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DE RUEHAK #1732/01 3381500
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O 041500Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1390
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1522
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
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RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J-3/J-5//
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RUEUITH/TLO ANKARA TU
RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

UNCLAS ANKARA 001732 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
JUSTICE FOR OPDAT 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER SNAR PREL EFIN IR IZ TU
SUBJECT:  TURKEY: Eastern Provinces Score Gains in Counternarotics, 
but Lag in Information Sharing 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Turkish officials are making steady inroads 
against drug smuggling in the southeast, local officials told 
Embassy officers during a recent visit.  PKK terrorist activity has 
declined, but it remains active in drug smuggling.  The inability of 
Turkish officials to share information seized in terrorism and 
narcotics investigations limits our ability to strengthen law 
enforcement cooperation.  We intend to pursue remedies. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) From November 23-25, 2009, the Embassy Resident Legal 
Advisor, FBI Legal Attache, and a DEA Agent, accompanied by Locally 
Engaged Staff, visited three provinces in eastern Turkey to gain a 
better understanding of cross-border smuggling and terrorism issues 
confronting the region.  The participants traveled to the cities of 
Van, Dogubayazit, and Kars.  The prosecutors in Van and Dogubayazit 
were informative and provided constructive ideas for future 
cooperation.  The prosecutor in Kars, however, was suspicious and 
uncooperative.  This report consequently summarizes the first two 
meetings and suggests areas for closer law enforcement cooperation. 
 
Van 
--- 
. 
¶3. (SBU) On November 23, the Embassy group met with Van Chief Public 
Prosecutor Mustafa Alper and Public Prosecutor Sumer Koybasi.  The 
Van public prosecutor's office is responsible for prosecuting all 
crimes committed in Van province, as well as organized crime and 
drug prosecutions in the provinces of Hakkari, Mus, and Bitlis.  The 
Van office consists of 21 prosecutors - 13 are responsible for 
general investigations, and eight are responsible for terrorism and 
organized crime cases. 
 
¶4. (SBU) The prosecutors reported that heroin, opium, hashish, and 
cannabis are the primary drugs smuggled in this region.  The drugs 
are smuggled through border entry points by truck or through 
mountain passes by mule.  The cities of Van, Hakkari, and Baskale 
(in southeastern Van province) are the main entry points of drugs 
into Turkey.  Most drugs are smuggled through legitimate border 
crossings during winter, as mountain routes are impassable.  In many 
instances, family members living on both sides of the border 
facilitate the smuggling.  The PKK is tied to most drug smuggling in 
some way, prosecutors claimed, either by demanding a "tax" from the 
smugglers, or directly organizing the smuggling on its own. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The prosecutors reported that the Turkish National Police 
(TNP), Jandarma, and Customs officers work narcotics cases.  Of the 
three agencies, the TNP is the most effective.  This is a result of 
the TNP's use of wiretaps, confidential sources, routine road stops, 
and narcotics detection dogs.  TNP success is also facilitated by 
its professionalism, prosecutors believe.  The prosecutors claimed 
the success rate in prosecutions involving wiretaps is "close to 100 
percent."  The importation and production of narcotics carry a 
ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under Turkish Penal Code (TPC) 
Article 188, and a fine.  The penalty is increased by half if the 
drug is heroin, cocaine, or morphine, and then increased by half 
again if the crime involves a criminal organization. 
 
¶6. (SBU) According to Van's prosecutors, in 2008, their office 
conducted 15,000 prosecutions (including 250 cases from Hakkari, 
Mus, and Bitlis provinces).  Of these, approximately ten percent, or 
1,500 cases, related to drug possession and trafficking.  All of the 
drugs seized had been produced in other countries.  In Van province 
in 2009, authorities seized nearly one ton of heroin, as well as 
hashish, opium, ecstasy, and acetic anhydride (used to refine opium 
into heroin). 
 
¶7. (SBU) Other smuggling involves fuel oil, cigarettes, and people, 
according to Van's prosecutors.  Individuals smuggled into Turkey 
come from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and African nations. 
Few if any have terrorist connections, prosecutors reported.  These 
persons enter Turkey in search of a better life, either in Turkey or 
in European countries. 
 
¶8. (SBU) The PKK remains the biggest terrorism threat in Van 
 
province, the prosecutors related, although PKK activity has 
decreased significantly in the past year.  The PKK continues to 
kidnap teenage boys from villages in Eastern Turkey, our 
interlocutors claimed. The boys are taken to training camps in 
Northern Iraq, where they are indoctrinated and trained as PKK 
members. The parents may report their children "lost," rather than 
kidnapped, out of fear for their safety and that of their children. 
Statistics on such kidnappings are sparse, as village children often 
do not have birth certificates, and the reports of "lost" children 
cannot be verified. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Al Qaeda has also been active in Van province, prosecutors 
stated.  In October 15-16, 2009, a number of al Qaeda-related 
arrests were made throughout Turkey, 11 of which were in Van.  The 
suspects are all Turkish citizens.  Investigators have gathered 
30,000 pages of evidence, as well as CD's showing videos of fighting 
in Afghanistan.  Five of the 11 suspects have been detained. (Note: 
This account is not consistent with classified reporting received 
about the October 2009 arrests).  When asked if they could share 
information on this case with the FBI, the prosecutors stated 
Turkish law prevents them from doing so, as the case files can only 
be accessed by parties to the case. 
 
