VZCZCXRO7203
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHLM #1112/01 3380501
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040501Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0924
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 COLOMBO 001112 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SCA/INSB 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM PTER EAID MOPS CE
SUBJECT: IDP UPDATE: SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WITH CHALLENGES 
AHEAD 
 
COLOMBO 00001112  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  Large numbers of returns of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) over the past several months and 
recent advances in freedom of movement policy are very 
encouraging.  The returns process will continue to be 
complex, however, and long-term reintegration may present new 
challenges.  The U.S. should continue to press the GSL for 
increased information sharing and coordination with 
international actors so our partners can provide appropriate 
support for GSL-led returns initiatives including return 
movements and demining.  The returns package meets basic 
needs but may require adjustment, particularly longer-term 
food rations for those who have missed planting seasons. 
Rehabilitation of ex-combatants, and permission for ICRC to 
take on a key role in rehabilitation, continues to be a 
priority.  END SUMMARY. 
MANIK FARM: REDUCED NUMBERS, INCREASED FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT 
--------------------------------------------- ------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) IDP returns have eased overcrowding in Manik Farm, 
with the total population dropping from approximately 230,000 
in August to approximately 125,000 at the end of November.  A 
USAID fact-finding mission to the North on November 23-25 
found that people no longer had to wait in long lines for 
health services or water collection, nutrition indicators had 
improved, and flooding had not been a problem as previously 
forecast.  But the departure of those providing services, 
such as teachers at temporary learning centers, had impacted 
service delivery.  Firewood for cooking was in short supply. 
IDPs seemed optimistic about the GSL's plan to return 
everyone by the end of January 2010. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Government of Sri Lanka's (GSL's) new freedom of 
movement policy went into effect on December 1.  UN sources 
estimated that 9,000 or more people left Manik Farm that day, 
despite considerable confusion over implementation and 
procedures. While news reports on numbers vary widely, the UN 
reported that approximately 80 percent chose to come back to 
the camp that night.  Some indicated they did not want to 
miss out on transportation or returns packages by traveling 
on their own.  According to authorities' explanations to an 
INGO monitoring Zone 4 that day, there was no limit on how 
long IDPs could remain outside the camp, they could bring 
belongings with them, and they could bring items back into 
the camp with them as long as they were not restricted 
material (e.g. cell phones).  IDPs, however, believed they 
could leave only for seven days and were confused about 
bringing materials out of or into the camp.  The exit 
application required signatures from three officials.  IDPs 
were under the impression that application forms had to be 
photocopied, while authorities said handwritten applications 
were acceptable.  While IDP movement was generally 
unrestricted once they left the camp, they could not visit 
other camp zones except through a special pass, as previously 
required.  The Zonal Commander and Area Commander indicated 
to the INGO that they would clarify the procedures through 
the camp PA system to avoid further confusion. 
 
RETURNS: EARLY SUCCESS, CHALLENGES AHEAD 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) There has been significant progress on returns, with 
approximately 150,000 returns to date, including 
approximately 23,000 to former LTTE areas.  Most returns were 
to areas best able to support them, however, and many 
returnees were staying with host families or transit camps 
rather than in their original homes.  The bulk of returnees 
went home to the districts of Jaffna, the East, southern 
Mannar and parts of Vavuniya not heavily affected by the 
conflict.  Among those in temporary locations, some could not 
return home because of security concerns and some were from 
 
COLOMBO 00001112  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
areas in the Vanni not yet open for returns.  USAID officials 
emphasized that IDPs from the interior of the Vanni would 
face a more difficult reintegration at home than those from 
other areas.  Long under LTTE control, this area now lacks 
government services such as health and education.  It is 
heavily mined, and in the rush to prepare for returns, much 
has simply been designated dangerous.  An estimated 50-70,000 
people, mainly from Kilinochchi and Mullaithivu, will likely 
remain in Manik Farm for a variety of reasons even after 
organized returns operations have been completed. 
 
