VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #2607/01 3371104
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031104Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6393
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4203

UNCLAS AMMAN 002607 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/ELA, INL, S/CT, AND EEB 
JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OIA, AND OPDAT 
TREASURY FOR FINCEN 
CAIRO FOR ROWE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN PTER SNAR KCRM JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN SUBMISSION FOR 2009-2010 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 
CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) PART II 
 
REF:  A) PARKER/LYLE EMAIL DATED 12/2/2009 
-     B) STATE 114960 
 
¶1.  Per ref B, following is the text for Part II, Money Laundering 
and Financial Crimes, of Embassy Amman's submission for the 
2009-2010 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), 
also e-mailed as requested as a Microsoft Word document.  Embassy 
point of contact is Resident Economic Crimes Advisor Joe Parker who 
can be reached at ParkerJE@state.gov or by phone at 962-6-590-6544. 
 
 
¶2.  Begin Text: 
Jordan is not a regional or offshore financial center and is not 
considered a major venue for international criminal activity. Jordan 
does have a well developed financial sector with significant banking 
relationships in the Middle-East. Jordan's long and remote desert 
borders and nexus to Iraq, Syria, and the West Bank make it 
susceptible to the smuggling of bulk cash, fuel, narcotics, 
cigarettes, and counterfeit goods and contraband, although there is 
insufficient information available from the Government of Jordan 
(GOJ) to quantify all of these crimes. 
Jordan boasts a thriving "import-export" community of brokers, 
traders, and entrepreneurs that regionally are involved with value 
transfer via trade and customs fraud. Illicit narcotics, 
psychotropic substances, and chemical precursors are not known to be 
major components of criminality in Jordan. There are anecdotal 
indications of use of Jordan for money laundering of illicit funds 
derived from narcotics and other criminal activity in the U.S. and 
possibly Europe via bulk cash smuggling for criminal elements 
involving Jordanians in those areas. However, it is thought that the 
major sources of illicit funds in Jordan are most likely to be 
related to commercial fraud, customs fraud, tax fraud and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) violations due to Jordan's 
dependence on imports and its limited natural resources and 
manufacturing base. A wide array of pirated or counterfeit goods is 
for sale on the streets of Jordan. One phenomenon that surfaced 
during 2008 and continued through 2009 was the use of gold in lieu 
of cash for movement of liquid assets. The scheme involves persons 
crossing into Jordan at land and seaports, making an admission of 
trying to enter multi-kilo quantities of gold to inspecting customs 
authorities, paying a fine and then re-exporting the gold at the 
entry point thus creating a declaration document to lend legitimacy 
to the movement of the high-value precious metal. The activity noted 
in 2009 related to smuggling of gold bars into Jordan followed by 
deposit into a "gold account" in a Jordanian bank with subsequent 
transfer to other countries like Switzerland ostensibly for the 
jewelry trade. 
Inquiries and assessments conducted during 2009 reveal that Jordan 
continues to be vulnerable to trade-based money laundering, bulk 
cash smuggling, and alternative remittance systems. Data on the 
prevalence of these activities was not available for two reasons: 
recognition of these methodologies in Jordan is relatively new; and 
it is a common practice in Jordan for individuals and businesses of 
all types to first contact the General Intelligence Directorate if 
suspicions of certain crimes surface. Offenses that the populace 
perceives as crimes relating to national security fall into that 
category. Money laundering and terrorist financing are categorized 
in this way. For example, when money services businesses had 
suspicions about persons using their service, their practice has 
been to report it to the General Intelligence Directorate and not 
submit a suspicious activity report to the AMLU. Details of these 
cases are rarely published or revealed. 
In 2008, there was an increase in securities-related financial 
crimes due to the discovery of a number of major Ponzi schemes in 
which thousands of investors lost investments. By year's end there 
were over 50,000 complaints filed relating to these schemes.  By 
mid-2009 426,000 complaints had been filed by 115,000 victims. 
