VZCZCXYZ0003
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBO #3635/01 3651952
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311952Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1863
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA

UNCLAS BOGOTA 003635 

CODEL 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
H FOR LYNNEA SHANE AND GEORGE COLVIN 
WHA FOR DAS MCMULLEN 

E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID PGOV PREL SNAR PTER ETRD PHUM MOPS OREP CO
SUBJECT: COLOMBIA SCENESETTER FOR CODEL ENGEL (JANUARY 7-10) 

SUMMARY 

------- 



¶1. (SBU) Your upcoming visit to Cartagena and Monteria is an 
opportunity to discuss with the Colombians our shared fight against 
illegal drugs and illegal armed groups as well as the underlying 
social inequality that drives both phenomena.  President Uribe's 
final decision on whether to push for reelection remains the 
central chord of Colombian politics and will define the tone of 
congressional elections in March and the presidential elections in 
May.  Bilateral relations with Colombia remain solid but will be 
tested by our handling of the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) and the regional sensitivities to our Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (DCA).  Despite improving performance on human rights 
throughout Plan Colombia, there are continuing abuses and potential 
for backsliding.  Afro-Colombian and indigenous populations bear a 
disproportionate share of violence, social exclusion and poverty. 
After rousing success against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) in 2008, progress against the guerrilla 
organization has plateaued.  The recent kidnapping and 
assassination of a departmental governor demonstrated that the FARC 
still have the capability to carry out successful operations 
against high-profile targets.  There are few prospects for peace in 
the near term.  Post has begun implementing the Colombia Strategic 
Development Initiative (CSDI) -- the logical evolution of Plan 
Colombia -- with greater focus on expanding state services in 
Colombia's ungoverned spaces where illegal armed groups and the 
illicit economy flourish.  End Summary. 



COLOMBIA IN TRANSITION 

---------------------- 



¶2. (SBU) Embassy Bogota welcomes the visit of House Foreign Affairs 
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee Chairman Eliot Engel and delegation 
to Colombia on January 7-10, 2010.  In the past ten years, Colombia 
has transitioned from a near failed state and terrorist haven to a 
stable democracy.  Murder and kidnapping rates have dropped 
dramatically, while the rule of law has been strengthened through 
major judicial reforms.  While Colombia still experiences serious 
problems with illegal armed groups, the conflict has ceased to be a 
threat to Colombia's national security and sovereignty. 



¶3. (SBU) Colombia's turnaround can be attributed to improvements in 
overall security, but further progress depends on resolving chronic 
issues such as social inequality and land tenure.  Colombia has 
made significant inroads in confronting narco-terrorism but drug 
trafficking organizations and illegal armed groups, often with ties 
to guerillas and organized crime, still operate in large parts of 
the country, including along borders. 



¶4. (SBU) Colombia has been feeling the effects of the global 
economic crisis, though the impact has been lessened by 
conservative lending practices coupled with sound fiscal and 
monetary policies that have attracted foreign investment.  Growth 
rates for 2009 are expected to be close to zero, but the GOC 
predicts 2.5% growth next year.  Poverty rates have also decreased, 
though unemployment remains a major problem.  About 60% of the 
economy remains mired in the informal sector. 



REELECTION AND ELECTIONS 

------------------------ 



¶5. (SBU) The Colombian Congress passed a law in September 
permitting a referendum on whether President Alvaro Uribe may stand 
for a third term in the presidential elections on May 30, 2010. 
The Constitutional Court must now rule on the referendum process 
and its impact on the Constitution, a decision that may not come 

until March 2010.  If the referendum does go forward, 25% of 
registered voters (currently about 7.47 million) must participate 
with the majority of those voting in favor of reelection; current 
polls suggest Uribe would win in this scenario.  Uribe seldom 
speaks publicly of the referendum, characterizing it as a 
grassroots initiative of Colombian citizens.  His popularity 
remains between 65% and 70% after more than seven years in office. 
Should Uribe decide against running again, there are strong but far 
less popular candidates who could replace him such as former 
Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos or opposition Senator Gustavo 
Petro.  Elections to replace the entire Congress (166 
Representatives and 102 Senators) will be held on March 14. 



