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FM AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TEGUCIGALPA 001122 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM HO
SUBJECT: TFH01: GETTING TEGUCIGALPA/SAN JOSE AGREEMENT BACK 
ON TRACK 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose 
Agreement derailed on November 5 when President Jose Manuel 
"Mel" Zelaya insisted on immediate restoration to office 
before creation of a national unity and reconciliation 
government and then modified this demand to having the 
Verification Commission request that Congress set a date for 
its consideration of his restoration to office.  Zelaya 
refused to agree to issuance of a communique stating that 
both sides remained committed to implementation of the 
Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement and had reached agreement on 
the mechanism for choosing the members of the national unity 
government.  In response, de facto regime leader Roberto 
Micheletti at midnight on November 5 announced that he had 
formed a government of national unity, but did not release 
its members' names. The Ambassador and the OAS 
representatives will convene both sides the morning of 
November 6 to attempt to get implementation of the 
Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement back on track. End Summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU)  After a full day of negotiations with the 
Ambassador and Organization of American States (OAS) 
representatives Jose Bordon and Enrique Correa, Verification 
Commission members Ambassador Jorge Arturo Reina and Arturo 
Corrales agreed on November 5 to issue a communique stating 
that they remained committed to implementation of the 
Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement, that they had reached 
agreement on the mechanism for choosing the members of the 
national unity and reconciliation government, and that each 
side had a list of names.  Reina and Corrales agreed that 
discussion of the names on their lists would begin on 
November 6 and that the composition of the cabinet would be 
announced as soon as they had reached agreement.  Reina and 
Rodil Rivera, one of the negotiators for President Zelaya at 
the Guaymuras talks who accompanied Reina to the meetings 
with the Ambassador and the OAS, took the draft communique to 
President Zelaya to obtain his approval.  President Zelaya 
insisted that without a clear path to his restoration to 
office, he would not agree to formation of the national unity 
government.  Zelaya pressed the Ambassador, Bordon, and 
Correa for restitution to be granted immediately, effectively 
linking Article 1 of the Agreement regarding configuration of 
a national unity government and Article 5 regarding Zelaya's 
restoration to office. President Zelaya subsequently modified 
his demand to having the Verification Commission request that 
Congress set a date for its consideration of his restoration 
to office.  Zelaya refused to agree to issuance of the draft 
communique or to allow discussion of the names on both sides' 
lists.  De facto regime leader Roberto Micheletti did agree 
to issuance of the communique and instructed his regime 
cabinet ministers to present their resignations. 
 
¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador, Bordon, and Correa persuaded Reina, 
as per guidance from Verification Commission members 
Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis and former President of Chile 
Ricardo Lagos, that the "step by step" approach would be 
best.  Once agreement was reached on a national unity 
government, the mechanism for swearing in the government 
would be discussed and decided on.  Once the new cabinet was 
sworn in, Micheletti would be required to step down.  The 
Ambassador, Bordon, and Correa told Reina that once 
Micheletti and his regime no longer existed, President Zelaya 
would have the best chance for the Congress to consider the 
question of his restoration in a rational manner, providing 
the best prospects for a successful vote.  Reina and Rivera 
were unable to convince Zelaya to accept this approach.  The 
Ambassador also unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Zelaya, 
but Zelaya argued that he did not believe that Micheletti 
would step down and that efforts to placate Micheletti would 
only lead to the loss of prestige by the OAS and the 
international community. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Micheletti convened a press conference at midnight 
on November 5 and announced he had formed a government of 
national unity, but did not release its members' names.  The 
presumption in the country was that Micheletti was going to 
run the government of national unity, but Micheletti did say 
that he was still open to receiving suggested names for the 
Cabinet from Zelaya. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador and the OAS representatives will 
convene both sides the morning of November 6 to attempt to 
 
TEGUCIGALP 00001122  002 OF 002 
 
 
get implementation of the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement back 
on track.  The Ambassador, Bordon, and Correa will urge them 
to issue a communique stating that, although differences 
exist, they are committed to resolving them and implementing 
the Tegucigalpa/San Jose Agreement in good faith. 
LLORENS