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RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2042
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8711
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 8168

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 002734 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA; 
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION; 
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE; 
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN, 
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA 
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR; 
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA. 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
 
SUBJECT:  DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 11/30/09 
 
INDEX: 
(1) Interview with Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima on Futenma 
relocation (Asahi) 
 
(2) Editorial: Verification of "secret nuclear pact" should result 
in enhanced nuclear deterrence (Sankei) 
 
(3) Questioning of suspect on U.S. military base mulled in Okinawa 
hit-and-run case to avoid making the case a political issue (Ryukyu 
Shimpo) 
 
(4) Yomitan hit-and-run incident; U.S. military submits staff 
sergeant's saliva; prefectural police to crosscheck saliva with 
samples (Okinawa Times) 
 
(5) Political Cartoon (Tokyo Shimbun) 
 
ARTICLES: 
 
(1) Interview with Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima on Futenma 
relocation 
 
ASAHI (Page 17) (Full) 
November 28, 2009 
 
Interviewers: Masaaki Tonedachi, editorial staff member; Hirofumi 
Goto, Naha General Bureau chief 
 
The outlook for the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air 
Station remains uncertain. With the Hatoyama administration 
advocating a "review" of the current relocation plan, the people of 
Okinawa are shifting their hope to relocation out of the prefecture, 
but the cabinet ministers are making conflicting statements. What 
does the governor, who has accepted the relocation of the Futenma 
base within Okinawa so far, think of the administration's handling 
of this issue? 
 
Q: Public opinion in Okinawa is strongly in favor of relocation out 
of the prefecture. 
 
Nakaima: The prime minister of this country and the president of a 
political party has talked about (relocation) out of the prefecture 
or out of Japan. This is of great significance. No prime minister or 
party president in the past has talked about something that was 
impossible to achieve. I think the Okinawan people have come to have 
strong expectations that this will indeed be realized. 
 
Q: On the other hand, your position is that "while relocation out of 
Okinawa is the best option, relocation within the prefecture is also 
inevitable." We believe that you made a difficult decision based on 
what you thought was feasible. Even the ruling parties in Okinawa 
are demanding that you call for relocation out of the prefecture. 
You seem to be standing alone. 
 
Nakaima: Ha, ha, ha, you think so? I don't feel alone at all. 
Honestly, I basically think that relocation out of Okinawa is best. 
If the prime minister and the concerned cabinet ministers will work 
toward that in good faith, and they present a concrete plan and road 
map, I am prepared to change my stance anytime. However, to what 
extent have they done on-site investigations and taken the local 
situation into account? I have no idea. Looking for a relocation 
site for a military base is different from looking for a house to 
 
TOKYO 00002734  002 OF 007 
 
 
rent. Even building a civilian airport in Narita was a big problem. 
It is even a bigger problem to move the U.S. forces' military 
machine from one site to another. It is much more difficult than you 
imagine. This has to be handled with great care. It takes a lot of 
time to get the residents in the proposed relocation site to say 
yes. 
 
If I begin to echo everybody's opinion and start clamoring for 
relocation out of Okinawa, there will be only one option left. I 
have worked for the removal of the danger posed by the Futenma base 
(which is surrounded by residential areas) so far. A solution will 
then face a hurdle and it will then be hard to say when a solution 
can be found. We need to keep the option of relocation within 
Okinawa. 
 
Q: However, in reality, don't you ever think that it will soon be 
time to change tack and call for relocation out of Okinawa? 
 
Nakaima: I think about that all the time. (Pointing to his throat) 
the words are up to here. If I say it, I will probably feel good and 
be relieved. Ruling party Diet members elected from Okinawa and even 
many Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and New Komeito Prefectural 
Assembly members belonging to the ruling camp supporting the 
governor favor relocation out of the prefecture. I have a feeling 
that the only people who are saying relocation within Okinawa is 
inevitable have become me and Mayor Yoshikazu Shimabukuro of Nago, 
the proposed relocation site. However, I cannot possibly call for 
relocation out of the prefecture in the absence of a concrete plan. 
Although the relocation site in Nago faces problems in terms of the 
environment and opposition from many people, the specifications have 
been decided to a certain extent, so it is a concrete option. 
 
Q: The specific incident that triggered the Futenma issue is the 
1995 rape of a schoolgirl by U.S. marines. There was a public outcry 
in Okinawa. You were then the president of Okinawa Electric Company. 
What did you think when you learned of this incident from the news? 
 
