VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0529/01 3241609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201609Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0316
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0226

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000529 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA/BOG TECHNICAL BRIEFING: AGENCY 
REAFFIRMS SYRIA SHOULD HAVE DECLARED URANYL NITRATE IMPORT 
 
REF: UNVIE 00521 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1.  (SBU) The IAEA Technical Briefing on Syria did not yield 
many new details beyond those in the Director General's 
November 16 report.  The Secretariat made its pitch for the 
need to continue the Al Kibar investigation, repeating its 
outstanding requests for specific Syrian cooperation.  DCM 
asked the only questions of the Secretariat, inquiring after 
additional details on the safeguards implications of the 
import of uranyl nitrate and asking where the yellowcake used 
in experiments at the MNSR was produced.  In response, the 
IAEA confirmed that Syria had a safeguards obligation to 
report the import of uranyl nitrate.  The Secretariat also 
confirmed that the yellowcake used in the MNSR experiments 
was produced at the IAEA Technical Cooperation 
(TC)-subsidized facility at Homs (a pilot plant for producing 
uranium yellowcake as a by-product of phosphates used in 
fertilizer production).  Notably, Syrian Atomic Energy 
Director Ibrahim Othman did not speak, although he has 
commented in each of the previous technical briefings since 
the Al Kibar reactor issue came to light.  (Comment:  We 
presume Othman may not have wanted to dwell on a report that 
seems to presage a confirmation before the next Board meeting 
in March of safeguards failures in Syria.  Mission will 
consult like-minded states as to their reactions to the 
confirmation that the experiments involved yellowcake from a 
TC-financed facility, and consider whether this fact might be 
leveraged to pursue transparency and reform in how TC is 
monitored.  End Comment.)  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
"Stuck" on Al Kibar Investigation 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) The IAEA technical briefing was given by Section 
Head for Safeguards Operations B2, Max Aparo.  Aparo reviewed 
the investigation on Al Kibar (or Dair Alzour, as referred to 
by the IAEA) to date, concluding that the Agency is "stuck." 
He laid out three main areas in which Syria needs to 
cooperate: providing necessary access and cooperation to 
determine origin of the uranium particles, providing 
necessary information and access to the Agency's 
investigation of the destroyed facility, and clarifying the 
procurements that, in the Agency's view, could support 
construction of a reactor.  He cited the latest letter from 
the Secretariat to Syria dated October 23, 2009 requesting 
this cooperation and reminding Syria that the Agency sees no 
limit on access just because this is a military site. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Agency Gets Access to Yellowcake 
And Uranyl Nitrate at MNSR 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In contrast to the Al Kibar investigation, Aparo 
noted that Syria has been "very cooperative" on the Agency's 
efforts to determine the origin of the anthropogenic uranium 
found at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) site in 
Damascus.  Aparo said that inspectors visited the MNSR on 
November 17 and Syria provided access to the yellowcake and 
to the uranyl nitrate, the materials Syria most recently 
suggested could be the source of the anthropogenic uranium. 
Furthermore, Aparo specified that the yellowcake was produced 
at the Homs plant in Syria.  Aparo clarified that uranyl 
nitrate was both imported and produced from experiments using 
yellowcake at the MNSR and that the material quantities in 
question are in grams.  In response to our question at the 
briefing, Aparo clearly stated that the import of the 
commercially available uranyl nitrate standard should have 
been declared when imported.  However, Aparo did not provide 
any specifics on the uranyl nitrate procurement. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Aparo said that Syria's explanation that uranium 
particles came from neutron activation analysis of soil and 
ore and from a shielded transport container could not be 
corroborated with additional IAEA samples taken in July 2009 
(as noted in the report).  He gave an extensive review of the 
difference between anthropogenic uranium (the type found) and 
natural uranium to make clear for the mostly nontechnical 
Member State representatives the notable difference that the 
former must have been altered via processing. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Aparo showed a list of four publications from the 
Syrian Atomic Energy Commission that the IAEA had recently 
asked Syria about, which may be related to the experiments at 
 
the MNSR recently disclosed by Syria.  The list was displayed 
only briefly, but two of the papers were titled: "Preparation 
of in-house neutron detectors and the software needed to 
process experimental data, April 2007," and "Measure of the 
fast neutron flux in the MNSR, 2007." 
 
¶6.  (SBU) In response to another U.S. question whether there 
was any connection between the technical cooperation (TC) 
project at Homs and the yellowcake used in the newly reported 
experiments, Aparo confirmed that the yellowcake was produced 
at Homs.  As to whether the experiments utilizing the 
yellowcake should have been reported for safeguards purposes, 
Aparo said that the Agency is still analyzing the issue.  He 
added that after the TC-supported project to extract uranium 
from phosphates concluded the development of a pilot plant at 
Homs, was found not to be commercially feasible. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Comment: Despite a report that introduced 
significant new information, member state reaction to the 
Syria briefing was anti-climatic, with only the U.S. asking 
questions.  Even close likeminded do not seem to understand 
the full implications of the MNSR findings, or are unwilling 
to confront them.  The MNSR findings will need to await 
further clarification from the Secretariat, to include 
sampling results, which we expect would be reflected in the 
March Board report.  Meanwhile, as noted above, Mission will 
consult like-minded states on the implications of the Homs 
findings for transparency practices in the Technical 
Cooperation program.  We would also encourage further 
diplomatic efforts in capitals to stimulate attention to the 
increased prospect for confirmed safeguards failures arising 
from the IAEA's ongoing Syria investigation.  End Comment. 
DAVIES