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Viewing cable 09BAGHDAD3312, REGIONAL EMBASSY OFFICE HILLAH CLOSES; BABIL GOVERNOR FILLS

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BAGHDAD3312 2009-12-23 03:26 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Baghdad
VZCZCXYZ0002
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3312/01 3570326
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230326Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5857
UNCLAS BAGHDAD 003312 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SOCI
SUBJECT: REGIONAL EMBASSY OFFICE HILLAH CLOSES; BABIL GOVERNOR FILLS 
SECURITY VOID 
 
REF:  BAGHDAD 3273 
 
1. (SBU) Summary and Comment:  The Regional Embassy Office (REO) 
Hillah handed over its facility in a former hotel building to 
representatives of the Ministries of Interior and Tourism on 
December 15 (reftel).   The GOI representatives appeared to 
disregard the PRT's briefing on security, operations, and the 
inventory of assets.  Amidst reports of disorder and possible 
unauthorized removal of the former REO's equipment, Babil Governor 
Salman al-Zarqani arrived, and ordered his personal security forces 
to secure the premises.  The Governor expressed frustration to 
PRTOffs that that Baghdad did not coordinate the handover with him. 
Despite his frustration the Governor convinced the Council of 
Ministers to cede control of the facility to the provincial 
government.  The PRT believes that a valuable opportunity to 
increase the economic value of the property by training Iraqi 
technical personnel in the proper operation of equipment left behind 
has been lost.  End Summary. 
 
GOVERNOR ZARQANI AFFRONTED BY TURNOVER PROCESS 
 
2. PRTOffs December 12 briefed Governor al-Zarqani about the 
handover of the REO facility to GOI control.  After the brief, the 
Governor expressed reservations about the property's security 
post-turnover and lamented that the PRT was not going to be present. 
 He appreciated the PRT's information and said that he had been told 
nothing by any central Ministry.  He intimated that the provincial 
government's exclusion from the turnover ceremony was a personal 
affront. (Note: The Governor has repeatedly complained to PRT about 
the USG's focus on Baghdad, to the detriment of supporting the 
authority of provincial governments.  End note.) 
 
GOI SENT NO TECHNICAL PERSONNEL ON ADVANCE TEAM 
 
3. According to U.S. military personnel from MND-S detailed to 
provide security for the turnover, an advance team from the 
Ministries of Interior and Tourism arrived from Baghdad several days 
before the turnover ceremony. However, none of the delegation 
members were engineers, administrative managers, or logistical 
experts.  The delegation toured the REO offices and looked at the 
desks, chairs, and air conditioners.  In addition, they focused on 
planning the turnover ceremony, but did not inventory nor inquire 
about operation of the generators, reverse osmosis water plant, or 
any other technical matters. 
 
INADEQUATE SECURITY COORDINATION 
 
4. A number of Iraqi uniformed personnel arrived concurrently with 
the advance delegation from Baghdad.  However, according to U.S. 
military present, none approached either U.S. soldiers or security 
personnel to coordinate security of the premises. 
 
MORE THAN 100 IRAQIS PARTICIPANTS IN THE TURNOVER 
 
5. More than 100 officials from Baghdad attended the handover 
ceremony.  No additional Iraqi security forces arrived for the 
ceremony to assist during the festivities.  Immediately following 
the 1130 AM exchange of documents between the American and Iraqi 
representatives that effectuated the turnover, U.S. military 
personnel, Embassy representatives, and remaining KBR personnel 
departed.  Although there have been reports of gunfire at the scene, 
U.S. personnel present state that they witnessed no celebratory 
shooting in the air by ISF; they do not know whether such shooting 
occurred after they left. 
 
GOVERNOR ADDRESSES LOOTING BY CHANGING SECURITY PERSONNEL 
 
7. On December 16, the Governor, Babil Chief of Police, and PRT 
Babil LES assigned as liaison to the Governor's office, traveled to 
the former REO to verify reports of looting.  According to PRT LES, 
there were few Iraqi national police at the site.  Upon arrival, the 
Qthere were few Iraqi national police at the site.  Upon arrival, the 
Governor saw an Iraqi national police lieutenant, allegedly in 
charge of security, carrying off six air conditioner units.  The 
Governor ordered the Babil provincial Police Chief to arrest the 
National Police Lieutenant, and then ordered the Police Chief to 
detail his most trusted police to guard the site. 
 
GOVERNOR CONVINCES COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO CEDE REO TO PROVINCE 
 
8. The PRT LES observed the Governor calling the Council of 
Ministers to complain about the handling of the former REO property 
and said he intended to conduct his own inventory. (Note: PRT 
briefed him about the existence of a LOGCAP-prepared 25,000 item 
inventory.  He said he did not have a copy of this document and 
resolved to do his own count.  End note.)  The Governor said that 
items he had requested to use for the benefit of Babil's citizens 
were being damaged and/or stolen. 
 
9. Governor Al-Zarqani has assumed security of the hotel. The 
watchtowers and perimeter control points are manned by 30 IP and 
 
supervised by a number of officers.  The Governor ordered the gates 
closed to everyone including local government officials.  The 
exception is for a logistics team from Babil tourism department 
supervised by the Governor's security officer Colonel Rahman. 
10. On December 17, as a result of the Governor's complaint, the 
Ministry of Tourism assured the Governor the hotel would be returned 
to the province.  The Governor told the PRT that his top priority is 
to reopen the road along the canal to ease the flow of traffic in 
Hillah.  Although he had hoped to have the road opened in time for 
the Ashura holiday, upon inspection he determined that it would take 
at least two months to make the road passable.  The PRT understands 
that the former REO will resume its function as a tourist 
accommodation, but exactly how and when remains unclear. 
 
11.  Comment: TV stations covering the turnover evidently focused on 
the turnover and did not report the looting.  Local media appears 
not to have covered the story.  PRT Babil local staff tells us that 
few citizens in Babil know that the turnover has even taken place. 
 
 
12.  Comment continued:  The handover of REO Babil illustrates poor 
coordination between Baghdad and provincial governments.  Despite 
the critical role of the Office of Receivership and central 
ministries in turnover of U.S. assets like the hotel, the GOI must 
include local stakeholders in planning early in the process and 
ensure proper security coordination. Without that coordination, 
security lapses were apparent.  Further, the GOI lost an opportunity 
to learn how to operate the technical equipment at the facility, 
because it did not cooperate with REO staff and contractors 
throughout the process. End Comment. 
 
FORD