Nakaima: I also participated in the protest rally. I simply felt 
that (the U.S. forces) should go home. 
 
Q: If so, when did you come to the conclusion that the relocation of 
Futenma within Okinawa is inevitable? 
 
Nakaima: I don't remember clearly... Well, this is a question of 
choice. I also think the Japan-U.S. security treaty is necessary. I 
believe that the U.S. military presence is still needed for Japan's 
defense and for stabilizing the security environment in Asia and the 
Pacific. We should accept an appropriate level of U.S. military 
presence. U.S. military bases do not only exist in Okinawa; there 
are bases also in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aomori and Yamaguchi. However, 
the scale of U.S. bases in Okinawa is far beyond the tolerable 
level. What I am saying is that this excessive burden should be 
reduced. I have never demanded the elimination of all bases. I don't 
remember ever negating all bases. My thinking remains unchanged. 
 
Q: I see. What are your demands on the government with regard to the 
relocation? 
 
Nakaima: Basically, I want the government to consult with Okinawa 
and with the local communities before deciding on a policy. (I want 
them to tell us:) This is our basic policy, this is what we want to 
change, this is how our negotiations with the U.S. are going, and 
 
TOKYO 00002734  003 OF 007 
 
 
this is what the outcome is likely to be. If we are told only 
shortly before the announcement or after a decision has been made, 
it will be unacceptable to us. 
 
Q: You are asking to be consulted in advance? 
 
Nakaima: Of course. I learned from former Governor Keiichi Inamine 
that (with regard to USFJ realignment) the government once 
negotiated on the Henoko relocation plan with the U.S. side over 
Okinawa's head. That was the time when Takemasa Moriya was the 
administrative vice minister of the (then) Defense Agency. That will 
not work. What I am saying is that employing such a method will only 
result in extra time and effort required for coordination with the 
local communities. 
 
Q: Do you think the Democratic Party of Japan will negotiate 
seriously with the U.S. government? 
 
Nakaima: I think they at least have the aspiration. I sympathize 
with the Hatoyama administration's attempt to embark on a general 
clean-up of Japan and to work for a breakthrough. I also feel that 
it is beginning to alter the previous unqualified pro-U.S. stance to 
one that leans more toward Asia, without changing the cornerstone. I 
have great expectations for certain aspects. 
 
The Japan-U.S. cabinet level examination panel on the Futenma issue 
will sort out the basic thinking. I still do not know what the 
substance of this is, but I think they are proceeding based on the 
spirit of the tri-party agreement reached before the start of the 
administration. I appreciate such spirit and aspiration. I think 
some Okinawan people also support such a stance. 
 
However, the government is currently grappling with more issues than 
it can possibly handle. For example, the government will review the 
National Defense Program Guidelines (dealing with defense 
capabilities in the next 10 years). But it is difficult to see its 
basic thinking in dealing with defense issues without watching for a 
certain period of time. 
 
Q: We believe that in all Japan, Okinawa is the local government 
that is forced to make choices and decisions on security issues most 
frequently. This sometimes divides the local people. 
 
Nakaima: That is true. However, the people of Okinawa do not think 
in terms of the bases alone. We adopt a comprehensive approach in 
interacting with the U.S. in particular. Many Okinawans have been 
successful in Hawaii. After World War II, many young people went to 
America to study, thinking that an American university is better 
than a university in Tokyo. We are enraged by the terrible crimes 
and accidents and rapes; that is quite natural. We sometimes 
complain and argue heatedly. But overall, we have a feeling of 
affinity toward America in a multifaceted way. 
 
Q: May I ask you again? Don't you have any plan to change your 
position that relocation within Okinawa is inevitable? 
 
Nakaima: For now, my position remains unchanged. However, if 
tomorrow, the prime minister makes a decision and states clearly 
that the entire cabinet will work for relocation out of Okinawa and 
asks us to help with this effort, I will change my position right 
away. That is how I feel. 
 
 
TOKYO 00002734  004 OF 007 
 
 
Q: You are saying that since no concrete proposal has been presented 
for relocation out of Okinawa, if you also join those people calling 
for this, it will make a solution to the problem even more remote. 
Therefore, not only will you not change your position, (you think) 
you should not change your position. 
 
Nakaima: (Laughs) You can read people's minds. That is half of what 
I think. It will take a few years just to find another relocation 
site. Another thing is how does the Japanese government compare with 
the U.S. government? I have been governor for three years, but 
during that period, there were seven defense ministers. This 
situation makes the other side take Japan lightly. I directly tell 
the U.S. forces to make constant operational improvements and 
enhancements and implement the zero-defect campaign of no accidents 
and no violations. 
 
