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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 001129 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: WHA ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHANNON'S MEETING 
WITH HONDURAN CIVIL SOCIETY FIGURES 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 1103 
     ¶B. TEGUCIGALPA 1067 
     ¶C. TEGUCIGALPA 989 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: WHA Assistant Secretary Thomas A. Shannon 
met with two separate groups of civil society representatives 
on October 29 to discuss the status of the Guaymuras talks, 
the urgent need to reach a negotiated accord, and the 
readiness of the USG to support the elections process if an 
accord could be reached.  At the first meeting, members of 
the Zelaya cabinet, anti-coup Members of Congress and 
anti-coup "resistance" organizers described their opposition 
to the coup as a peaceful movement and accused the de facto 
regime of creating an environment that was antithetical to 
free and fair elections.  They agreed an accord was urgently 
needed.  In the second meeting, representatives of the 
anti-Zelaya civil society elements expressed at least tacit 
support for signing an accord, because they felt it would 
shift the national focus from the political crisis to 
economic and social development.  The group expressed the 
need for a plan for Honduras to recover from the social and 
economic damage brought about by the crisis.  End summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
Zelaya Cabinet and Anti-coup Figures 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador hosted a meeting for Assistant 
Secretary Shannon and National Security Council Senior 
Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs Daniel Restrepo with 
members of the Zelaya government and other prominent 
anti-coup figures on October 29.  Participants were: Liberal 
Party (LP) congressman and former Zelaya Defense Minister 
Edmundo Orellana, Vice Foreign Ministers Eduardo Rosales 
Ramirez, Beatriz Valle and Patricia Licona de Reina, 
Democratic Unification (UD) congressman Marvin Ponce, and 
anti-coup resistance leader Rafael Alegria.  Canadian 
Ambassador to Honduras Neil Reeder, who is resident in San 
Jose, and ranking resident Canadian diplomat Daniel Arsenault 
also participated in the meeting. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador opened by explaining that the purpose 
of A/S Shannon's visit was to encourage all sides to conclude 
an agreement to restore constitutional and democratic order 
in Honduras.  The Ambassador said that the delegation's 
meetings had been intense and productive, and that the 
delegation was eager to hear from the group.  A/S Shannon 
noted that the parties were on the verge of an accord, and 
that the United States was very interested in a successful 
resolution soon.  He added that the United States was ready 
to provide robust support for elections if an accord could be 
reached, but conversely, if no accord was reached before 
elections, the United States position was that successful 
elections would be difficult to carry out and difficult to 
recognize as legitimate.  The Assistant Secretary 
acknowledged that the political crisis was very dramatic, and 
there were strong feelings on both sides of the conflict. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Rosales noted that the crisis was both political and 
social, and that the reality of the conflict was very 
different from what the de facto regime was portraying.  He 
said the regime was placing many restrictions on freedom of 
expression and opinion.  Ponce added that opponents of the 
coup have been required to request permission from the de 
facto authorities to be able to march and protest, and do not 
always receive it.  He said these were historic times, when a 
peaceful resistance movement was standing up to aggression by 
security forces which defend an undemocratic regime.  He told 
the Assistant Secretary that the grassroots movement had 
stood its ground for four months despite detentions and 
torture at the hands of the security forces.  Ponce stressed 
that it was the Congress who committed a coup -- a political 
(versus military) coup, but a coup nonetheless. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Orellana stated that the opponents of the coup fully 
supported a transparent process to reach a resolution of the 
crisis, which he characterized as arising out of two illegal 
acts: first the forcible removal of President Zelaya from the 
country, then his deposal from office by the Congress. 
Orellana noted that while both sides were on the verge of 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001129  002 OF 004 
 
 
reaching a political solution, much work would remain to heal 
the social wounds brought on by the crisis. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Orellana then highlighted the sense of urgency to 
resolve the crisis noting there were almost 300 congressional 
candidates and 200 municipal candidates who were prepared to 
renounce their candidacies if no accord were reached by 
November 1.  He said if this many candidates were to drop 
out, the validity of the elections would be placed in serious 
doubt.  Orellana expressed the anti-coup movement's desire 
for a rapid resolution and subsequently a strong 
international observer mission for the elections.  (Note: No 
candidates have yet renounced.) 
 
¶7. (SBU) Licona stated that although the crisis was caused by 
Hondurans and was an internal conflict between Hondurans, 
they welcomed international support to resolve it.  She said 
elections held without an accord beforehand would be a 
legitimization of the coup, because the regime had placed so 
many restrictions on freedoms necessary to hold elections. 
Licona noted that despite repealing a decree that had placed 
limits on gatherings of more than 20 people, forbade any 
public criticism of the regime and ordered the closure of 
media outlets who encouraged resistance to the regime, many 
of the restrictions remained in force (See Reftels B and C). 
She then presented a document she claimed had been sent out 
by the Armed Forces to all mayors in the country, requesting 
the names and contact information of local resistance 
leaders, as well as leaders of the (pro-regime) Civic and 
Democratic Union movement.  (Note: On October 29, an Armed 
Forces spokesman gave a radio interview denying the document 
had been issued by the Armed Forces, and telling any mayors 
receiving the document to disregard it.  End note) 
 
