VZCZCXRO7791
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #2946/01 3501403
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161403Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7176
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 8000

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 002946 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA 
PARIS FOR WBAIN 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL AU
SUBJECT: USAU: AMISOM MEETING UNDERSCORES FRUSTRATION, 
PLEAS FOR TROOPS, FUNDS, EQUIPMENT 
 
THIS MESSAGE IS FROM USAU AMBASSADOR MICHAEL A. BATTLE. 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At a December 14 meeting at the AU, AMISOM 
stakeholders and partners expressed their frustration with 
the ongoing danger in Somalia and discussed how to improve 
the situation.  Many underscored the need to enhance the TFG 
and its security forces, as well as the need for partners to 
make good on troop, funding, and equipment commitments.  AU 
Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra discussed 
transforming AMISOM into a UN force.  Participants also 
addressed the utility of training in the absence of 
sufficient equipment and timely troop payments.  The lack of 
change in the overall situation and concomitant frustration 
has led key players to urge those involved to think outside 
the box, and to transfer more responsibility to the Somali 
people.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------- 
FRUSTRATION WITH DIRE SITUATION 
------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) African Union (AU) Peace and Security Commissioner 
Ramtane Lamamra chaired a December 14 meeting in Addis Ababa 
of the African Union Commission, Ministers of Defense of the 
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Troop Contributing 
Countries (TCCs), and partners.  During the meeting, 
participants reiterated their frustration with the dire 
situation in Somalia.  The AMISOM Force Commander, Major 
General Nathan Mugisha, noted the strong influence of 
al-Shabaab, particularly in Mogadishu in recent weeks.  He 
listed the following nine challenges that AMISOM faces: 
 
-- An inadequate number of troops for both AMISOM and 
Transitional Federal Government forces (TFG) 
-- Stakeholders' understanding of the AMISOM mandate and the 
limitations that restrict their assistance 
-- TFG's lack of cohesion 
-- Operational limitations, such as the small maritime force 
that covers only a fraction of Somalia's 3000 km coast 
-- Lack of capability to track aircraft going in and out of 
Mogadishu (NOTE: The reason for wanting an air traffic 
control system, as Mugisha seemed to be saying, was not 
clear, even after asking for clarification.  END NOTE.) 
-- Difficulty deploying other components such as humanitarian 
aid 
-- Improvised Explosive Devises (IEDs), suicide bombers, 
pirates, and spoilers 
-- Difficulty obtaining timely information 
 
-------------------------------- 
"SOMALIZE" FORCES   AU/UN HYBRID 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Given AMISOM's high level of frustration in Somalia, 
meeting participants discussed possible ways to improve 
AMISOM's efforts.  Several speakers mentioned the need to 
empower the TFG, enhance Somali capacity, and focus on the 
"Somalization of forces."  The Ugandan Ambassador to Ethiopia 
and the AU, Mull Katende, stated that AMISOM could follow its 
mandate, but the "security of the country is the 
responsibility of the Somalis." 
 
¶4. (SBU) During the meeting, Lamamra stated that AMISOM 
should become a UN force.  AMISOM represents the 
international community, he reasoned, and UN involvement will 
help to ensure that the international community can reach its 
objectives in Somalia.  He reiterated this point the 
following day at an AU Partners Group Peace and Security 
meeting, explaining that the AU and UN are building a hybrid 
force in Somalia.  The UN will handle logistics, while the AU 
will supply human resources.  The ultimate goal is to 
transform AMISOM into a UN peace-keeping operation, though 
the UN balks at this notion, saying there is no peace to keep 
in Somalia. 
 
¶5. (SBU) While the UN has agreed to get involved by providing 
logistical support, there are limitations on what it can 
contribute, a fact referenced in the meeting on AMISOM.  The 
UN cannot, for example, pay salaries to Somali forces or fund 
the purchase of lethal equipment with assessed contributions. 
 The UN-administered trust funds, one for AMISOM and the 
 
ADDIS ABAB 00002946  002 OF 002 
 
 
other for the TFG, also have various strings attached that 
may make for a more complicated picture than Lamamra paints. 
 
----------------------- 
UNFULFILLED COMMITMENTS 
----------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Much discussion focused on AMISOM's unfulfilled 
needs in terms of troops, funds, and equipment.  The Force 
Commander reminded participants of the commitment Djibouti 
made to contribute troops to AMISOM, while others urged their 
African counterparts to step up to the plate as TCCs.  (NOTE: 
 No potential additional TCCs besides Djibouti were mentioned 
specifically.  END NOTE).  The issue of delays in the 
payments of stipends arose, with European Union (EU) 
representatives assuring those present that over five million 
euro should have reached the AU by day's end, as well as 30 
million euro before Christmas to make troop payment possible. 
 Participants also discussed lack of equipment as an 
impediment to success.  On a positive note, the UN will start 
to reimburse TCCs for non-lethal, Contingent Owned Equipment 
(i.e. TCC-owned equipment used in Somalia).  In general, 
participants sung a familiar refrain that commitments have 
not been honored in a timely fashion, negatively impacting 
the mission in Somalia and allowing al-Shabaab to gain 
strength. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Significant debate centered around the utility of 
training troops.  The Force Commander stated that AMISOM's 
recommended process was to "train massively," and the EU 
discussed its substantial training efforts.  The Somali 
Foreign Minister, however, argued that "training is OK when 
the situation is normal, but we need to turn the tide against 
insurgencies."  Given the exceptional situation in Somalia, 
and the lack of sufficient equipment and timely troop 
payments, he felt that training would not make AMISOM or 
Somali forces effective.  Moreover, AMISOM and its partners 
could end up training the enemy if dissatisfied troops join 
the insurgents.  Ugandan Ambassador Katende emphasized the 
need not simply to train and equip troops, but also to retain 
them with regular pay, competent leadership, basic equipment, 
and esprit de corps. 
 
¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: Recurring difficulties on the ground in 
Somalia have left those involved frustrated and desperate for 
stakeholders and partners to make good on their promises.  In 
recent months, Lamamra has indicated the need to brainstorm 
new approaches and think outside the box.  At the December 15 
meeting with partner Ambassadors, he asked, "Are we winning 
or are we wasting time, energy, and resources just to 
maintain the status quo?"  He then noted that developing a 
new strategy in the coming weeks or months would be 
appropriate.  His repeated call for more resources to go to 
the Somali Security Forces, and his confidence in an AU/UN 
hybrid force in Somalia, could signal the AU's desire to 
relinquish a degree of responsibility for AMISOM.  As Lamamra 
put it, "AMISOM should not be seen as a substitute for the 
Somali Security Forces."  END COMMENT. 
MUSHINGI