There is also the question of the outcome of the Nago mayoral 
election in January and the gubernatorial race in November next 
year. If opponents of relocation within Okinawa win in both 
elections, things will get stuck. 
 
Q: Will you run in the gubernatorial election next year? 
 
Nakaima: I have not decided. 
 
Q: It seems that the government may decide on Henoko relocation 
before the end of the year. If that happens, what are your 
conditions? 
 
Nakaima: Of course, I have certain conditions. First, the 
replacement facility should be located farther into the sea. I have 
cited some 300 conditions (in the governor's opinion on the 
preparatory documents for environmental assessment). I hope all 
these conditions are met. One of them is measuring noise. (The 
replacement facility) should not be located too close (to the 
residential areas). It needs to be moved farther offshore to leave 
some margin. 
 
The Futenma base is located right in the middle of an urban center. 
Even if a decision is made on Henoko relocation, it will take a few 
years to complete the new facility. I would like to see a reduction 
in the operational level (of takeoffs and landings by helicopters) 
in the meantime. For this purpose, the dispersal of helicopters 
should take place even right now. This will reduce the risk 
considerably. In reality, the helicopters have gone to Iraq or 
Afghanistan and the local residents know right away that (the 
Futenma airfield) is out of business even though it is supposedly in 
operation when they notice there is less noise. If the above two 
conditions are not met, I will not be able to grant the permit to 
reclaim land (in Henoko). 
 
Okinawa does not live by relying on the U.S. bases. On the contrary, 
we want the bases to be returned at an early date. The bases are 
located in the middle of the town, and returned land can easily be 
utilized. Right now, Okinawa is full of energy. We hope for the 
return of the bases south of Kadena while Okinawa is still full of 
vitality so that we can utilize the land. 
 
(2) Editorial: Verification of "secret nuclear pact" should result 
in enhanced nuclear deterrence 
 
SANKEI (Page 2) (Full) 
 
TOKYO 00002734  005 OF 007 
 
 
November 30, 2009 
 
A panel of experts tasked with verifying the Foreign Ministry's 
investigation into the question of Japan-U.S. secret pacts, 
including one on the introduction of nuclear weapons, in connection 
with the three nonnuclear principles, met for the first time (on 
Nov. 27). The panel plans to report its findings to Foreign Minister 
Katsuya Okada in January next year. 
 
What is being verified is directly connected with the security of 
Japan. A large part of the contents of the agreements has already 
become clear. What is necessary for Japan now is to reinforce 
extended deterrence (the nuclear umbrella) against new threats, such 
as the North Korean nuclear weapons program, rather than to expend 
energy to verify whether or not secret agreements exist. We want to 
see in-depth discussions for the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance 
rather than about its past. 
 
The ongoing controversy was triggered by indications by a former 
vice-foreign minister and others since last fall that Japan and the 
United States had concluded at the time of the revision of their 
bilateral security treaty in 1960 a secret pact that was designed to 
exempt from prior consultations U.S. warships/aircraft carrying 
nuclear weapons calling at Japanese ports and passing through 
Japan's territorial waters. 
 
Foreign Minister Okada ordered the Foreign Ministry to conduct a 
thorough investigation, and he received a report that related 
documents have been found. The panel was set up with the purpose of 
verifying the Foreign Ministry's reports on four cases, including 
the questions of introducing nuclear weapons into Okinawa and of 
using U.S. bases in Japan in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
"There might have been some demand for (the secret pact)," Okada 
said. In order to make a series of verifications meaningful, it is 
essential to present a clear direction after the verification. 
 
The national security of Japan has relied heavily on the U.S.'s 
nuclear umbrella under the security treaty with the United States. 
 
Threats are increasing in Northeast Asia due to such factors as 
North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs and China's 
military buildup. 
 
Japan has upheld the three nonnuclear principles (of not possessing, 
producing, or permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
Japan). Of them, the Sankei Shimbun has repeatedly called for 
reviewing the principle of not permitting the introduction of 
nuclear weapons in the direction of allowing nuclear-armed U.S. 
ships to call at Japanese ports/pass through Japan's territorial 
waters. South Korea, too, reaffirmed the U.S. nuclear umbrella over 
the country during the U.S.-ROK summit in June. The U.S. nuclear 
deterrent remains indispensable for the security of Japan and South 
Korea in the post-Cold War era as well. 
 