¶8. (SBU) Valle stated President Zelaya had shown his 
willingness to resolve the political crisis.  She stressed 
the solution would be a political one and not a legal one as 
de facto leader Micheletti had suggested.  Valle also 
observed that the U.S. position had appeared to evolve and 
soften from its original, unequivocal demand for immediate 
restoration of President Zelaya to support for negotiation 
with the de facto regime to reach a solution without 
preconditions. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Resistance leader Rafael Alegria explained that the 
resistance movement, which was actually four different groups 
working together, had begun the day following the coup.  He 
stressed its peaceful goals and approach, despite aggressive 
tactics to suppress it by the regime through the police, 
military and other intimidation tactics.  Alegria noted that 
same day, six demonstrators had been injured by security 
forces and hospitalized.  (Note: Post was able to confirm 
this claim with police contacts later in the day.  End note.) 
 Alegira stated that the movement's goal was restoration of 
the constitutional order, which he defined as the restoration 
of President Zelaya to power.  Alegria said that because all 
the national powers supported the coup, none of them was now 
legitimate.  Alegria concluded that without restoration of 
the constitutional order, elections were illegitimate. 
Alegria asked A/S Shannon what the U.S. position would be if 
an agreement were signed, the restitution question went to 
Congress and then languished there until after elections. 
 
¶10. (SBU) A/S Shannon reiterated the U.S. position that the 
need to sign an accord was urgent, noting that any further 
delays would signify a lack of good faith to reach an 
agreement, and that the United States would have to consider 
the negotiation process a failure.  He stressed also that the 
United States did not see a way for legitimate elections to 
take place in the absence of an agreement.  However, he 
noted, the solution to the crisis will be a political one, 
and therefore it required negotiation.  Restrepo said that 
the United States would have to deal with the Honduran 
situation whether there was a resolution of the crisis or 
not, and that the chief U.S. concern would be to promote 
progress toward democratic principles and institutions. 
 
¶11. (SBU) Reeder noted that the issue of constitutional order 
was not about a person, but about the constitutional 
institutions, and eventually about a peaceful transfer of 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001129  003 OF 004 
 
 
power to a government selected by the Honduran people.  He 
stressed that a deal was on the table, but time was running 
out because legitimate elections under the current regime 
appeared very unlikely. 
 
------------------------------- 
Anti-Zelaya Civil Society 
------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) Following the meeting with the Zelaya cabinet and 
supporters, the Ambassador hosted a similar meeting for the 
delegation with representatives of anti-Zelaya civil society 
groups.  Guests were: Armida Villeda de Lopez Contreras of 
the Civic Democratic Union (UCD), Juan F. Ferrera, also UCD 
and former head of the National Anti-corruption Council, Ines 
de Zablah of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of 
Tegucigalpa (CCIT), Adolfo "Fito" Facusse, head of the 
National Association of Industrialists (ANDI), and 
Epaminondas Marinakys of the Honduras National Chamber of 
Tourism. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The meeting began with the USG representatives 
explaining the purpose of their visit and reminding the 
attendees that if an accord was signed, the international 
community and the USG could begin to provide support for the 
upcoming elections.  Facusse retorted that it would not be 
possible to accomplish their task in such a short amount of 
time since Congress was in recess, to which Villeda rebutted 
that various  members of Congress told the UCD that they were 
on "stand-by" to go to Congress if the accord was signed. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Villeda continued that the UCD supported a 
resolution that fell within the Honduran constitution and 
legal system, but did not want the international community to 
pressure Honduras to reform its constitution.  She said that 
their goals were to protect the electoral process, return to 
normalcy, and shift the focus to social development.  A/S 
Shannon responded that the United States agreed that the 
conflict over Zelaya's proposed constitutional assembly was a 
tragedy, but pointed out that the best option for promoting 
social development was for both sides to sign the accord. 
A/S Shannon emphasized the urgency of reaching a solution, 
saying that his delegation would leave on October 30 and that 
the OAS delegation would also leave soon if no agreement was 
signed.  De Zablah expressed the CCIT's support for the talks 
and said they saw a signed agreement as the way to shift the 
focus towards economic development and job creation.  A/S 
Shannon agreed, saying that the political crisis had an 
impact on the Honduran economy. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Facusse shifted the conversation, asking what 
guarantees the USG would provide to ensure that President 
Zelaya would not resume the campaigns he pursued before June 
¶28.  A/S Shannon responded that the USG had made many 
attempts over the course of several months to get Micheletti 
to tell the USG what actions it could take to ensure the 
constitutional transfer of power on January 27, 2010, but 
that Micheletti had not provided any specific requests. 
Facusse responded that Zelaya was not the problem, rather 
"his owner - Chavez" was the problem. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Ferrera stated that Honduras would need a special 
plan to recuperate from the crisis.  He cited the three 
biggest problems as poverty, corruption and insecurity, 
noting that each one exacerbated the other, similar to a 
vicious circle.  Ferrara continued that the business 
community wanted to revamp the now dormant development and 
job creation programs.  Villeda added that the brunt of 
economic impact of the June 28 coup was borne by the poor. 
She said that they would welcome international assistance, 
even suggesting naming it the "Clinton Plan," and said they 
were ready to provide suggestions.  She said that her 
organization was planning to sign a "social pact" with the 
presidential candidates on November 3 (septel). 
 
¶17. (SBU) A/S Shannon concluded the meeting by telling the 
participants that Honduras could serve as an example to other 
countries in the region where democracy was weak or in 
danger.  He said that if the accord was signed, it would 
demonstrate that one cannot simply get rid of a leader 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001129  004 OF 004 
 
 
unconstitutionally.  A/S Shannon reiterated that it was 
possible to resolve the crisis peacefully and democratically. 
 Furthermore, he recognized that Honduras had many more 
problems besides the political crisis and that although 
signing an agreement would not resolve all those problems, it 
was a necessary first step. 
 
¶18. Assistant Secretary Shannon cleared this cable. 
LLORENS