VZCZCXRO5907
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHGB #3344/01 3611614
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271614Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5909
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 003344 
 
SIPDIS 
 
S/CT FOR RHONDA SHORE; NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQ: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: SECSTATE 109980 
 
¶1.  Iraq remained a committed partner in counterterrorism 
efforts. As a result of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, 
Iraqi security forces assumed primary responsibility for the 
security and stability of Iraq, with support from 
Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I, which became U.S. 
Forces-Iraq (USF-I) as of January 1, 2010).  Together, U.S. 
and Iraqi security forces continued to make progress in 
combating al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and affiliated Sunni 
terrorist organizations, as well as Shiite militia elements 
engaged in terrorism.  A significant reduction in the number 
of security incidents throughout much of Iraq, beginning in 
the last half of 2007, continued through 2009, with a steady 
downward trend in numbers of civilian casualties, enemy 
attacks, and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. 
 
¶2.  Terrorist organizations and insurgent groups continued 
attacks on Iraqi security forces, civilians, and government 
officials using IEDs, including vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices (VBIEDs), and suicide bombers. Although a 
scattering of small scale attacks continued to hamper the 
country's progress toward broad-based security, terrorist 
elements focused their efforts on high profile and deadly 
attacks in Baghdad, as demonstrated by attacks on August 19, 
October 25, and December 8, with an estimated combined death 
toll of around 250, according to media reports. The three 
attacks targeted Iraqi government buildings with 
simultaneous, multiple suicide and/or remote-detonated VBIEDs 
in Baghdad. While AQI claimed responsibility for the 
violence, some Iraqi government officials publicly blamed 
Syrian-based individuals with alleged ties to the former 
Baath Party for the violence. 
 
¶3.  U.S. forces conducted warranted and partnered full 
spectrum operations with the Iraqi forces to defeat the 
adaptive threats employed by AQI.  Their efforts to defeat 
AQI cells, in addition to an increasingly violence weary 
Iraqi public, forced AQI elements to consolidate in Ninewa 
and Diyala provinces. Despite being limited to smaller bases 
of operation within Iraq, AQI retained networks in and around 
Baghdad and in eastern Anbar. In Ninewa, U.S. and Iraqi 
security forces focused operations against AQI and other 
Sunni extremists through warranted operations and judicial 
detentions of senior leaders, and targeting the terrorists, 
operational support systems. AQI, whose apparent goal in 2009 
was to discredit the GOI and erode its security and 
governance capabilities, targeted primarily the Iraqi 
security forces, government infrastructure and civilians, SOI 
(Sons of Iraq) groups, and tribal awakening movement members. 
Despite the improved security environment, AQI, fueled in 
part by detainee recidivists, still possessed a limited 
capacity to launch high-profile attacks against Iraqi 
civilians and infrastructure. In addition to reducing the 
strength of AQI and Sunni extremists, Iraq made progress in 
containing other terrorist groups with differing motives, 
such as Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandiyah (a Sunni 
nationalist insurgent group with links to the former Baath 
Party that advocates for the removal of occupation forces 
from Iraq) and Kata,ib Hizballah (a Shia militant group with 
ideological ties to the militant wing of Lebanese Hizballah), 
also operating in the country. 
 
¶4.  The flow of foreign terrorists from North Africa and 
other Middle Eastern countries sympathetic to Sunni 
extremists greatly diminished, though they continued to enter 
Qextremists greatly diminished, though they continued to enter 
Iraq, predominantly through Syria. AQI and its Sunni 
extremist partners mainly used Iraqi nationals and some 
females as suicide bombers. Terrorist groups receiving 
weapons and training from Iran continued to endanger the 
security and stability of Iraq. However, incidents of such 
violence were markedly lower than in previous years. Many of 
the groups receiving ideological and logistical support from 
Iran were based in Shia communities in central and southern 
Iraq. 
 
¶5.  Iraqi government officials condemned terrorists from all 
quarters. Iraq, Turkey, and the United States continued their 
formal trilateral security dialogue as one element of ongoing 
cooperative efforts to counter the militant Kurdish 
nationalist group, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Iraqi 
leaders, including those from the Kurdistan Regional 
Government, continued to publicly state that the PKK was a 
terrorist organization and would not be allowed a safe haven 
in Iraq. The trilateral discussions and other efforts 
continued through the end of the year, with a ministerial in 
late December. 
 
