VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBR #1540/01 3651333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311332Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0233
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0001
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

UNCLAS BRASILIA 001540 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER PREL PGOV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
¶1. (U) The Brazilian government continues to cooperate in 
countering terrorism and related activities that could contribute 
to the facilitation of attacks in the region or elsewhere-to 
include investigating potential terrorism financing, document 
forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, 
elements of the Brazilian government responsible for combating 
terrorism, such as the Federal Police, Customs, and the Brazilian 
Intelligence Agency, work effectively with their U.S. counterparts 
most of the time and pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. 
and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial 
agencies regarding terrorist suspects. 
 
¶2. (SBU)There are two separate discourses in the government of 
Brazil on counterterrorism; politically, Brazil continues to deny 
the presence and potential threat of terrorists and terrorism in 
Brazil, while law enforcement and intelligence monitor and 
cooperate to counter the threat. The head of the Brazilian Federal 
Police (DPF) intelligence division in July went on record during a 
Brazilian Chamber of Deputies hearing on terrorism and admitted 
that an individual arrested in April was in fact linked to al Qaeda 
(AQ). Despite the statement, most GOB officials continue to toe the 
party line and deny any evidence that terrorists have, or would be, 
interested in establishing a presence in Brazil. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement services are 
concerned that terrorists could exploit Brazilian territory to 
support and facilitate terrorist attacks, whether domestically or 
abroad, and have focused their efforts in the areas of Sao Paulo, 
the tri-borders areas of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay; Brazil, 
Peru, and Colombia; and the Colombian and Venezuelan borders. Other 
branches of the Brazilian government, particularly the Ministry of 
External Relations, do not believe Brazil is vulnerable to 
terrorism-related activities and instead focus more heavily on 
threats from transnational crimes. In October 2009, the MRE did 
admit, for the first time, that terrorists could become interested 
in Brazil because of the award of the 2016 Olympics to Rio de 
Janeiro.  Brazilian law enforcement's recognition of the potential 
threat from terrorism prompted a reform of the Brazilian 
Intelligence Agency (ABIN) that could raise the profile of the 
issue by upgrading the counterterrorism division to the department 
level. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Brazil's intelligence and law enforcement forces work with 
regional and international partners. Brazil participates in 
regional counterterrorism fora, but is less committed to regional 
groups in which the Unites States is involved.  Brazil is actively 
involved Mercosul's working group on terrorism and the sub-working 
group on financial issues, the latter of which discusses terrorism 
financing and money laundering among the Mercosul countries, but 
has proven difficult to engage in 3+1 mechanism on security in the 
Tri-Border Area (TBA), where Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay share a 
border. 
 
¶5. (U) Bilaterally, the USG provided a variety of training courses 
throughout Brazil in counterterrorism, combating money laundering, 
detection of travel document fraud, container security, and 
international organized crime. In 2009 the USG again hosted a Major 
Crimes Conference that successfully brought together Brazil and 
neighboring countries' federal and state law enforcement 
communities and judges and prosecutors to share best practices and 
receive practical training. 
 
¶6. (U) Although Brazil has no official list of terrorist groups and 
does not recognize the FARC as one, President Luiz Inacio Lula da 
Silva has been critical of the FARC's use of violence and has 
publicly called on the group to desist in the armed struggle 
against the Colombian government. 
 
¶7. (U) Brazil is capable of monitoring domestic financial 
operations and effectively utilizes its financial intelligence 
unit, the Financial Activities Oversight Council (COAF), to 
identify possible funding sources for terrorist groups. Through 
COAF, Brazil has carried out name checks for persons and entities 
on the UNSCR 1267 and 1373 terror finance lists, but has so far not 
found any assets, accounts or property in the names of persons or 
entities on the UN terror-finance lists. 
 
¶8. (U) Brazil also continues to undertake steps to enhance its 
capabilities to combat money laundering. Since 2003, fifteen 
specialized money laundering courts have been established, 
 
including two in Sao Paulo, with each court headed by a judge who 
receives specialized training in national money laundering 
legislation. In addition, in 2008, the United States and Brazil 
established a working group with money laundering judges to share 
best practices and training needs. 
 
