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Viewing cable 09BERLIN1588, GERMANY REQUESTS ASSURANCES ON VIRUS EXPORT

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BERLIN1588 2009-12-15 13:14 2011-08-24 01:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Berlin
VZCZCXYZ0549
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRL #1588 3491314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151314Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6068
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS BERLIN 001588 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
STATE FOR ISN/CB AND OES/IHA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ETTC MOPS PARM TBIO GM
SUBJECT: GERMANY REQUESTS ASSURANCES ON VIRUS EXPORT 
 
1. (SBU)  This is an action request.  Please see paragraph 4. 
 
2. (SBU)  German MFA Deputy Head of Division for Export 
Control Markus Klinger provided the following non-paper to 
Econoff, seeking additional assurances related to a proposed 
export of extremely dangerous pathogens to the U.S. Army 
Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases.  The 
Army's end use certificate provided to Germany is lacking an 
official seal.  Klinger's deputy, Nancy Reck, noted that 
Germany had made two follow-up requests to the Army seeking 
assurances and clarifications related to this proposed 
export.  The GOG seeks assurances from the USG or US Army 
that the end use certificate and the information contained 
therein are legitimate and accurate. 
 
3. (SBU)  Begin text of informal translation of German MFA 
non-paper: 
 
"For Official Use Only" 
Against the background of our partnership in the area of 
non-proliferation and our excellent cooperation in the 
matters of export controls, we would like to bring the 
following issue to the attention of your government. 
A German firm has applied for the approval of the export of 
184 genetic elements with nucleic acid sequences of viruses 
for the production of recombinant viruses.  The viruses will 
be used in optical imaging to identify host factors required 
for viral replication.   The recipient in the USA is, 
according to the enclosed end use certificate, the Department 
of the Army "US Army Medical Research Institute for 
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)" Fort Detrick, Maryland. 
Specifications in English about the goods, the recipient and 
end use can be seen from the end use certificate. 
The goods are controlled by the Australia Group and are 
subject to compulsory export approval (List position 
C1C353A).  This matter concerns the complete genome of 
viruses such as the Zaire Ebola virus, the Lake Victoria 
Marburg virus, the Machupo virus and the Lassa virus, which 
are absolutely among the most dangerous pathogens in the 
world.  The delivery would place the recipient in the 
position of being able to create replicating recombinant 
infectious species of these viruses. 
Because of the particular criticality of these goods, the 
German federal government practices an exceptionally 
restrictive approval policy for such exports.  An approval 
here can only be issued if an improper end use in association 
with the development or production of biologic weapons 
approaches can be foreclosed with a probability approaching 
certainty. 
The enclosed end use certificate is on the letterhead of the 
U.S. Army.  The required official seal is missing, however. 
A decision about the export has not yet been made.  Given the 
foregoing, we would appreciate confirmation that the end use 
certificate really is from the Department of the Army and of 
the accuracy of the data contained therein. 
We look forward to the continuation of our excellent 
cooperation in matters of non-proliferation and export 
controls. 
End text of informal translation of German MFA non-paper. 
4. (SBU)  Action Request.  Post requests guidance on 
responding to the GOG request in the non-paper. 
MURPHY