 
BAGHDAD 00003344  002 OF 003 
 
 
¶6.  The Iraqi government increased its efforts to garner 
regional and international support against the common threat 
of terrorism. The Expanded Neighbors Process continued to 
provide a forum in which Iraq and its neighbors could address 
the political and security challenges to further Iraq's 
development as a regional partner. In October, the Iraqi 
government sent representatives to Egypt to participate in 
the sixth Neighbors Process working group on border security, 
in which the group sought ways to enhance and integrate 
border security systems in preparation for Iraq's 2010 
parliamentary elections.  Iraq became a more active voice at 
the UN, advocating for international support as a means to 
combat terrorism in Iraq. 
 
¶7.  Perceived Iraqi government political targeting of SOI and 
Awakening Council members threatened to harm efforts to 
consolidate national unity.  Terrorists continued attacks on 
SOI members and on Sunni populations sympathetic to 
reconciliation.  In November, gunmen dressed in Iraqi Army 
uniforms killed at least 13 Sunnis in the Sunni-dominated 
district of Abu Ghraib, in west Baghdad. The same month, an 
IED killed three SOI members and wounded six while they were 
responding to a tip about a weapons cache south of Baghdad. 
Iraqi press reports indicated that the local perception of 
nationwide violence increased, while the actual amount of 
violence, including the numbers of killed and wounded, 
dropped steadily.  Importantly, the perception of greater 
threat did not create a violent response on the part of 
Sunnis or Shia. 
 
¶8.  The Iraqi government pressed senior Iranian leaders to 
end support for lethal aid to Iraqi militias, and the Iraqi 
army carried out operations against extremists trained and 
equipped by Iran in Basra, Baghdad, and other areas. 
Although attacks by militants have sharply decreased, 
concerns remain that Iranian-supported Shia groups may be 
stockpiling weapons to influence the elections or the 
subsequent government formation. Shia militant groups' ties 
to Iran remained a diplomatic and security challenge and a 
threat to Iraq's long-term stability.  National unity efforts 
to involve Iraqi Shia groups with Iranian ties, such as Asaib 
ahl al Haq (League of Righteousness) in the political 
process, also decreased Shia-linked violence.  The Iraqi 
government faced internal and external pressure to relocate 
the Mujahideen al-Khalq (MEK) organization, a U.S. designated 
foreign terrorist organization, from the group's current 
location in eastern Iraq.  The MEK is an Islamic-Marxist 
group that originated in Iran and seeks the overthrow of the 
Iranian government.  The Iraqi government committed to act 
with respect for human rights in any efforts to relocate the 
group, and UN and international observers monitored the 
situation. 
 
¶9.  The Iraqi government attributed security gains to Iraqi 
security force capability and proficiency, as well as to 
increasing popular support for Iraqi government actions 
against AQI and other extremist groups. SOI and other groups 
provided U.S. and Iraqi forces with valuable information that 
helped disrupt terrorist operations and exposed large weapons 
caches. The SOI began integration into Iraqi security forces 
in 2008, and many more transitioned to non-security 
ministries throughout 2009. Sunni tribal awakening movements 
continued alliances with U.S. forces against AQI and 
extremist groups. Reports of AQI targeting of Christian 
churches and schools, as well as other ethnic and religious 
Qchurches and schools, as well as other ethnic and religious 
minority facilities, indicated that AQI and other terrorist 
elements sought different strategies to determine which 
required the least resources and yielded the highest payoff 
in the media and minds of Iraq's citizens. Despite this, 
ethno-sectarian violence continued to decline. 
 
¶10.  The Iraqi security forces continued to build tactical 
and operational momentum and assumed responsibility for 
security in all of Iraq's 18 provinces. On June 30, U.S. 
forces pulled out of cities, villages, and localities, in 
accordance with the Security Agreement, and henceforth 
conducted all kinetic operations in partnership with Iraqi 
security forces.  The focus of U.S. operations moved from 
urban to rural areas.  The Security Agreement is the legal 
basis for continued security cooperation to help Iraq build 
its capacity to fight terrorist organizations and establish 
formal mechanisms for joint security operations. 
International support will remain critical for the Iraqi 
government to build its capacity to fight terrorist 
organizations. 
 
¶11.  Iraq's intelligence services continued to improve in 
both competency and confidence, but will require ongoing 
 
BAGHDAD 00003344  003 OF 003 
 
 
support and legislative authority before they will be able to 
adequately identify and respond to internal and external 
terrorist threats. 
FORD