VZCZCXRO6298
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #1141/01 3570747
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 230747Z DEC 09 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8258
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 1053
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6819
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1994

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001141 
 
(C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y - ADD SENSITIVE CAPTION AND ADDEE NIAMEY) 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE AND NCTC 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER ASEC AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 
 
REF: STATE 109980 
 
ALGIERS 00001141  001.3 OF 003 
 
 
¶1. (U) The security situation in Algeria was marked by a 
decrease in the number of high-profile terrorist attacks 
throughout the country, although ongoing low-level terrorist 
activities, comparable to guerilla insurgency operations, 
continued in non-urban areas.  Previously, the Salafist Group 
for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which formally affiliated 
with al-Qa'ida in 2006 and now calls itself al-Qa'ida in the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), focused on targeting Algerian 
government interests and had been more averse to suicide 
attacks and civilian casualties.  Although Algerian 
government interests remained the primary focus of AQIM, its 
continued resort to kidnappings for ransom inside Algeria and 
expansion of such operations against westerners in the Sahel 
region confirmed AQIM's continued embrace of tactics imported 
from Iraq and Afghanistan.  Algerian government 
counterterrorism operations, which included an increased 
security presence and the dismantling of support and 
recruitment networks, restrained AQIM's capacity to conduct 
high-profile attacks, particularly in major Algerian cities. 
There have been no suicide bombings since March.  The month 
of Ramadan, typically a period of frequent attacks, remained 
quiet.  Nevertheless, AQIM carried out lethal operations, 
using ambushes and roadside bombs against government and 
civilian targets, particularly in the Kabylie region east of 
Algiers, and increased its terrorist activities along the 
Algerian-Malian border.  The information in this report is 
derived from Algerian press reporting. 
 
¶2. (U) Two events in recent years helped heighten concerns 
about terrorism in Algeria:  the September 2006 merger of 
elements of the GSPC with al-Qa'ida (AQ) to form AQIM and the 
conclusion of the amnesty period for Algeria's Charter for 
Peace and National Reconciliation in August 2006.  National 
reconciliation remains a contentious issue for many 
Algerians, who are still divided over whether amnesty and 
re-integration or a more aggressive, unforgiving approach to 
terrorism is the best way to address the continuing threat. 
Although the Charter has officially expired, its terms may 
still be applied on a case-by-case basis at the exclusive 
discretion of the Algerian president. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Following the September 11, 2006, announcement of 
affiliation with AQ, AQIM began to increase threats against 
what it termed "crusading" westerners, particularly American 
and French citizens, although English, Swiss, Chinese, 
Russians, Ukrainians, Danes, Austrians, Italian, Spanish, and 
Canadians have been targeted as well.  Even before its 
official affiliation with AQ, the GSPC was an organization 
whose regional and international ties were expanding.  AQIM 
support cells have been discovered and dismantled in Spain, 
Italy, Morocco, Mauritania, and Mali, and AQIM maintained 
training camps and support networks in northern Mali. 
 
¶4. (U) The year was punctuated with several high-profile 
terrorist attacks: 
 
  On March 9, two people were killed when an AQIM suicide 
bomber attacked a communal guard post in Tadmait, 70km east 
of Algiers. 
 
  On June 17, AQIM killed 18 officers in an attack against a 
gendarme escort guarding a group of Chinese workers near 
Bordj Bou Arreridj, east of Algiers. 
 
  On July 29, AQIM killed 23 soldiers in an ambush against a 
military supply convoy near Damous, 150km west of Algiers. 
 
  On August 4, terrorists injured 25 people, including four 
police officers, in a vehicle borne IED at a police station 
in Tizi Ouzou, east of Algiers. 
 
  On October 22, terrorists killed seven and wounded three 
Algerian security guards working for a Canadian water 
project. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The majority of attacks have occurred in rural and 
suburban areas.  Terrorists have been very careful to 
establish remote bases, communicate sparingly, and carry out 
meticulously-planned attacks.  AQIM does not have significant 
popular support and is not assessed as strong enough to bring 
down the Algerian government.  AQIM appears aware of the need 
to avoid civilian casualties, but this has been difficult to 
accomplish as its police and military targets often operate 
among civilians.  When security forces are in the 
countryside, approaching terrorists often stand out and are 
intercepted before they can successfully complete their 
attacks.  Roadside bombs and ambushes persist despite the 
 
ALGIERS 00001141  002.3 OF 003 
 
 
efforts of the security forces.  The combination of a 
population weary of civilian casualties from over a decade of 
Islamic terrorist violence and the growing availability and 
use of cell phones has made the terrorists more vulnerable to 
detection and attack by the police.  At the same time, the 
Algerian government has had limited success in reducing 
unemployment, which unofficially is more than 25 percent, or 
in implementing significant economic reforms.  This has 
contributed to a slow but steady recruitment rate for AQIM 
and criminal gangs in general. 
 
