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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000250 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL RU OSCE
SUBJECT: THE OSCE'S CORFU PROCESS STARTS TO GROW LEGS 
 
REF: A. USOSCE 249 
     ¶B. USOSCE 246 
     ¶C. USOSCE 231 
     ¶D. USOSCE 223 
     ¶E. USOSCE 200 
     ¶F. USOSCE 146 
 
 SUMMARY 
¶1.  (SBU) Following seven out of ten sessions of informal but 
carefully developed dialogue among OSCE PermReps under the 
umbrella of the Corfu Process (CP), a consensus has emerged 
that the discussions have served a useful purpose, 
particularly in three areas.  First, the CP provides a strong 
 answer to the incessant Russian demands for a dialogue on 
European Security (even if Moscow claims the CP is separate 
from their initiative for a European Security Treaty). 
Second, Europe is obviously not fully "whole, free and at 
peace," and a better analysis and consensus on where it falls 
short is clearly needed.  Finally, the CP has revitalized the 
political dialogue and breathed new life into the sclerotic 
methods, procedures and reputation of the OSCE, offering a 
constructive path forward on addressing Europe's frozen 
conflicts.  Yet, just as the CP has started to flesh out a 
purpose, it has been buffeted by two other emerging factors: 
the upcoming Kazakh Chairmanship of the OSCE and Astana's 
desire to host a summit next year. 
¶2.  (SBU) The OSCE remains the only Euro-Atlantic and 
Eurasian forum embracing a comprehensive concept of security, 
involving human, economic and political-military dimensions, 
and where 56 states  participate on an equal basis.  It is in 
the interest of the United States to support and promote the 
CP, both as a means of tackling the lingering security 
concerns in Europe and developing a more effective regional 
framework for confronting 21st Century security challenges. 
USOSCE has put forward proposals that would deepen the 
dialogue in Vienna next year and extend it to a wider range 
of participants.  While a challenge in some respects, the 
Kazakh Chairmanship and its ardent desire for a summit also 
present us with an opportunity to extend the influence of the 
OSCE in Eurasia and to gain greater Russian buy in to the 
organization.  End summary. 
Background 
¶3.  (SBU) Sensing an opportunity during its 2009 OSCE 
Chairmanship, Greece has developed and nurtured a 
comprehensive dialogue within the OSCE on the nature and 
extent of continuing challenges to European and Eurasian 
security in the 21st Century.  Known as the Corfu Process, it 
was launched at an informal OSCE Ministerial June 28-29, 
2009, held on the Greek island of Corfu.  Ministers agreed in 
Corfu that the dialogue was worth pursuing and tasked their 
Permanent Representatives in Vienna with following up.  The 
Greeks scheduled ten informal PermRep meetings beginning 
early September to cover security challenges in each of the 
three dimensions, as well as more generalized discussions 
focusing on the work and accomplishments of the OSCE and the 
causes of conflict. 
¶4.  (SBU) Contemplating the added workload, many delegations 
initially wondered whether anything would really change, 
suggesting privately this was another futile effort by the 
OSCE to reinvent itself.  Nevertheless, most delegations we 
met with in the past week, especially during and after the 
October 30-31 Ambassadors' Retreat, expressed pleasant 
surprise at the altered atmosphere and attitudes of 
participants.  The discussions around the table, most 
recently during a November 2 stocktaking session, were 
remarkably responsive to the input and comments of other 
delegations and indicated that a subtle, more nuanced 
understanding of the concerns and priorities of every 
delegation is beginning to emerge.  Delegations have 
frequently cited as factors in the change the active 
engagement by the U.S., the civil tone employed by both the 
Russian and U.S. delegations during meetings, and, most 
recently, the positive remarks about the OSCE and the Corfu 
Process at the Helsinki Commission October 28  by Assistant 
Secretaries Gordon and Posner and ASD Vershbow. 
Nevertheless, any sort of cohesion around specific outcomes 
for the process is still hard to come by.  In addition, the 
continued impasse over CFE and CSBMs with Russia will likely 
exert a negative influence.  Delegations are now focusing on 
how to take the process forward in 2010 and build on the 
perceived progress. 
Rubber Meets Road 
¶5.  (SBU) A key decision point for the CP will be at the 
OSCE's annual Ministerial Council, to be held December 1-2 in 
Athens.  Participating States (pS) will be called upon to 
approve a Ministerial Declaration that reiterates the 
validity of OSCE principles and commitments--as well as the 
concept of comprehensive, cooperative and indivisible 
security--and pledges continuing strategic dialogue in the 
 
