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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0506/01 3101603
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O 061603Z NOV 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0271
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000506 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR IO/GS, ISN/MNSA; NSC FOR SCHEINMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA UN
SUBJECT: ANYTHING LEFT TO SQUEEZE FROM THE IAEA'S "FUTURE 
OF THE AGENCY" PROCESS? 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary:  Member States are looking forward - some 
with relief - to the final session of the year-long Future of 
the Agency (FOA) process on November 19 - 20.  The Brazilian 
chair of the process will circulate and then formally submit 
a report to the March Meeting of the Board of Governors. 
While some observers believe that any dialogue across Member 
States is better than silence, the toothless FOA process was 
ultimately fenced off from more substantive developments in 
other fora, such as budget negotiations and various Board 
meetings.  U.S. attempts to invigorate the process were 
dampened by OECD disinterest and the G-77's blinkered focus 
on technical cooperation.  As Member States prepare to 
baptize a new budget forum on November 25, the Budget Working 
Group (BWG), many have expressed the hope that it not become 
"another Future of the Agency."  At best, the FOA process 
shows us what to avoid as we head into 2010 - a year of 
difficult negotiations over the 2011 budget, 2012-2013 
Technical Cooperation cycle, and 2012-2017 Medium Term 
Strategy.  At this stage U.S. interests are best served by a 
quick and bloodless end to the FOA effort.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Member States will convene November 19 - 20 for the 
final "Future of the Agency" discussion on the Agency's 
activities as a whole.  In a meeting with Ambassador Davies 
on October 29, Brazilian Ambassador Antonio Guerreiro 
(current Chair of the FOA process) admitted that the exercise 
was not initially welcomed by his G-77 counterparts.  (The 
G-77 had also looked askance at the FOA's founding document, 
the May 2008 "Commission of Eminent Persons Report.") 
Guerreiro was quick to assert, however, that the FOA had 
reaped some benefits, chief among them that Member States 
"had finally begun speaking their minds."  Guerreiro also 
noted that the FOA process had allowed Member States to 
educate themselves, an important function at an agency where 
diplomats cover several organizations and can be overwhelmed 
by technical material.  (Guerreiro may be correct on this 
point: Diplomats from Sri Lanka and Costa Rica recently told 
MsnOff that the FOA process allowed non-Board Members to 
learn about the IAEA and get updated on recent trends.)  Most 
positively, Guerreiro told Ambassador that the FOA had 
convinced some Member States that Nuclear Security was indeed 
a legitimate activity of the Agency. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Guerreiro did not delve into the less positive 
aspects of the process, particularly its time-consuming 
schedule of two-day meetings and its tendency to be taken 
over by the narrow interests of individual Member States. 
For example, Guerreiro surprisingly characterized Iranian 
Ambassador Soltanieh's contributions as "particularly 
helpful," when in fact, Iran accounted for up to half of 
total interventions, many of which were irrelevant to the 
work at hand.  Pakistan also made unhelpful contributions, 
most notably by blocking any discussion of how to improve 
Technical Cooperation projects.  In fact, the increasing 
willingness of local G-77 leaders to throw their weight 
around meant that the priorities of OECD countries often fell 
by the wayside during FOA discussions.  Alluding to the 
unhelpful stance of Iran and others over the course of the 
process, Ambassador asked Guerreiro to avoid letting any one 
Member hold undue sway over the final FOA report. 
 
FOA Winds Down, BWG Winds Up 
---------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The last FOA Meeting on November 19 - 20 is (rather 
awkwardly) titled "Any Outstanding Issues and the Agency 
Activities as a Whole and the Result of the Process." 
(Guerreiro had little to share with Ambassador on what he 
hoped to accomplish at the final meeting.)  As usual, Member 
States are invited to submit questions to the Brazilians in 
advance of the meeting.  For this final meeting, Mission will 
put forward questions that focus on 1) methods to ensure the 
IAEA is fully resourced over the long term, 2) efforts to 
improve the IAEA's Safeguards function, and 3) steps to 
encourage more effective governance by Member States. 
(Additional proposals and contributions may be submitted to 
Usha Pitts at pittsue@state.gov). 
 
¶5. (SBU) Guerreiro will then work with his predecessor as FOA 
Chair, former Finnish Ambassador Kirsti Kauppi (now in the 
MFA in Helsinki), to memorialize the process in a "Chairs' 
Report to the Board of Governors."  The Report will be 
circulated informally to major players (including the U.S.) 
during December or January and then submitted to the March 1 
- 5, 2010 Meeting of the Board of Governors.  The timing 
suggests that the report will come out too late to influence 
 
the new Budget Working Group (BWG), which meets over the 
course of several days in January.  The report could, 
however, become a resource for Member States when they 
discuss the 2012 - 2017 Medium Term Strategy later next year. 
 Guerreiro also hoped the Report could be of use to incoming 
Director General Amano (unfortunately, Guerreiro did not 
provide specifics).  Other than the above, the timing of the 
FOA Report and its non-binding nature suggest that the 
process may be heading for a lackluster conclusion.  Some 
Member States have even taken to vocalizing the desire that 
the BWG not turn into "another Future of the Agency." 
 
Comment: What Not To Do in 2010 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. priority at this stage is to ensure that 
the FOA report does not morph into a vehicle for the G-77 to 
impose its agenda on the Board or to dilute Board 
authorities.  From that perspective we seek to bring FOA to a 
quick and uncontroversial conclusion. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Mission had hoped that an activist approach to the 
Future of the Agency would help the U.S. win points with the 
G-77 and gain buy-in on priority issues.  Mission had also 
hoped the process would lead to improvements in the IAEA's 
performance and relevance over the long term.  Needless to 
say, these hopes did not come to fruition.  The process was 
ultimately left behind by more concrete developments in other 
fora, particularly intense budget negotiations, the DG 
election, and goings-on at the Board and General Conference. 
In that regard, the strongest determinants of the future of 
the IAEA will be its new Director General and the resources 
at his disposal.  Progress in FOA was further hampered by 
Member States' insistence that the dialogue remain "informal" 
and "open-ended."  As a result, the process appeared to 
reinforce basic political divisions rather than to address 
seriously the crisis of IAEA resources and ballooning 
mandates.  Finally, the process was brought down by the 
G-77's insistence on introducing Technical Cooperation at 
every FOA session, no matter what the topic.  OECD countries, 
for their part, had initially hoped the process would whither 
away; when it didn't, they tolerated it without enthusiasm. 
At most, the FOA reminded us of the limited value of an 
extended, informal process without measurable goals or 
commitments.  The lesson must be taken into account as we 
approach 2010, a year that will witness the establishment of 
working groups to tackle the 2011 budget (and beyond), the 
2012-2017 Medium Term Strategy, and the 2012-2013 Technical 
Cooperation cycle.  One hopes these new bodies achieve 
greater gains than their enfeebled predecessor, the Future of 
the Agency. 
 
DAVIES