RETURNS PROCESS: IMPROVED COORDINATION NEEDED 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) There appears to be some lack of coordination 
between the GSL and the UN in the returns process.  Lack of 
timely information on how many people would return where and 
when forced the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) to scramble to provide appropriate transport, and the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to 
supply non-food items rapidly.  To better support upcoming 
returns, the World Food Program (WFP) was establishing hubs 
in the Vanni (Malawi, Mullaithivu District, and Kilinochchi 
Town).  WFP planned to pre-position food at the hubs for 
easier access to distribution points at returns destinations. 
 
¶6.  (SBU) GSL and INGO demining organizations coordinate 
their efforts through monthly meetings, but INGOs are not 
engaged in developing the national demining strategy.  INGOs 
and the Sri Lankan Army (SLA) work in separate areas assigned 
to them by the GSL and do not have input into, or knowledge 
of, an overall strategic plan.  U.S. INGO partners report 
pressure to complete their work unrealistically quickly in 
order to meet GSL returns timelines.  INGOs have expressed 
some concern that SLA demining operations do not adhere to 
international standards, but have not closely evaluated SLA 
operations.  Two PM/WRA-funded technical experts are now 
in-country assessing SLA demining capacity prior to a 
potential U.S. contribution of demining equipment and/or 
training.  Mine risk education (MRE) is also essential, 
especially where IDPs return to communities where minefields 
have only been demarcated and not cleared. 
 
REINTEGRATION UPON RETURN: ASSISTANCE REQUIRED 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (SBU) IDP returns packages may require adjustment to meet 
actual needs.  Returnee families are eligible for a shelter 
grant of Rs 25,000 (about USD 220) per family, a UNHCR NFI 
kit, a UNHCR kitchen set, and UNICEF hygiene kit, roofing 
sheets from the GSL and Government of India (GoI), an 
agricultural tool set from the GoI, 3 days of cooked meals 
provided by the GSL and six months of food rations from WFP. 
In a November 21 press release, the GSL announced that it 
would increase the shelter grant to Rs 50,000 (about USD 438) 
as of December 15. But a United Nations source reported that 
in a meeting with the Presidential Task Force (PTF) earlier 
this week, the PTF said it had not yet approved -- or 
seriously considered -- implementing the increase and the 
public announcement had been made without its concurrence. 
According to a UN housing expert, repairing a severely 
damaged home would cost around USD 1,500 to repair, but Rs 
50,000 (about USD 438) would be a positive step in addressing 
immediate needs.  It should be noted that the "shelter" grant 
is actually a cash transfer, so returnees may choose to use 
it on non-shelter priorities (and early indications are that 
some returnees are doing so). Food assistance may also 
require adjustment from earlier expectations.  USAID officers 
noted that many returning IDPs missed the Maha planting 
season and may miss the subsequent Yala season, and thus 
 
COLOMBO 00001112  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
would have to rely on rations for significantly longer than 
six months, possibly up to 16 months.  The GSL indicated to 
the UN that all national NGOs could access the North, and 
INGOs with national partners would also have access to 
returns areas.  This would allow for reintegration 
programming such as livelihoods, protection and community 
development. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Both short- and long-term solutions for 
ex-combatants are keys to Sri Lanka's long term stability. 
The GSL is holding over 11,000 ex-combatants in 17 closed 
camps, awaiting individualized legal review of their cases. 
ICRC does not have access to the camps.  USAID staff were 
permitted to visit some of the camps and noted overcrowding 
and the need for health services, particularly psychosocial 
counseling.  IOM provides technical assistance to the 
Ministry of Justice to develop the National Action Plan and 
Framework to profile and register detainees, with USAID 
support.  Ex-combatants now in rehabilitation programs will 
require support reintegrating into their communities upon 
completion of their program in early 2011.  The GSL's 
National Action Plan for the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 
into Civilian Life calls for USD 75 million over six years. 
The U.S. currently supports a portion of this plan through 
IOM. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) As returns increase and camp populations decrease, 
the U.S. may consider shifting aid from camp-based services 
to returns and reintegration support.  But some support, 
particularly on protection issues, may still be crucial for 
the residual population in the camps.  The GSL appears to be 
making a good faith effort to support returns and ease 
restrictions on IDPs, which is encouraging.  We should 
recognize the progress made so far while also urging the GSL 
to increase coordination with the international community, 
permit ICRC's engagement, and follow through on its 
commitment to allow NGO access to returns communities. 
FOWLER