USOSCE 00000250  002 OF 003 
 
 
framework of the CP.  In addition, there will likely be a 
Ministerial Decision outlining the next stage in the Process. 
 Together, these two documents should strike a balance 
between enough specificity to circumscribe the leeway of the 
incoming Kazakh Chairmanship and flexibility to underscore 
the need for continued and defined progress.  Although the 
Greeks have also proposed a political declaration, many 
believe that this is mostly a "cover" to protect the Corfu 
Process declaration:  when no consensus is reached on the 
political declaration-- as is likely--the Chair will plead 
for consensus on the Corfu declaration. 
¶6.  (SBU) There is a general consensus emerging on what the 
follow-on process for 2010 will involve.  First, deeper and 
more extensive discussions should be held, focused on several 
key topics:  conflict prevention and resolution; arms control 
and CSBMs; transnational threats and challenges; human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and democracy; need for greater 
implementation of commitments; and ways to create, upgrade or 
make better use of existing OSCE mechanisms/instruments 
across all three dimensions.  The informal CP meetings should 
be on a more or less monthly basis, and involve a wider range 
of participants, including from capitals, international 
organizations and civil society.  U.S. suggestions on a new 
mechanism for more rapid and effective OSCE crisis response 
and suggestions for an informal working group to look ahead 
to possible concrete outcomes have, on the whole, been warmly 
received.  Second, a more formal process, such as joint 
FSC/PC meetings or a  "Committee of the Whole" might be 
needed to approve any recommendations developed in the 
informal meetings. 
Russia 
¶7.  (SBU) The CP presents Moscow with a dilemma, which it has 
so far opted to sidestep.  Given the fact that the process 
was launched in part to address Russian concerns about an 
uneven security landscape in Europe --USOSCE has publicly 
thanked Russia on several occasions for inspiring the Corfu 
Process dialogue--Russia should have embraced the 
reassessment the CP represents.  However, in reaffirming the 
central role of the OSCE and its comprehensive approach in 
European security, the CP sidetracks Russia's intention to 
confine discussions to hard security and produce a binding 
Treaty on European security.  Despite the insistence of an 
overwhelming majority of pS that all discussions on European 
security should be concentrated within the CP and the OSCE, 
the Russians have insisted on the creation of a parallel 
track in other fora.  As if to underscore their ambivalence, 
even as Russia participates, often in a somewhat reluctant 
fashion, in the CP discussions, they have sent conflicting 
signals on their intention to present a draft European 
security treaty text in Vienna and elsewhere the week before 
the Athens Ministerial. 
Platform for Cooperative Security 
¶8.  (SBU) During the course of the CP discussions, Russian 
representatives have insisted on a high-level meeting of the 
five major European security organizations -- OSCE, NATO, 
CIS, CSTO and the EU.  Russia has suggested that this meeting 
could take place under the auspices of the OSCE,s Platform 
for Cooperative Security (PCS).  Agreed to at the 1999 
Istanbul Summit, the PCS encourages a mutually reinforcing 
working relationship between the OSCE and other organizations 
"concerned with the promotion of comprehensive security 
within the OSCE area."  Leaving aside the fact that neither 
the CSTO nor the CIS would meet the criteria specified in the 
PCS, we and some of our NATO allies have expressed concerns 
about any steps toward such a meeting, which would put these 
organizations on an equal footing with NATO.  Although the 
recent change in the Greek government seems to have weakened 
plans to propose or support such a meeting on the margins of 
the Athens ministerial, we remain uncertain whether the 
Greeks have sufficiently internalized our opposition. 
Frozen Conflicts 
¶9. (SBU) Leaving aside tactical and process considerations, 
the CP potentially carries with it the seeds for tackling 
Europe's frozen conflicts -- Moldova/Transniestria, 
Nagorno-Karabakh and even Georgia and its breakaway regions. 
In establishing a common framework for considering the 
factors that contribute to conflict and confrontation as well 
as making more effective use of new or improved instruments 
for resolution, the CP has played a valuable role in focusing 
attention on needed next steps.  It is still too early for a 
firm conclusion, and the situation in Georgia remains bleak, 
but the fact that the involved parties can sit in the same 
room and freely express their perspectives and views- 
generally without histrionics--is a meaningful step forward. 
Kazakhstan and an OSCE Summit 
x.  (SBU) As this stage of the CP reaches its end game at 
Athens, the incoming Kazakh Chairmanship and its plans to 
host a summit in 2010 are increasingly roiling the waters. 
Delegations are concerned about the Kazakh Chairmanship's 
 
USOSCE 00000250  003 OF 003 
 
 
suitability and capability to manage the CP, questioning 
their exposure and experience, along with their potential 
lack of even-handedness, given their apparent fealty to a 
Russian-centric view of the world.  In addition, in their 
quest for a summit the Kazakhs seem prepared to hijack the 
substance and purpose of the Corfu process, and use the 
ongoing discussions under this framework both as a 
justification for and an output of the summit. In particular, 
they spoke about using the summit to launch: 1) "a process of 
negotiations on issues related to the security of Europe," 
including new threats; 2) negotiations "on key issues of 
security in Europe," such as CFE and CSBMs; and 3) reviewing 
and strengthening instruments to assist in implementation of 
existing commitments, especially in the human dimension. We 
will need to push back firmly on any notion that the little 
progress so far realized in the Vienna discussions is ripe 
for any sort of high-level review or push.  Unfortunately, 
some countries appear ready to support the Summit idea. 
However, there are indications that the Kazakhs may in fact 
still be searching for the perfect topic and format to 
showcase their president and country in a high-level meeting. 
 USOSCE continues to suggest alternatives to a Summit that 
might satisfy this desire. 
OUR NEXT STEPS 
¶10.  (SBU) We should arrive in Athens  prepared to agree to a 
CP Declaration and Decision that takes the process to the 
next phase, to a dialogue that is more focused and deeper, 
involving a wider range of participants.  These documents 
will represent the highlights of the Ministerial and solidify 
the process of political dialogue for 2010.  USOSCE will 
continue to oppose using the CP as a justification for a 2010 
summit.  We should also hold firm against efforts to 
subjugate the process to Russia's aims for a legally-binding 
treaty and a high-level meeting of the five major European 
security organizations. 
FULLER