Prosecutors identified 334 companies and 865 individuals involved in 
the schemes and arrested 110 individuals in this approximately 
JD300,000 ($423,000) fraud.  Approximately JD155,000 ($218,550) was 
recovered.  However, since the criminal activity behind the scheme 
was fraud, none of the defendants could be charged with money 
laundering since the penalty exposure for fraud in Jordan is not 
more than three years of incarceration.  Thus, none of the offenses 
are predicate offenses for money laundering. 
Although the GOJ has revealed no indicators of the use of hawala or 
other alternative remittance systems, Jordan's sizeable foreign 
worker population and Jordanian enclaves in the U.S., Europe, and 
Arabian Gulf countries are thought to use this form of cash transfer 
methodology to move legal and illicit funds both out of and into 
Jordan. 
In August 2001, the Central Bank of Jordan (CBJ), which regulates 
Jordan's 24 banks as well as its financial institutions, including 
money services businesses, issued anti-money laundering regulations 
designed to meet some of the FATF 40 Recommendations on Money 
 
Laundering. Subsequently, money laundering has been considered an 
"unlawful activity" subject to criminal prosecution. Jordan's 
banking laws prohibit registration of offshore banks or shell 
companies. In 2002, money laundering was criminalized related to 
insurance operations. 
On July 17, 2007, Jordan enacted Law No. 46 for the Year 2007-the 
Anti Money Laundering Law (AML) that criminalizes money laundering. 
The AML Law does not cover financing of terrorism, but it 
criminalizes money laundering and stipulates as predicate offenses 
to that crime all felony crimes or any Qime stated in international 
agreements to which Jordan is a party whether such crimes are 
committed inside or outside the Kingdom, provided that the act 
committed is subject to criminal penalty in the country in which it 
occurs. Felony crimes are those for which a penalty of three years 
or more of incarceration is attached. With this approach, several of 
the 20 crimes recommended by the FATF for inclusion in AML 
legislation do not meet the penalty level for major crimes and 
therefore are excluded as predicate offenses for money laundering 
under Jordan's current AML Law. The most noteworthy of these are: 
financing of terrorism, smuggling, extortion, intellectual property 
rights violations, sexual exploitation of children, trafficking in 
persons, trafficking in stolen property, and environmental crimes. 
The Banking Law of 2000 (as amended in 2003) allows judges to waive 
bank secrecy provisions in any number of criminal cases, including 
suspected money laundering and terrorist financing. The AML Law 
provides immunity against confidentiality sanctions for obligated 
entities that report suspicious transactions based on the AML Law. 
The effectiveness of the AML Law remains untested as there have been 
no prosecutions for money laundering based on either the CBJ 
regulations or the AML Law. 
The AML law created the National Committee on Anti-Money Laundering 
(NCAML) as well as the Anti-Money Laundering Unit (AMLU) as Jordan's 
financial intelligence unit. The NCAML is chaired by the Governor of 
the Central Bank of Jordan and has as members: a Deputy Governor of 
the Central Bank named by the CBJ Governor to serve as deputy 
chairman of the committee, the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Justice, the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, the Secretary General 
of the Ministry of Social Development (which overseas charitable 
organizations), the Director of the Insurance Commission, the 
Controller General of Companies, a Commissioner of the Securities 
Commission, and the head of the Anti-Money Laundering Unit. The 
NCAML is responsible for: formulating general AML policy, 
supervising the implementation of tasks of the AMLU, facilitating 
and coordinating exchange of information related to money 
laundering, participating in international fora, proposing necessary 
regulations for implementation of the AML Law, coordinating and 
assigning competent parties to generate statistical reports related 
to the AML program of the GOJ, and approving and adopting a budget 
for the AMLU. 
