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DE RUEHBR #1407/01 3431132
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R 091132Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0044
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001407 
 
SIPDIS 
AMEMBASSY BRASILIA PASS TO AMCONSUL RECIFE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/09 
TAGS: PGOV PREL BR
SUBJECT: Brazil: Center-Left Presidential Candidates Compete for 
Small Party Support 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge D'Affaires; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 
 
¶1.    (SBU) Summary.  While the gap between front-running 
presidential candidates Jose Serra (PSDB) and Dilma Rousseff (PT) 
appears to be tightening, parties within President Lula's PT-led 
governing alliance are quietly considering other options besides 
supporting Dilma.   Ciro Gomes (PSB) entered the presidential race 
with Lula's blessing as an additional voice against Serra, but PT 
and PSB are currently in a behind-the-scenes battle to win the 
support and television time of five smaller parties in the 
governing coalition.  With adequate support, Ciro could seriously 
rival Dilma's efforts to attract the center-left vote, especially 
in Lula's northeastern base, where she has thus far been 
underperforming.  The odds of PSB succeeding in cobbling together 
this coalition still appear considerably less than 50-50, however. 
Meanwhile, the center-right opposition Democratas (DEM) party, also 
primarily based in the northeast, may be seriously hurt by a 
high-profile corruption scandal revolving around Federal District 
(Brasilia) Governor Jose Arruda.  End summary. 
 
 
 
Presidential Race State of Affairs 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶2.   (SBU) As predicted by most local political insiders, the gap 
between front-running Serra and PT's Rousseff appears to be 
tightening somewhat; a late November CNT/Sensus poll indicates 
Serra at 32 percent, Dilma with 22 percent, 18 percent for Ciro 
Gomes, and PV candidate Marina Silva with 6 percent.  The poll 
confirms that both Serra and Dilma carry significant baggage. 
Dilma maintains the highest voter "rejection rate" among serious 
candidates; politicians from both sides concur that her stature was 
not helped by statements made before and during the November 
blackout.  PT insiders hope Dilma's role leading the massive 
Brazilian delegation in Copenhagen for climate change talks will 
give her a significant boost.  Serra must contend with an 
environment in which half the electorate state they would never 
vote for a candidate backed by former President Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso (PSDB).  The market for presidential candidate alternatives 
to PT and PSDB continues to be strong. 
 
 
 
Aligned with Lula, not PT 
 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.   (C) Ciro Gomes, ostensibly in the race with Lula's blessing to 
be an attack dog against Serra, has most effectively filled the 
need for an alternative candidate by attracting the many voters and 
politicians who support Lula but are suspicious of PT.  (Ciro also 
has been drawing some support away from Serra.)  Lula still 
maintains a strong connection with Ciro and PSB.  In a recent 
meeting with the Charge, Pernambuco Governor Eduardo Campos (PSB) 
said that Lula, Dilma, Ciro and others (including himself)  would 
meet shortly in advance of the PT national convention in early 
March, when Dilma is expected to announce her candidacy officially. 
Campos made it clear that Ciro would step aside if asked to do so 
by Lula at that time. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (C) Some PSB leaders see Ciro's rise mostly as an opportunity 
to leverage Lula, while others foresee a strong Ciro presidential 
candidacy up to the general election.  Fernando Bezerra Coelho, a 
leading Pernambuco state official and 2010 PSB candidate for 
federal senate, told us that, as a price for Ciro stepping down, a 
coalition of supporters could force Lula to withdraw support from a 
weak Dilma candidacy and support a third candidate.  He believes 
that Governor Campos, who is especially close to Lula, could be 
that candidate.  Bezerra Coelho also spoke of the need to solidify 
PT support for several PSB senate and governor candidates, the 
strongest of whom are running against opposition bloc incumbents in 
the northeast.  (PSB's glaring weakness is in the federal senate, 
where they hold only two seats.)   In a December 2 conversation 
with poloff, Senator Renato Casagrande (PSB-Espirito Santo) 
outlined a more ambitious goal.  He confirmed that PSB is in a 
fairly heated behind-the-scenes battle with PT to secure the 
support for Ciro from all the other smaller parties within the 
governing coalition. 
 