Despite that, Okada has urged the United States to abandon the 
preemptive use of nuclear weapons, while indicating that Japan might 
step out from under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Prime Minister Yukio 
Hatoyama's statements have also been inconsistent, pointing to a 
review of the three principles at one time and at legislating (the 
three principles) at another time. Such is not a responsible 
stance. 
 
TOKYO 00002734  006 OF 007 
 
 
 
As seen in Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's comment, "We hope 
that care is taken not to have a negative impact on nuclear 
deterrence and the bilateral relationship," the United States is 
concerned about the situation. The government should put its efforts 
into improving and increasing the deterrence of the alliance on the 
occasion of the establishment of the experts' panel. 
 
(3) Questioning of suspect on U.S. military base mulled in Okinawa 
hit-and-run case to avoid making the case a political issue 
 
RYUKYU SHIMPO (Page 1) (Slightly abridged) 
November 29, 2009 
 
The U.S. Army staff sergeant, 27, from Torii Station who has been 
identified by the Okinawa Prefectural Police as the suspect in the 
hit-and-run incident in Sobe, Yomitan Village, on Nov. 7, has 
refused to present himself for questioning on a voluntary basis. It 
was learned on Nov. 28 that in light of this, the Japanese and U.S. 
governments are considering questioning him on a U.S. military 
facility. Interrogation of the suspect on a U.S. military base is 
unprecedented. In a similar case in Ginowan City in 2003, 
questioning on a U.S. base was suggested for the three U.S. marines 
charged with robbery resulting in bodily injury, but this was 
rejected by the prefectural police on the grounds that this was an 
issue bearing on national sovereignty. 
 
According to informed sources, the proposal for on-base 
interrogation was made as a compromise between the prefectural 
police, which is continuing its investigation, and the suspect, who 
is demanding the video recording of the interrogation and the 
presence of lawyers. It is likely that this attempt to resolve the 
stalemate in the investigation at an early date is being made to 
prevent crimes and accidents involving U.S. military personnel from 
turning into political issues, including triggering calls for the 
revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement. 
 
Several senior Okinawa police officers said that they "have not been 
informed at all" about the plan to conduct on-base interrogation. It 
appears that senior-level coordination had taken place between the 
two countries without the knowledge of the prefectural police. 
 
According to an informed source on the Japanese side, the U.S. 
forces have been cooperating fully with police investigations and 
have also indicated approval of the proposal for on-base 
questioning. 
 
(4) Yomitan hit-and-run incident; U.S. military submits staff 
sergeant's saliva; prefectural police to crosscheck saliva with 
samples 
 
OKINAWA TIMES (Page 31) (Excerpts) 
November 27, 2009 
 
Through Nov. 26, the Okinawa Prefectural Police collected saliva 
from the 27-year-old staff sergeant based at the U.S. Army's Torii 
Communications Station whom they determined is a suspect in the 
hit-and-run incident that occurred in Sobe in the village of 
Yomitan. The prefectural police intend to crosscheck the staff 
sergeant's saliva with the clothes of Masakazu Hokama, 66, who was 
killed in the incident, as well as with samples collected from the 
site where Hokama's body was found, in order to determine whether 
 
TOKYO 00002734  007 OF 007 
 
 
the staff sergeant touched Mr. Hokama immediately after the 
incident. Given the staff sergeant's refusal to appear for police 
questioning since Nov. 14, the prefectural police are gathering hard 
evidence to file charges against him for vehicular manslaughter and 
a violation of the Road Traffic Law (violation of the duty to aid 
the injured and a failure to inform the authorities of an 
accident). 
 
Lawyer asks for the view of the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee 
 
Obtaining a warrant on Nov. 23, the prefectural police asked a U.S. 
military investigative body for the collection of saliva. The U.S. 
military investigative body submitted the saliva  to the Kadena 
Police Station. 
 
The lawyer representing the staff sergeant sent a letter of inquiry 
dated Nov. 26 to the Japan-U.S. Joint Committee criminal cases 
jurisdiction subcommittee asking for its opinion, saying, "Now that 
it is clear that (the staff sergeant) was driving the vehicle when 
the accident occurred, the prefectural police should have 
immediately informed the U.S. military side of criminal charges. The 
Japanese side will not be given custody of the staff sergeant until 
he is indicted. We request the whole investigation process be taped 
with a U.S. military judge advocate present and the production of 
questions and answers in English." 
 
ROOS