The Ministries of Justice, Interior, Finance, and Social 
Development, as well as the Insurance Commission, Controller General 
of Companies, and Jordan Securities Commission all have a part in 
regulating various other nonfinancial institutions through issued 
regulations and instructions. The AMLU is obligated to work with 
these entities to ensure that comprehensive anti-money 
laundering/countering terrorism financing (AML/CTF) approach is 
undertaken in keeping with international standards and best 
practices. Of the regulatory entities of the GOJ, the Central Bank 
of Jordan, the Jordan Securities Commission, and the Insurance 
Commission of Jordan are best staffed and trained to conduct 
compliance investigations. These entities have issued implementing 
instructions to the regulated entities under their purview 
concerning AML/CTF requirements, which have the force of law. The 
extent of the use of the formal financial system for money 
laundering or terrorist financing is difficult to measure due to the 
lack of reporting data available that clearly identifies these 
offenses. Since the AML Law is still relatively new, some agencies 
of these cabinet level entities lack coordination in the overall 
AML/CTF effort in Jordan. 
The CBJ has a well developed bank supervision department whose 
procedures, until the recent past, focused almost exclusively on 
safety and soundness. However, the CBJ did instruct financial 
institutions to be particularly careful when handling foreign 
currency transactions, especially if the amounts involved are large 
or if the source of funds is in question. The AML Law requires 
obligated entities to: undertake due diligence in identifying 
customers; refrain from dealing with anonymous persons or shell 
banks; report any suspicious transaction to the AMLU; and comply 
with instructions issued by competent regulatory parties to 
implement provisions of the law. The CBJ drafted an AML/CTF 
dedicated bank examination manual in 2008 and adopted it for use in 
early 2009. The manual was also adopted for use by CBJ officials 
charged with inspecting money services businesses (MSB). Financial 
institutions are required under the AML Law to report all suspicious 
 
transactions, whether the transaction was completed or not, via 
suspicious transaction reports (STRs) sent to the AMLU. There is no 
threshold amount below which STRs are not required. Entities 
required to report suspicious transactions include: banks, foreign 
exchange companies, money transfer companies, stock brokerages, 
insurance companies, credit companies, and any company whose 
articles of association state that its activities include debt 
collection and payment services, leasing services, investment and 
financial asset management companies, real estate trading and 
development entities, and companies trading in precious metals and 
stones. Lawyers and accountants are not considered to be obligated 
entities under the law.  There is no reporting threshold which 
requires financial institutions to report large currency 
transactions in the absence of suspicious activity. 
All obligated entities are required to conduct due diligence to 
identify customers; their activities, legal status, and 
beneficiaries; and follow-up on transactions that are conducted 
through an ongoing relationship. Business dealings with anonymous 
persons, persons using fictitious names or shell banks are 
prohibited. Obligated entities are required to comply with 
instructions issued by competent regulatory authorities as listed in 
the law. Disclosure to the customer or the customer's beneficiary of 
STRs and/or verifications or investigations by competent authorities 
is prohibited. They are also required to respond to any inquiry from 
the AMLU regarding STRs or requests for assistance from other 
competent judicial, regulatory, administrative, or security 
authorities needing information to perform their responsibilities. 
GOJ officials report that financial institutions have been filing 
suspicious transaction reports and cooperate with prosecutors' 
requests for information related to narcotics trafficking and 
terrorism cases. Most reporting is done by banking institutions 
which have well-developed AML compliance programs. During 2009, only 
a few STRs came from all the other types of obligated entities. 
There were no arrests or convictions for money laundering or 
terrorist financing in Jordan in 2009. The standard for forwarding 
STRs is a potential problem in the existing law and will require 
significant outreach resources to educate obligated entities. The 
banking, securities, and insurance sectors are the best regulated 
obligated entities and those that have been best educated regarding 
recognizing indicators of money laundering and terrorist financing, 
but there is still much to be done with the other obligated sectors. 
The money services business (MSB) sector is the riskiest obligated 
sector and lacks sufficient regulatory oversight and verification of 
compliance with reporting suspicious transactions of the AML Law. 
Real estate businesses and precious metals and stones dealers are 
also under-regulated and are generally unknowledgeable of their 
responsibilities to report suspicious transactions. 
