VZCZCXRO9939
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2959/01 3520816
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 180816Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7202
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8007
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002959 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/RSA, AF/E, AND IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AU MASS PREL SO
SUBJECT: USAU: AMISOM EXPERTS MEET FOLLOWING AUC MINISTERIAL 
 
REF: ADDIS ABABA 002946 
 
THIS MESSAGE IS FROM USAU AMBASSADOR MICHAEL A. BATTLE. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY:  At a December 15 meeting of experts 
focusing on Somalia, the Force Commander advocated for an 
increase in AMISOM's troop strength in order to help the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) stabilize Mogadishu, as 
well as an internatQally supported program to encourage 
defection from insurgent groups.  Experts called on the TFG 
President to formally approve a three-phase training plan for 
Somali forces, and to provide strategic vision to guide 
partner assistance.  The TFG was also encouraged to step up 
information operations with its newly installed radio 
transmitter.  END SUMMARY. 
 
General Situation 
----------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) AMISOM Force Commander Major General Nathan Mugisha 
characterized the security situation as volatile, with 
al-Shabaab having reinforced Mogadishu and engaged in a new 
offensive on AMISOM.  He said the TFG is endeavoring to 
reorganize and bring cohesion to its coalition.  He clarified 
that President Sheikh Sharif and his cabinet are putting 
priority on the security sector, as evidenced by new 
high-level appointments in the Somali Police and the Somali 
National Armed Forces (SNAF). 
 
Operational Realities 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Mugisha stated that the TFG must secure Mogadishu. 
Without Mogadishu, the TFG is negotiating from a position of 
weakness, and until Mogadishu is taken all of the other 
things the TFG is trying to achieve are of marginal utility. 
Mugisha insisted that his primary role as Force Commander was 
to enable the TFG to stabilize Mogadishu.  He suggested for 
the first time that AMISOM's originally planned end strength 
of 8,000 troops is insufficient for today's realities, and 
called for an increase to 12,000 peace-keepers.  With 12,000 
AMISOM troops and 20,000 Somali Security Forces, Mugisha 
claimed he could pacify Mogadishu and possibly seize Kismayo. 
(NOTE: UNSOA's 2010-2011 budget assumes an 8,000-man force.) 
 
¶4. (SBU) On support to TFG forces, Mugisha reported that 
AMISOM is working with ex-Somali servicemen from the Siad 
Barre era and new troops recently trained in Djibouti to 
transform them into three "fighting units."  Once formed, the 
units would undergo one month of refresher training from 
AMISOM before being deployed.  Mugisha stated that he is 
preparing Somali troops for platoon-level combat, and that 
his biggest challenge is developing capable and loyal small 
unit leaders (NCOs, lieutenants, and captains). 
 
¶5. (SBU) Regarding new training initiatives to build the 
SNAF, Head of the Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) 
Sivuyile Bam confirmed that Peace and Security Commissioner 
Ramtane Lamamra has approved a three-phased process 
consisting of induction in Mogadishu, training abroad, and 
reintegration in Mogadishu. Per Lamamra's instruction, PSOD 
is now clarifying roles and modalities, as well as standing 
up an AMISOM training cell to assist in this training 
initiative.  The SRCC's office insisted that partners' offers 
of future training support would be accepted only on the 
condition that 12-18 months of stipends are included in the 
package. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Mugisha identified another challenge in that there 
is reportedly no program that caters to defectors from the 
various insurgent groups.  He suggested that more would join 
ranks with TFG if there were an organized and attractive 
program that was properly publicized. Why defect to the TFG 
if it cannot feed its own troops, Mugisha asked rhetorically. 
 
 
The Information War 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Mugisha noted that al-Shabaab is seen by Somalis as 
the most unpopular force on the ground, yet the TFG does not 
seem to be exploiting this weakness.  Several experts 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002959  002 OF 002 
 
 
reinforced Mugisha's statement with calls for the TFG to use 
the recent suicide bombing at a graduation of medical 
students which killed four Somali ministers and at least 18 
others to drive a wedge between Shabaab and the Somali 
populace, as well as exploit Somali xenophobia with constant 
reminders of Shabaab's foreign elements and ideology.  The 
TFG's Radio Mogadishu is being used to inform the public, but 
is not yet being used offensively against Shabaab.  The TFG's 
lack of information operations sophistication was evident in 
the immediate aftermath of the December 3 suicide attack on 
the medical graduation ceremony when Radio Mogadishu staff 
contemplated going off the air for three days of mourning. 
The SRCC's office reportedly convinced them that this was 
precisely the time to remain on the air, but conceded that 
more should be done to take the initiative away from the 
extremists who dominate the media. 
 
Strategic Imperatives 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) Several interlocutors implored the TFG to provide 
more strategic vision to guide partner assistance.  Mr. Bam 
called on President Sharif to address the AU's Peace and 
Security Council in January, and maybe even the UNSC, to 
provide clarity for international partners.  He noted, for 
example, that the TFG has yet to formally approve the 
aforementioned three-phased training initiative. The Military 
Advisor to the SRCC stated that the UN Political Office for 
Somalia (UNPOS) and the Force Commander would press the TFG 
at the meeting of the International Contact Group in Jeddah 
on December 16-17 to approve the concept.  He also announced 
that following the meeting in Jeddah, the Joint Security 
Committee would produce a short paper outlining priorities 
and required resources for prospective donors.  The UNPOS 
representative expounded, saying that in Jeddah the TFG will 
present four papers and lead discussions on coordination 
mechanisms, security, reconciliation, and recovery.  The 
UNPOS representative also anticipated a surprise announcement 
in Jeddah, with TFG bringing Al Sunnah wa Al Jammah (ASWJ) 
into the political process. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Mr. Bam reported that he anticipates no fundamental 
change in AMISOM's mandate, which is set to expire in 
mid-January.  Bam predicted that the mandate would be 
extended for at least six months, if not through the end of 
the mandated life of the TFG (i.e. August 2011).  Bam 
cautioned the experts group against a "Christmas tree 
mandate" like MONUC, advocating instead that AMISOM be 
limited to a few, achievable tasks. 
 
¶10. (SBU) COMMENT: One important sentiment throughout the 
meeting was that time is not working in AMISOM's favor. 
Given that AMISOM's mandate is to support the TFG, and that 
the transitional period expires in August 2011, the AU views 
the next 18 months as critical.  While the AU welcomes 
newfound offers of support from the international community, 
it questions whether the United Nations and other partners 
can react quickly enough to make a difference in the life of 
the TFG.  The EU's training of Somali forces, for example, 
will only begin in May 2010 and will last 9-12 months, 
producing a maximum of 2,000 troops. END COMMENT. 
MUSHINGI