 
PSB, Small Parties and TV time 
 
--------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶5.   (C) Senator Casagrande outlined the central challenge facing 
Ciro Gomes.  With political advertising on television and radio 
calculated based on the number of seats each party has in the 
Chamber of Deputies, PSB earns minimal airtime based on having 28 
of the 513 seats in the Chamber.  The next largest parties within 
Lula's governing coalition - PP, PDT, PTB, and PC do B - include 
slightly over 100 more seats, which combined with PSB would almost 
rival the 170 combined held by PT and the largest delegation in the 
coalition, the PMDB.  PSB has therefore been aggressively courting 
these parties since October to gain their official support and 
TV/radio time.  The senator did not want to reveal too much detail 
or sound overly optimistic about outfoxing Lula and PT, but hinted 
that negotiations with some parties (PDT) were more advanced than 
others.  He also confirmed that, if Aecio Neves were nominated as 
PSDB candidate instead of Serra, Ciro would stop his candidacy and 
most of the party would support Neves. 
 
 
 
¶6.   (C) November conversations with representatives from the 
recruited parties indicate support for the idea of backing Ciro but 
have questions about the wisdom of doing so.  A political advisor 
for the conservative Progressive Party (PP), which holds the most 
seats among the courted parties, told poloff that he is pushing his 
party leadership to donate TV time to Ciro.  He reasons that Ciro 
is in excellent position to supplant PT in the north, given PSB's 
strength in two major states, Pernambuco and Fortaleza, and the 
weakness of PT in Bahia.  The advisor said that most of the party's 
elected representatives prefer Ciro, but that they are still 
figuring out if there would be repercussions for breaking with 
Lula.  The PDT party deputy chair from the state of Goias told 
poloff much the same thing.  He even compared favorably the idea of 
smaller parties joining to offset the power of PT and PMDB with 
Brazil's strategy of allying with other emerging countries (like 
India, South Africa) to balance the power of the United States and 
the European Union.   Most of these parties are considered more 
conservative than PSB or Ciro, but are philosophically more 
comfortable with PSB/Ciro than with PT/Dilma. 
 
 
 
DEM disaster 
 
----------------- 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) While PSB and Ciro Gomes make their case to be stronger 
players on the national scene, the center-right opposition 
Democratas (DEM) party, also based primarily in the Northeast, 
faces a scandal that could darken their already-dimming prospects 
on the national level.   Jose Arruda, Governor of the Federal 
District (Brasilia area), was caught on November 23 accepting 
bribes on camera, as were many of his political supporters.   While 
most politicians caught on camera represented other parties, DEM 
faces the brunt of the scrutiny as it prepares to kick its only 
elected governor out of the party and office.  DEM still has the 
third-largest benches in both the Senate and House of Deputies, 
despite a significant number of recent switches by its elected 
officials to other parties.  The fall of one of its only nationally 
known figures outside the Northeast, considered a possible 
vice-presidential candidate for Jose Serra, will further isolate 
DEM.   One DEM staffer told poloff that, "it's just too much of a 
disaster to talk about now."  More on this and the challenges 
facing the Brazilian center-right will be reported septel. 
 
 
 
Comment 
 
------------- 
 
 
 
¶8.  (C) The fact that so many political insiders like the idea of a 
Ciro candidacy (or an Aecio Neves candidacy) suggests significant 
space for maneuver during the 2010 election season, including a 
possible reshuffling of alliances.  The vitality of smaller 
political parties such as PSB and its prospective allies is 
particularly interesting.   In an environment where PT sans Lula is 
not widely trusted, PSDB still suffers from negative public 
perceptions of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, PMDB is associated with 
Sarney and corruption, and DEM has its own growing corruption 
scandal, smaller parties have potential to fill the vacuum and to 
play a meaningful role in affecting Brazil's 2010 presidential, 
gubernatorial, and congressional race outcomes.  Nonetheless, 
although Ciro Gomes and PSB hold a surprisingly strong hand right 
now, President Lula's immense power to block ambitions of other 
center-left presidential contenders means that efforts to unite the 
smaller governing coalition parties behind Ciro and eventually 
supplant Dilma as the center-left candidate remain a long shot. 
End comment. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (U) This cable was coordinated with Consulate Recife. 
KUBISKE