Charitable associations, although not specified as obligated 
entities, occupy another troublesome sector, which requires better 
regulatory supervision and oversight. There are over 1,000 nonprofit 
organizations registered in Jordan, the majority of which are 
charitable organizations. Oversight responsibility for these rests 
with the Ministry of Social Development, which is understaffed and 
incapable of verifying the financial activities of all of the 
organizations.  All Jordanian civil society and charitable 
organizations must now receive prior approval for use of funds from 
foreign sources.  Organizations must submit the approval request to 
a registrar's office under the Ministry of Social Development but 
final approval must come from the Jordanian Cabinet.  If the entity 
does not receive notification within thirty days of submitting the 
request, the organization can proceed with the funding. These 
changes became effective on September 17, 2009, after a multi-year 
effort to amend legislation governing civil society.  The 
registrar's office is the primary regulatory body for civil society 
organizations and is comprised of representatives from eight 
different government bodies as well as four non-governmental 
representatives approved by the Prime Minister.  The Minister of 
Social Development or her designate heads the registrar.  All 
non-profit companies must also register with the registrar before 
December 2010.  Previously non-governmental organizations had 
several registration options, including under the Ministries of 
Social Development, Industry and Trade, Culture, Justice, and 
Interior.  The degree to which due-diligence is conducted to screen 
for potential money laundering or terrorist financing activity by 
applicants is unknown. Even with the current regulatory scheme, 
provisions to safeguard against abuse for money laundering andQ 
terrorist financing are unproven in practice. 
The AMLU was formed immediately upon passage and enactment of the 
AML Law. The financial intelligence unit is designated by law as an 
independent entity within the organizational structure of the 
Central Bank of Jordan. It is also physically located in and was 
operationally funded for 2009 by the CBJ. The AMLU also uses the CBJ 
server and database for all information technology needs. The AMLU 
was staffed with the same personnel that made up the CBJ's 
Suspicious Transaction Follow-Up Unit, in existence for several 
 
years, and is composed of a director, an outreach officer, one 
attorney, and one analyst. Three additional analysts were added to 
the AMLU staff in 2009.  A comprehensive FIU development plan was 
informally adopted for the AMLU prior to the implementation of the 
AML Law. Until mid-2009 follow-through on this plan was stymied due 
to administrative hurdles until mid-2009 when by-laws governing AMLU 
administration were approved by GOJ Cabinet. A new AMLU chief was 
appointed by the Governor of the CBJ in his capacity as Chairman of 
the NCAML in August 2009.  Office space in a building not owned by 
the CBJ was acquired in November 2009 with plans to occupy the new 
facility shortly after January 1, 2010.  These moves should help to 
reduce questions concerning FIU independence and autonomy. Although 
the AMLU has made overtures to sponsoring countries stating its 
desire to become a member of the Egmont Group of Financial 
Intelligence Units, it is unlikely that it can gain membership until 
2011 at the earliest. 
The AMLU is organized on a general administrative FIU model and is 
responsible for receiving STRs from the obligated entities 
designated in the AML Law, analyzing them, requesting additional 
information related to the reported activity and forwarding the 
information to the prosecutor general for further action if there is 
sufficient cause to believe the transaction is related to money 
laundering or other financial crime activity. The AMLU does not have 
criminal investigative and/or direct regulatory responsibility, but 
it is authorized to require any information needed from obligated 
entities stipulated in the AML Law considered necessary for the 
performance of its duties if the needed information is related to 
information already received by the AMLU. Involvement of the AMLU in 
assisting criminal investigations is dependent on the will of public 
prosecutors to use it. It is authorized to request and coordinate 
with judicial parties, regulatory and supervisory authorities, and 
security (law enforcement) authorities. Suspicious transactions 
identified as potentially related to terrorist financing are outside 
of the AMLU's purview. 
At the end of 2009, the AMLU continued to work toward establishment 
of formal ties through memoranda of understanding with competent GOJ 
authorities possessing the necessary databases and records pertinent 
to pursuing financial intelligence analysis and money laundering 
investigations. The AMLU received approximately 170 STRs in 2009. 