¶9. (U) A 2006 national anti-money laundering strategy goal was 
formed aimed to build on the success of the specialized courts by 
creating complementary specialized federal police financial crimes 
units in the same jurisdictions. In 2008, the federal police 
established such units in the Federal District (Brasilia) and the 
states of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In addition, the Ministry 
of Justice funded the creation of technology center to combat money 
laundering in the federal district and Rio de Janeiro, the latter 
of which received two such centers, one embedded with the Public 
Ministry and one with the State Civil Police. In 2008, the Ministry 
signed accords to establish additional centers in Bahia, Goiais, 
and Rio Grande do Sul. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The government of Brazil's counterterrorism strategy 
consists of deterring terrorists from using Brazilian territory to 
facilitate attacks or raise funds, along with monitoring and 
suppressing transnational criminal activities that could support 
terrorist actions. It accomplishes this through actions between its 
law enforcement entities and through cooperation with the United 
States and other partners in the region.   For example, in 2009 
Brazilian authorities began in earnest to work with other concerned 
nations (particularly the U.S.) in combating the significant and 
largely unchecked document fraud problem in the country.  During 
the year, multiple regional and international joint operations with 
U.S. authorities successfully disrupted a number of document 
vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking 
infrastructures.  This included one of the largest visa fraud cases 
of its type in U.S. law enforcement history. 
 
¶11. (SBU) In 2009, the work on the U.S.-Brazil container security 
initiative in Santos, Brazil was stalled after U.S. officials 
traveling to Brazil for the program had difficulties getting 
Brazilian visas.  The container security initiative was created to 
promote secure containerized cargo to the United States through the 
establishment of a trade transparency unit to detect money 
laundering through trade transactions. The Brazilian Ministry of 
External Relations (MRE) was uncomfortable with the 
counter-terrorism focus of the program, but has recently agreed to 
issuing visas in support of the initiative. 
 
¶12. (U) The Brazilian government is achieving visible results from 
recent investment in border and law enforcement infrastructure that 
were executed with a view to gradually control the flow of 
goods-legal and illegal-through the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of 
Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, the proceeds of which could be 
diverted to support terror groups. The inspection station at the 
Friendship Bridge in the TBA that was completed by the Brazilian 
customs agency (Receita Federal) in 2007 continued to take 
effective action to reduce the smuggling of drugs, weapons, and 
contraband goods along the border with Paraguay. According to 
Receita Federal, from January to July 2009 the agency seized more 
than USD 400 million in contraband goods, including drugs, weapons, 
and munitions, an increase of eight percent from 2007. As a result 
of the effective crackdown on the Friendship Bridge, most smuggling 
operations now take place through the Parana River and Lago Itaipu 
and some have migrated to other sections of the border, such as the 
towns of Guiara and Ponta Pora. The Federal Police has special 
maritime police units in both Foz de Iguacu and Guaira that patrol 
the maritime border areas, but because of the scale and complexity 
of the endeavor to curtail smuggling and trafficking activities 
through the waterways, Brazil is considering using an unmanned 
aerial vehicle to assist law enforcement in monitoring the border, 
a development that could further improve border security. 
 
¶13. (SBU) Brazil's overall commitment to combating terrorism and 
illicit activities that could be exploited to facilitate terrorism 
is undermined by the GOB's failure to strengthen its legal 
counterterrorism framework significantly. Although terrorist 
financing is an established predicate offense for money laundering, 
Brazil lacks legislation criminalizing terrorism or its financing 
as autonomous offenses.  The 2005 National Strategy against Money 
Laundering (ENCLA) created a working group (composed of 
representatives of ministries involved in CFT, the judiciary, and 
the federal prosecutor's office) charged with drafting legislation 
 
to criminalize terrorism and its financing.  The draft legislation 
was never forwarded from the executive branch to the Brazilian 
Congress. A long-delayed anti-money laundering bill is still 
pending before the Brazilian Congress.  The bill would facilitate 
greater law enforcement access to financial and banking records 
during investigations, criminalize illicit enrichment, allow 
administrative freezing of assets, and facilitate prosecutions of 
money laundering cases by amending the legal definition of money 
laundering and making it an autonomous offense. 
KUBISKE