, Iraq withdrew its ambassador to 
Damascus, alleging Syrian government support to Iraqi 
Baathists it implicated in the attacks.  In turn, Syria 
recalled its ambassador from Baghdad.  The Iraqi government 
demanded the handover of four Iraqi Baathist leaders it 
claimed are living in Syria.  The Syrian government denied 
involvement in these terrorist attacks, and pledged to act on 
any "credible evidence" Iraq provided concerning terrorist 
activities of Iraqi "opposition" members in Syria. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In 2008, the U.S. Government designated several 
Iraqis and Iraqi-owned entities residing in Syria which 
provided financial, material, and technical support for acts 
of violence that threatened the peace and stability of Iraq, 
including Mish'an Al-Jaburi and his satellite television 
channel al-Rai.  Iraqi government officials criticize al-Rai 
for serving as a "platform for terrorists."  Media reports in 
November reported al-Jaburi had sold the equipment and 
offices of al-Rai to Syrian businessman Rami Makhlouf (whom 
the Treasury Department has designated an individual 
determined to be responsible for or having benefited from 
public corruption in Syria), though Makhlouf later denied 
these reports.  Observers speculated al-Jaburi and other 
Iraqi Baathists may also have been linked to a new anti-Iraqi 
government television stated called "Saddam," which completed 
its inaugural two-day broadcast in late November. 
Additionally, the U.S. Government designated known foreign 
fighter facilitators based in Syria, including members of the 
Abu Ghadiyah network, which orchestrated the flow of 
terrorists, weapons, and money from Syria to al-Qa,ida in 
Iraq.  Attacks against Coalition Forces and Iraqi citizens 
continued to have a destabilizing effect on Iraq's internal 
security.  Though Syrian and Iraqi leaders met throughout the 
first part of the year both publicly and privately to discuss 
border enhancements and other measures needed to combat 
foreign fighter flows, that cooperation has been largely 
inactive after the withdrawal of the Syrian and Iraqi 
ambassadors from Damascus and Baghdad, respectively. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Syria remains a source of concern regarding 
terrorist financing.  The Commercial Bank of Syria is subject 
to U.S. sanctions.  Industry experts report that 70 percent 
of all business transitions are conducted in cash and that 
nearly 90 percent of all Syrians do not use formal banking 
services.  Despite Syrian legislation requiring 
money-changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, many 
money-changers continued to operate illegally in Syria's vast 
black market, estimated to be as large as Syria's formal 
economy.  Regional "hawala" networks remain intertwined with 
smuggling and trade-based money laundering - facilitated by 
notoriously corrupt customs and immigration officials - 
raising significant concerns that the Syrian government and 
the business elite are, at the very least, complicit in 
terror financing schemes. 
 
¶12.  (SBU) Syria's government-controlled press continued to 
tout Syrian regime efforts to combat terrorism.  In response 
to a September 27, 2008 bombing near a Syrian security 
installation that killed 17, the Syrian security services 
conducted at least one reported raid on a terror cell 
residing in the Damascus area, killing and arresting several 
suspected militants and confiscating a cache of weapons and 
explosives.  Since the attack, the regime has attempted to 
portray Syria as a victim of terrorism rather than a purveyor 
of it.  The Syrian government explained an explosion of a 
tourist bus in the Damascus suburb of al-Sayyida Zainab as 
the result of a tire repair mishap that killed three people, 
though the presence of shattered windows 200 meters away from 
the explosion creates some doubt about the source of the 
explosion. 
 
HUNTER