There was no report of any STRs being forwarded to prosecutors for 
further action. No prosecutions for money laundering are known to 
have occurred in Jordan since the enactment of the 2007 AML law. Due 
to lack of knowledge of the AML law, uncertainty about the role of 
the AMLU with its limited personnel and functional capability, few 
prosecutors have considered using the AMLU to assist in criminal 
prosecutions or to charge financial crime violators with money 
laundering. 
One significant challenge facing the GOJ is determining how law 
enforcement entities are tasked to conduct financial investigations 
relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. Law 
enforcement agencies and public prosecutors continue to deliberate 
the question of whether the AML law or the Prevention of Terrorism 
Act of 2006 provides sufficient basis for charging money laundering 
or financing of terrorism. There is no specific GOJ agency 
designated as the lead entity for investigating financial crimes. 
Although the AMLU is required by law to forward findings developed 
from STRs to the public prosecutors of the Ministry of Justice, 
prosecutors of the State Security court also investigate and 
prosecute financial crimes, particularly those that deal with 
national security. In Jordan, a civil law country, prosecutors lead 
all criminal investigations. Investigative field work needed by 
prosecutors for criminal investigations is shared between several 
GOJ law enforcement agencies dependent on the predicate offense 
generating money laundering activity: the Public Security Department 
(PSD-national police service), the General Intelligence Directorate 
(GID-both a criminal investigative agency and intelligence service; 
investigation of all terrorist activity falls to the GID), and the 
Directorate of Military Security (DMS) of the Jordan Armed Forces. 
Jordan Customs also conducts criminal investigations and has its own 
prosecutors, but penalties for customs violations fall below the 
level of a major crime (penalty in excess of three years of 
incarceration). Nearly all customs violations including commercial 
fraud are decided as administrative cases and seldom accrue criminal 
penalties including incarceration. The concept of forwarding large 
monetary value customs fraud cases to public prosecutors for 
criminal investigation and prosecution has not taken root in 
Jordan's legal system. This anomaly leaves the possibility of 
forfeiture of proceeds of customs related criminal activity to the 
Kingdom totally unexploited.  Notwithstanding the lack of emphasis 
on pursuing money laundering or terrorism financing investigations, 
the GOJ has welcomed training to learn how to do so. 
There are six public free trade zones (FTZ) in Jordan: the Zarqa 
Free Zone, the Sahab Free Zone, the Queen Alia International Airport 
Free Zone, the Al-Karak Free Zone, the Al-Karama Free Zone, and the 
Aqaba Special Economic Zone (ASEZ).  With the exception of Aqaba, 
 
these FTZs list their activities merely as trade. There are 36 
private free trade zones, a number of which are related to the 
aviation industry with five more being established. Some of these 
FTZs list their activities as industrial, agricultural, 
pharmaceutical, training of human capital, and multi-purpose. With 
the exception of ASEZ, all free trade zones are regulated by the 
Jordan Free Zones Corporation in the Ministry of Finance and are 
guided by the Law of Free Zones Corporation No. 32 for 1984 (and 
amendments). State security entities regularly circulate information 
and names of suspected individuals and activities to the free trade 
zone areas and this information is always monitored and instructions 
are followed to ensure no abuse of the Free Trade Status of those 
areas.  Vehicles and individuals entering the FTZ are searched by 
both PSD and Customs upon entry and exist.  There is a full set of 
procedures that are implemented. Regulations state that companies 
and individuals using the zones must be identified and registered 
with the Corporation. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone is controlled 
by a ministerial level authority. The Aqaba Special Economic Zone 
Authority (ASEZA) encompasses all of the port city of Aqaba and is 
bounded by Saudi Arabia on the south, Israel on the west and is a 
short ferry ride across the Gulf of Aqaba (Red Sea) to Egypt. ASEZA 
has its own customs authority, which operates separately from Jordan 
Customs and processes all merchandise and commodities destined for 
businesses in the zone. It also processes all passengers entering 
the zone. Jordan Customs processes all shipments of goods in transit 
to areas outside the zone. Awareness of the methodologies and threat 
of trade-based money laundering and bulk cash smuggling was improved 
through training in 2009 for both ASEZA Customs and Jordan Customs. 
