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RR RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNEH RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHPW
RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHNT #1966/01 3091033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 051032Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TASHKENT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1494
INFO ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TASHKENT 001966 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ECON PHUM SOCI SENV UZ
SUBJECT: UZBEKISTAN: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING THE USE OF CHILD LABOR 
IN THE COTTON HARVEST 
 
REF: 1567; 1547; 1511; ASTANA 1953 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: This USAID-drafted cable examines strategies for 
addressing the problem of child labor in the cotton sector in 
Uzbekistan. (Please see Ref A for an analysis of the cotton sector 
overall and a specific look at this year's harvest.) Uzbekistan's 
cotton economy remains state-driven and little changed from Soviet 
times.  As a consequence, usual market signals are absent. 
Furthermore, societal attitudes and structures in rural areas of 
the country place a great emphasis on collectivism, where the 
participation of children in the family economy is not viewed in a 
negative light, and, indeed, can represent a vital supplement to a 
family's income. Efforts to address the problem of child labor need 
to focus both on encouraging structural reform in the agricultural 
sector as a whole and on influencing attitudes more generally. 
Additionally, mechanization can play a role in reducing the 
dependence on manual labor during the cotton harvest. There are 
some indications that the Uzbek government is already taking steps 
in this direction. The international community, through the UN and 
the U.S. (through USAID), can play an important role in helping 
Uzbekistan rationalize its agricultural sector and, eventually, 
eliminate the use of child labor. There may be a dimension 
involving efforts to revive the Aral Sea. This effort will need to 
be a cooperative, long-term strategy that takes account of local 
sensitivities and avoids trying to isolate the Uzbeks over this 
issue. It will also require a sustained financial commitment. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
 
 
 
 
COTTON REMAINS THE KEYSTONE OF AGRICULTURE 
 
 
 
¶2. (SBU) Uzbekistan is the fourth-largest cotton producer in the 
world.  As the central export crop, cotton accounts for roughly 12% 
of all exports and 7-8% of the country's GDP. Although cotton has 
been planted in Uzbekistan since the late 1800's, greater attention 
has been paid to Uzbekistan's cotton harvest recently due to 
concerns about the use of child labor.  For decades, each autumn, 
schoolchildren, university students, rural inhabitants, and 
government workers throughout the country have been mobilized for 
two to six weeks to pick cotton. The use of children in the harvest 
is rooted in practices set up during the Soviet era, but 
perpetuated by laws and practices that force farmers to meet strict 
cotton quotas, the overdependence of the Uzbekistan economy on one 
crop, the depressed economic climate, and the cultural significance 
of the harvest. Eliminating the use of child labor in the cotton 
harvest will require sustained and well-designed programs to 
address these underlying factors. 
 
 
 
COTTON CULTIVATION TIGHTLY CONTROLLED 
 
 
 
¶3.  (SBU) After the fall of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan undertook 
agrarian reforms that restructured the collective farms into 
standalone plots that farmers could rent from the state for private 
use. Although the new laws created individual household farms, 
these private farms did not replace the previous system, making the 
new farms parallel institutions.  As a result, private farmers 
remained under the control of local elites (from whom inputs such 
as seed and fertilizer are obtained), crops to meet state quotas 
were still sold to the government at fixed prices, and the economy 
remained dependent on cotton as a major export crop. 
 
 
 
¶4.  (SBU) This legal structure and its associated trade mechanisms 
are reinforced by a pricing system that puts a premium on 
generating output to meet state-set quotas imposed on a national, 
provincial, district and even local farm level, often without 
regard to varying degrees of soil fertility throughout the country. 
As a result, the farming collective will put pressure on its 
members and on subcontracting household farms to maximize cotton 
output to fulfill the quota, thus reinforcing the tendency toward 
monoculture and stifling initiatives to diversify or find niche 
outputs other than for private consumption. 
 