BILATERAL AND REGIONAL RELATIONS 

-------------------------------- 



¶6. (SBU) Colombia has been a staunch U.S. ally against the threats 
ofnarco-trafficking and terrorism.  We continue to enjoy a robust 
extradition relationship, though the Supreme Court in 2009 denied 
requests to extradite the FARC operatives charged with taking 
hostage or attempting to harm U.S. citizens.  Colombia is our 
fourth largest export market in the region and a growing 
destination for U.S. investment.  Our close relations have made 
Colombia a target of criticism from some leaders in the region, 
especially after the signing of the DCA.  The GOC has begun to 
patch up diplomatic relations with Ecuador which were severed 
following the Colombia's March 2008 military strike against FARC 
leader Raul Reyes in Ecuador.  The Colombians have also recently 
engaged in "security diplomacy," providing training and assistance 
to neighbors (such as Mexico and Haiti) suffering from drug 
trafficking and organized crime as well as a possible deployment to 
Afghanistan. 



VENEZUELA ON THE MIND 

--------------------- 



¶7. (SBU) Colombian officials worry that Venezuela poses a growing 
military, economic, and covert threat.  The GOC has sounded alarms 
in response to Venezuela's arms purchases, all but open support for 
the FARC, and bellicose rhetoric--including Chavez' statements to 
"prepare for war" and refusal to meet with Uribe in Brazilian 
brokered talks.  Caracas has blocked imports from Colombia, leading 
to border area confrontations and unrest.  Bilateral trade, once 
thought to be of sufficient volume to prevent bilateral conflict, 
has fallen dramatically since August.  November figures show a 75 
percent decrease in Colombian exports to Venezuela year-on-year. 
Despite the increased rhetoric, we see no evidence that either side 
is actively preparing for hostilities.  However, as tensions along 
the border rise and perceptions skew, there is a small risk that a 
local incident could spiral out of control.  Real or not, the 
perception of the threat posed by Venezuela has changed Colombia's 
worldview, causing them to seek ever greater assurances of our 
friendship and support. 



TRADE PROMOTION AND LABOR VIOLENCE 

---------------------------------- 



¶8. (SBU) While Colombians generally understand U.S. political 
realities associated with a vote on the FTA, frustration has grown 
within the government, business and academic communities over the 
lack of action on the accord.  The GOC remains committed to the 
agreement's passage, but worries that its efforts will turn out to 
be unsuccessful.  Business community members believe that long-term 
inaction on the FTA will be detrimental to U.S.-Colombian 
relations.  The majority of organized labor is opposed to free 
trade agreements and argues that the GOC needs to do more to 
respect worker rights and to protect unionists from violence.  In 
2009, 39 unionists were murdered as of December 15, which is less 
than the 49 murders in all of 2008.  President Uribe publicly 

adheres to the commitment President Obama made in their June 29 
meeting to move the FTA forward in the U.S. Congress once labor and 
human rights issues are adequately addressed. 



HUMAN RIGHTS 

------------ 



¶9. (SBU) By nearly all measures, the human rights situation in 
Colombia has improved over the last ten years.  Serious human 
rights concerns remain, however, especially with regard to the 
Colombian army.  Last year's exposure of military "false 
positives," in which unarmed civilians were murdered and presented 
as combat deaths, led to the dismissal of 51 members of the 
Colombian Army.  We are concerned about the military's lukewarm 
commitment to investigating these types of cases and its 
cooperation with the Prosecutor General's office.  The Prosecutor 
General's Office is currently processing more than 1,000 cases of 
extrajudicial executions; prosecutions have been slow but there is 
progress.  We are working with the Colombian military to improve 
their respect for human rights as they carry out security 
operations.  Impunity for human rights violations and past crimes 
carried out by paramilitary and guerrilla groups is a serious 
problem.  NGOs complain that the GOC regularly paints them as 
supporters of terrorist organizations, which in turn fuels growing 
death threats against them.  Revelations that Colombian 
intelligence and law enforcement entities carried out illegal 
surveillance against human rights groups, unionists and political 
opponents have also undermined the GOC's credibility on human 
rights.  Colombia has more than three million internally displaced 
persons (IDPs). 



AFRO-COLOMBIAN AND INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS 

----------------------------------------- 



¶10. (SBU) Colombia's populations of Afro-descendants (between 11 
and 20 percent of the population) and indigenous (between one and 
three percent of the population) suffer from discrimination, social 
exclusion, structural poverty, and lack of political participation. 
This marginalization allows illicit drug cultivation or trafficking 
to move into the communities, subjecting them to a disproportionate 
share of violence and displacement.  The GOC created the Commission 
for the Advancement of Afro-Colombians to help improve education, 
income generation, and political representation within the 
Afro-Colombian population.  However, the Colombian congress has not 
passed legislation to implement the commission's recommendations. 
The Embassy has implemented special programs to help Afro-Colombian 
and indigenous populations realize greater participation in the 
political and economic life of the country.  Cartagena's 
charismatic and dynamic mayor is Afro-Colombian and her rise 
reflects grass roots efforts to increase Afro-Colombian political 
participation that we have nurtured.  Recognizing the need for 
increased participation and integration of Afro-Colombians and 
African descendants worldwide, Colombia presented to the UN an 
initiative proclaiming 2011 as International Year for People of 
African descent, which was approved with unanimous consent.