Both entities have taken steps to improve inspection and control 
procedures to detect these crimes. Thus far there have been no 
criminal cases involving the FTZs of Jordan that indicate they were 
used for trade-based money laundering, bulk cash smuggling, or 
financing of terrorism. 
The 2007 AML law requires reporting of inbound cross-border movement 
of money if the value exceeds a threshold amount set by the NCAML. 
In 2008, the threshold amount was set by the NCAML at 10,000 
Jordanian Dinars but was raised in 2009 to 15,000 JD (approximately 
$21,150). The threshold amount was officially established and 
transmitted to border control authorities for enforcement. The law 
also provides for the creation of cross-border currency and monetary 
instruments declaration forms.  A declaration form was adopted and 
printed in 2009.  At year's end, Jordan Customs, in consultation 
with the AMLU, was working on a trial implementation plan to assess 
the enforcement of reporting requirements required by the AML law 
through use of the declaration at three ports of entry - Queen Alia 
International Airport, Aqaba Ferry Terminal, and Jabar land 
crossing(Syria). The declaration requirement applies only to the 
entry of money into the Kingdom and not exiting. Jordan Customs is 
responsible for archiving the declaration forms once implemented. 
In December 2004, the United States and Jordan signed an Agreement 
regarding Mutual Assistance between their Customs Administrations 
that provides for mutual assistance with respect to customs offenses 
and the sharing and disposition of forfeited assets. Collaboration 
on mutual money laundering related customs cases has been sparse and 
has been limited mostly to minimal intelligence sharing. The AML Law 
authorizes Customs "to seize or restrain" undeclared money crossing 
the border and report it to the AMLU which will decide whether the 
money should be returned or the case referred to the judiciary. In 
all known cases of detention of undeclared funds discovered during 
customs processing, the money has been returned to the importer. 
Seizure and forfeiture of assets related to criminal activity 
including money laundering and terrorist financing are authorized 
under a combination of statutes principal of which are: the Penal 
Code, the Economic Crimes Law, the Anti Money Laundering Law, the 
Narcotics and Psychotropic Substances Law and the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2006. Jordan's Anti-drugs Law allows the courts to 
seize proceeds and instrumentalities of crime derived from acts 
proscribed by the law. The Economic Crimes Law gives both 
prosecutors and the courts the authority to seize from any person 
proceeds generated by criminal activity under that law for a period 
of three months while an investigation is underway. Jordan's penal 
code further provides prosecutors the authority to confiscate "all 
things" derived from a felony or intended misdemeanor. GOJ officials 
claim that Jordan's cornucopia of seizure laws is sufficient to 
accomplish the purposes of FATF Recommendation 3 regarding authority 
to "confiscate property laundered, proceeds from money laundering or 
predicate offences, instrumentalities used in or intended for use in 
the commission of these offences, or property of corresponding value 
. . ." These statutes concentrate primarily on the proceeds of crime 
and not the means or instrumentalities used to commit a predicate 
offense to money laundering or the financing of terrorism. The 
multi-statute approach to freezing, confiscating or seizing of 
assets makes it unclear as to whether investigators may specifically 
trace and seize assets related to criminal activity. The GOJ has 
been advised by both Council of Europe and U.S. Government advisors 
 
 
that since this position is untested, it would be better to amend 
current or draft new legislation which clearly complies with FATF 
Recommendation 3. The GOJ publishes no statistics related to 
freezing, seizing, forfeiting, or confiscating the proceeds or 
instrumentalities of crime, and it is believed that there is no 
tracking mechanism for such since there is not a statutory provision 
for an asset forfeiture fund or civil forfeiture in Jordan. 