Dogubayazit 
----------- 
. 
¶10. (SBU)  Dogubayazit Chief Public Prosecutor Hakan Dundar and 
Public Prosecutor Adem Aydemir explained that Dogubayazit is a 
center of smuggling for drugs, people, and commodities.  It is the 
closest city to the primary Iranian border gate, Gurbulak, and the 
neighboring border region is rugged and mountainous.  The office 
consists of the Chief Prosecutor and six public prosecutors. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Drugs are smuggled in roughly equal amounts through the 
legitimate border crossing at Gurbulak and through mountain passes. 
As in Van, the percentage going through mountain passes drops 
dramatically in the winter when deep snow makes mountain routes 
impassable.  The prosecutors claimed that law enforcement has 
achieved a 60 percent reduction in drug smuggling from 2008 to 2009. 
 In early November 2009, they destroyed one ton of heroin that had 
been seized during the first nine months of 2009.  However, two 
troubling trends have emerged: an increased purity in the heroin 
seized (from 40 percent in past years to roughly 70 percent in 
2009), and an increase in the smuggling of liquid heroin.  (Note: 
Liquid heroin is a watered down version of heroin, which experts say 
can be more fatal than other illegal drugs.  It is injected into 
fruits or mixed with drinks.)  Drugs are transported by villagers 
via mules in mountain regions and by truck drivers through the 
border crossings.  Those arrested rarely cooperate with 
investigators, either out of fear or because they really do not know 
much about the trafficking organization. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The prosecutors reported their office handled 100 drug 
smuggling cases during 2008-2009 and approximately 300 non-drug 
smuggling cases.  Generally, these cases involved fuel and 
cigarettes.  Asked about judicial assistance and cooperation with 
Iranian authorities, prosecutors replied that during the two years 
they have been in the region, they have received no assistance from 
Iranian judicial authorities. 
 
¶13. (SBU) As in Van, the primary terrorism threat in Dogubayazit is 
the PKK.  Prosecutors reported 67 "terrorism events" in 2009 such as 
demonstrations, "propaganda," and marches.  Of these 67 events, two 
were gun attacks by PKK members, neither of which resulted in a 
fatality.  The prosecutors claimed the PKK remains active in drug 
trafficking. 
 
Comment and Suggested Way Forward 
-------------------------------- 
. 
¶14.  (SBU) DEA has requested samples of heroin from Turkish seizures 
to test for purity and origin.  Turkish forensic regulations 
prohibit this.  The prosecutors with whom we spoke suggested that 
the only way to remedy the situation is to lobby for a change in the 
 
procedures used in forensics labs.  This would require the Ministry 
of Justice, which oversees certain forensic laboratories, and the 
Ministry of the Interior, which oversees the Jandarma and TNP labs, 
to change their regulations.  These changes would not require 
Parliamentary approval, but only the signature of the two relevant 
Ministers.  The prosecutors suggested language which would "permit 
sharing of drug samples with international law enforcement 
organizations."  Additional language could include that this sharing 
of drug samples be "solely for use in criminal investigations," or 
for other legitimate law enforcement purposes.  We should actively 
pursue these changes, which would greatly facilitate DEA regional 
counter-narcotics efforts. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Separately, criminal indictments and criminal court 
documents are sealed from public view in Turkey - they can only be 
accessed by the parties to the case.  Consequently, the DEA, FBI, 
RLA, and other U.S. embassy personnel have had difficulty learning 
the status of cases making their way through the Turkish criminal 
court system.  The contradictory reports we have received on the 
October 2009 "al Qaeda" arrests highlight the need for concrete, 
verifiable information about the arrest and prosecution of terrorism 
suspects in Turkey.  The opening of Turkish court documents would 
allow the U.S. to more easily verify this information.  We should 
encourage the Turkish Ministry of Justice to support laws and 
regulations which would open court files to public view. 
Alternatively, we and partner nations should encourage Turkey to 
permit sharing court documents with law enforcement personnel for 
legitimate law enforcement purposes.  In future weeks, we will be 
meeting with relevant officials in the Ministries of the Interior 
and Justice to press for these changes.  We will also engage with 
our European partners to encourage their participation in the above 
efforts. 
 
¶16. (SBU) We are under no illusion that reform of Turkey's judicial 
system will be easy, particularly if legal changes are needed.  We 
will continue to look for openings to pursue the above goals and 
other improvements in law enforcement cooperation.