CONFLICT STALLED, PEACE DELAYED 

------------------------------- 



¶11. (SBU) The GOC made significant progress against the FARC in 
2008: the deaths of three Secretariat members, the liberation of 15 
prized hostages, including three Americans, and record high 
desertions.  Progress in 2009 has, however, been mixed.  The 
December kidnapping and assassination of the governor of Caqueta
Department marked the highest profile political kidnapping by the 
FARC since 2002.  The FARC also continue to carry out asymmetrical 
attacks on selective soft targets as the Colombian military tries 
to grind them down in a slow war of attrition.   Any significant 
progress towards peace seems unlikely until after the elections; we 

expect the guerrilla groups to wait to see whether Uribe will be 
reelected before considering a broader peace process. 



THE COLOMBIA STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE 

--------------------------------------------- 



¶12. (SBU) To consolidate the gains of Plan Colombia, we have 
developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), 
which meshes with Colombia's own National Consolidation Plan (PNC). 
Our efforts initially focus on four priority zones of ongoing 
conflict, drug trafficking and social marginalization. PNC/CSDI has 
prioritized addressing the lack of state presence that enables coca 
production and illegal armed groups, and seeks to establish state 
presence in strategic, under-governed parts of the country.  The 
plan is centered on increasing territorial control in these areas 
to provide security for communities, to achieve permanent coca 
eradication, to transfer security responsibility to the police, to 
provide a wide range of socio-economic services to address the root 
causes of marginalization, and to improve the justice sector to 
strengthen the rule of law.  A major challenge to implementation is 
achieving strong, effective civilian leadership of the PNC.  The 
head of Social Action (Accion Social), Colombia's development 
agency, is the titular head of the PNC effort.  Civilian agencies 
have been reluctant, however, to devote their budgets to the 
effort, often leaving the Ministry of Defense organizationally in 
front.  Other obstacles include the need for a comprehensive GOC 
security strategy to transition from military to police in 
"consolidated" territories, more clarity on a post-eradication 
strategy, stronger presence of the justice sector in CSDI areas, 
and increased funding support for PNC ministries in the GOC budget. 



CARTAGENA AND COCAINE 
--------------------- 

¶13. (SBU) Developments in Cartagena will play a major role in 
Colombia's future.  In the Montes de Maria zone near Cartagena, 
where state security has been reestablished following a long period 
of lawlessness, the effectiveness of our CSDI efforts will likely 
become evident within the next year.  At the same time, with drug 
traffickers moving seaborne shipments of drugs in go-fast boats, 
self-propelled semi-submersible boats, or hidden in commercial 
cargo, maritime counter-narcotics interdiction, with Caribbean 
coastal operations based out of Cartagena, will be ever more vital 
to our efforts to combat drug trafficking.  Our joint efforts with 
the Colombian Navy had unparalleled success in 2009, with record 
seizures of cocaine on the high seas, which coupled with a 
significant year in eradication led to double digit increases in 
the price of cocaine in the United States and decreases in its 
purity. 



CONSTERNATION OVER CORRUPTION IN THE NAVY 
----------------------------------------- 

¶14. (SBU) A high profile narco-corruption case against a retired 
rear admiral was recently dismissed amidst controversy. Guillermo 
ArangoBacci was forced to retire in 2007 based on 
evidence that he had conspired with drug traffickers to help them 
evade U.S. and Colombian interdiction patrols.  Colombian Navy 
Commander Admiral Guillermo Barrera took the additional step of 
referringArangoBacci's case to the civilian Prosecutor General's 
Office for criminal charges; the case was nearing a guilty verdict 
by mid-2009.  On November 3, however, a new prosecutor assigned to 
the case petitioned the Supreme Court 
to absolve ArangoBacci on grounds that the investigation failed to 
prove the admiral's guilt.  The Court granted the petition and have
called for an investigation of Admiral Barrera and other Navy 
officers for allegedly smearing Admiral ArangoBacci.  The 
Ambassador publicly lauded Barrera for having brought the 
corruption case to light. 
BROWNFIELD