An October 8, 2001 revision to the Penal Code criminalized terrorist 
activities and the financing of terrorist acts. The Prevention of 
Terrorism Act of 2006 also prohibits the financing of terrorist 
acts. However, Jordan has no legislation that prohibits financing of 
terrorist organizations or groups. Guidelines issued by the CBJ 
state that banks should research all sanctions lists relating to 
terrorist financing including those issued by individual countries 
and other relevant authorities. The Central Bank may not circulate 
names on sanctions lists to banks unless the names are included on 
the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. No such 
assets have been identified to date. Banks and other financial 
institutions are required to maintain records for a period of five 
years in order to facilitate investigations. 
Jordan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention 
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and the UN 
Convention against Corruption. Jordan ratified the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime on May 22, 2009. Jordan is a 
charter member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action 
Task Force (MENAFATF) and in 2007 Jordan held the presidency of 
MENAFATF. The GOJ received a MENAFATF Mutual Evaluation in July 
¶2008. The report of that evaluation was accepted by the MENAFATF 
plenary in spring 2009. 
A multitude of deficiencies were detailed in the report.  Of the 
sixteen core and key Financial Action Task Force 40+9 
Recommendations, Jordan was found deficient on fourteen.  Most 
noteworthy of these were absence of some predicate offenses for 
money laundering from the AML law and a corresponding requirement of 
obligated entities to report suspicious activity, lack of AML/CFT 
regulations and provisions relating to due diligence required of 
obligated entities, insufficient record keeping regulations, 
inadequate criminalization of terrorist financing, no requirement 
for the AMLU to receive STRs relating to terrorist financing, lack 
of legal procedures for freezing funds and assets of persons named 
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1267, and lack of or 
insufficient legal basis and/or measures for competent authorities 
to exchange information with counterparts at the international level 
in the field of AML/CFT. 
Jordan's AML Law provides judicial authorities the legal basis to 
cooperate with foreign judicial authorities in providing assistance 
in foreign investigations, extradition, and freezing and seizing of 
funds related to money laundering in accordance with current 
legislation and bilateral or multilateral agreements to which Jordan 
is a part based on reciprocity. Judicial authorities may order 
implementation of requests by foreign judicial authorities to 
confiscate proceeds of crime relating to money laundering and to 
distribute such proceeds in accordance with bilateral or 
multilateral agreements. There was no indication in 2009 that these 
provisions of the AML Law have been used by the GOJ. 
In light of identified statutory and procedural deficiencies coming 
out of the MENAFATF mutual evaluation of 2008, the Government of 
Jordan should conduct a comprehensive evaluation of Jordan's 
capabilities in preventing money laundering and enforcing its new 
law in accordance with international standards and best practices. 
There was little advancement in the AML/CTF regime in 2009. Many of 
the steps in the FIU implementation plan require action or approval 
of the NCAML which has not steadily moved forward in addressing the 
necessary requirements needed for compliance with the FATF 40+9 
recommendations. In spite of numerous criminal cases involving large 
financial value, no prosecutions of money laundering have occurred 
since the passage of the AML Law. GOJ prosecutorial, law enforcement 
and customs entities should examine forms of bulk cash smuggling 
relating to terrorist financing and trade-based money laundering and 
incorporate prevention and investigative strategies that meet the 
requirements of complex financial investigations. Jordan should also 
establish and implement a viable asset forfeiture regime. Charitable 
and nonprofit organizations should have better supervision and 
oversight. Per FATF Special Recommendation IX, Jordan's cross-border 
currency reporting should include outbound declarations. Jordan 
should draft, pass and implement legislation which meets 
international standards concerning the financing of terrorism as it 
is committed to do by virtue of its membership in the United Nations 
and in MENAFATF. The AML Law should be amended to include as 
predicate offenses to money laundering all crimes indicated by the 
FATF Forty Recommendations as well as any offense or act that causes 
a loss of revenue to the Kingdom in excess of 10,000 Jordanian 
Dinars (approximately $14,100). Many offenses that generate large 
illicit sums that are currently outside of the reach of the AML 
Law's definition of money laundering could be targeted. This would 
 
improve the financial sector in Jordan thus helping the Kingdom to 
comport with international standards. 
MANDEL