¶6. (U) AQIM's strategy in Algeria appears to be influenced by 
AQ's experience in Iraq.  AQIM has issued directions, 
following massive suicide attacks in 2007, to avoid civilian 
deaths, and attacks since have been concentrated once more on 
military, police and foreign national targets.  AQIM is 
likely seeking to disrupt business and commercial activity 
and probably uses such attacks to discourage foreign 
investment.  The overall civilian death toll due to terrorist 
attacks has been declining in recent years.  During the civil 
war that began in 1992 and had largely subsided by 2000, 
Algerian Islamic terrorists killed on average more than 
10,000 people a year, with the majority being civilians--well 
over ten times the yearly number of AQIM victims today.  The 
relative lack of civilian dead enables the new generation of 
Algerian terrorists to publicize their actions more 
energetically. 
 
¶7. (SBU) In the past, Algerian security services have 
expressed concern about AQIM using propaganda based on the 
call to fight in Iraq as a hook to recruit young people, many 
of whom never made it to Iraq but were redirected towards 
joining local groups.  In previous years, AQIM propaganda 
videos originating in Algeria were of amateur quality and 
poorly produced.  This has changed dramatically.  It was 
evident that AQIM has placed a greater emphasis on improving 
the quality of the videos, and these videos and communiques 
were orchestrated to attract Algerian youth to the AQIM 
"cause."  Several videos posted on the Internet, such as the 
series "Shadows of the Sword" and "Apostate Hell," showed 
operations conducted against Algerian military and security 
targets that included preparations for the attacks and pre- 
briefings with the commanders that led the attacks.  The 
ability to conduct an attack and claim responsibility via 
communique within hours demonstrated the importance AQIM 
placed in transmitting its message in an attempt to win the 
media war. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Criminal activities, such as holdups of motorists at 
roadblocks on remote roads (often disguised to look like 
security forces roadblocks), armed robbery, and kidnapping of 
Algerian citizens remain critical to funding operations of 
the cash-strapped AQIM units located in northern Algeria. 
Kidnapping of westerners in the Sahel region, to include the 
most recent kidnappings in Mali and Mauritania, underscore 
how AQIM's semi-autonomous units in the Sahel have come to 
rely on the revenues from ransoming westerners to provide 
cash infusions into the overall network intended to finance 
local operations and those in northern Algeria.  The use of 
suicide car bombs, suicide vests, and other improvised 
explosive devices by Algerian terrorists continues to 
indicate a significant level of AQIM inspiration by, if not 
cooperation and training with, terrorists from abroad.  The 
increasingly sophisticated tactics used in Iraq have had a 
profound effect on the level of organization and 
sophistication employed by terrorists in Algeria.  Funding 
for AQIM remains problematic, especially in the north of 
Algeria.  As noted above, AQIM relies heavily on kidnapping 
for ransom (in Algeria and the Sahel), extortion, and 
smuggling in southern Algeria/northern Mali.  The latter 
activities may involve the regional trade in narcotics, 
although information is mostly anecdotal and fragmentary. 
Individual AQIM cells in Europe likely also provide support 
through small-scale funding. 
 
¶9. (SBU) It has been estimated that Algerian security forces 
killed, wounded, or arrested nearly 1,300 terrorists in 2009, 
compared to an estimated combined figure of about 1,000 for 
¶2008.  (Note:  These figures are entirely based on press 
accounts, usually drawn from information passed to reporters 
by the GOA.  It is hard to verify them independently.  The 
difficulty of accepting these figures on their face is due to 
the fact that they come close to exceeding most estimates of 
the actual number of active AQIM fighters still operating in 
northern Algeria.  End note)  The counterterrorism successes 
of the Algerian services, combined with the public rejection 
of terrorism, possibly reduced AQIM's overall effectiveness 
during the past two years.  The Algerian government hosted a 
meeting of the military chiefs of staff from Mali, Libya, 
 
ALGIERS 00001141  003.3 OF 003 
 
 
Mauritania, and Niger in August to develop a regional 
counterterrorism strategy and establish a regional command 
center in the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset.  Algeria 
also proposed language for part of a UN Security Council 
resolution that would criminalize the payment of ransoms to 
terrorist groups in exchange for kidnapping victims.  During 
2008, the government of Algeria instituted a program to hire 
100,000 new police and gendarme officers, reinforce the 
borders, augment security at airports, and increase the 
overall security presence in major cities.  The initiative 
was effective in reducing the impact of terrorist incidents 
and also demonstrated the government of Algeria's 
determination to fight terrorism. 
 
¶10. (SBU) AQIM, thanks in part to high unemployment among 
Algerian youth, was partially successful in replenishing its 
numbers after the arrest or death of an estimated 1,300 
terrorists.  Those remaining appeared to be more hard-line 
and resistant to the government's amnesty offer.  Despite 
continued AQIM attacks, the overall security situation 
remained greatly improved from the situation of the late 
1990s.  That said, the Algerian military and security forces 
must continuously adapt to AQIM's changing tactics and accept 
that an organization that had primarily been a local threat 
now has a reach that extends to the surrounding region and 
has international ties.  Algerian security and military 
forces remained capable of handling a prolonged effort 
against internal terrorist threats and were a reliable 
counterterrorism partner. 
 
¶11. (U) Embassy point of contact is Political-Economic Chief 
Michael Bosshart:  bosshartmr@state.gov 
JORDAN