TASHKENT 00001966  002 OF 005 
 
 
GOU OFFICIALLY DENOUNCES CHILD LABOR 
 
 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In 1992, Uzbekistan ratified the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child.  Last year, on September 12, the Cabinet of Ministers 
issued a resolution on the implementation of two ILO conventions 
against child labor that the GOU had signed earlier in the year 
(ILO Convention 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
and ILO Convention 192 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor). The GOU has also formulated a national action plan to 
carry out the ILO Conventions, but implementation of this action 
plan is still nascent. Also at the national level, a landmark law 
"On the Guarantees of the Rights of the Child" was introduced in 
2008 and a Children's Ombudsman was established. These laws 
ostensibly prevent the use of child labor in the cotton industry, 
and the GOU claims to be enforcing these laws, as evinced by 
reported dismissals of hokims (governors) who used child labor in 
their districts.  Post continues, however, to receive reports of 
some school districts mobilizing children to help meet quotas at 
local farms. 
 
 
 
DE-MECHANIZATION AND RE-MECHANIZATION IN UZBEKISTAN'S COTTON 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU) Following independence, the Soviet-era mechanization of 
Uzbekistan's cotton industry collapsed, as machines became 
unserviceable and funds for repairing and replenishing 
machine-parts disappeared.  Consequently, harvesting practices 
reverted to their pre-Soviet state, where they have languished ever 
since. 
 
 
 
¶7.  (SBU) While mechanization was used in Uzbekistan in the past, a 
return to mechanization will require costly complementary 
adjustments, including the development of simultaneously ripening 
strains, the straightening of furrows and planting rows in the 
fields, and the application of herbicides and defoliants.  Without 
these prerequisite conditions, the efficacy of the equipment is 
reduced. Moreover, using mechanized harvesters has meant the 
application of defoliants; problems with the availability of 
foreign exchange to procure appropriate defoliants means that many 
farmers do not have the resources to purchase these required inputs 
(even if the local elites make such chemicals available). 
 
 
 
¶8.  (SBU) In 1995, a push to re-mechanize cotton harvesting began 
as the Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources directed local 
farm machinery maker Tashkentselmash to provide extra harvesters. 
A year later, Case Corporation announced plans to establish a 
joint-venture with the GOU to assemble cotton harvesters in 
Tashkent to be ready in time for the 1997 harvest.  In 1997, Case 
shipped $80 million worth of equipment to Uzbekistan to launch 13 
service centers for agricultural equipment throughout the country. 
These service centers remain in operation; in April 2009, Case New 
Holland announced it had established new agreements with the GOU to 
begin production of tractors and to refurbish the service centers 
set up 12 years earlier. In addition to production and service, 
Case New Holland offers options for farmers to lease equipment, 
including harvesters and other agricultural equipment. 
 
 
 
¶9.  (SBU) The GOU appears to be headed once again towards 
mechanization and recently passed a resolution to re-equip four 
enterprises that produce agricultural equipment at a cost of $26 
million. One of the firms, Technolog, will produce about 100 
harvesters in 2009. There are concerns that the effort to quickly 
re-start the industrial production of harvesters will compromise 
the quality of the machines. Nevertheless, the machines priced at 
$16,000 are cheap compared to those produced elsewhere but still 
too expensive for most individual farmers to purchase and a 
collective approach would likely be taken. 
 
 
 
PROSPECTS FOR ENDING HAND-PICKING OF COTTON 
 
TASHKENT 00001966  003 OF 005 
 
 
¶10. (SBU) At present, power structures in rural areas prevent 
farmers from making personal decisions about what to grow; this 
intimidation is manifest in the control over resources and inputs 
provided to farmers - a few decision-makers have the potential to 
ruin the livelihoods of individuals who do not comply. Compounding 
these problems is the lack of a financial system where farmers can 
acquire loans to circumvent the control over resources exercised by 
local elites. As a result, initiatives to fight the problem of 
child labor in cotton harvesting must address traditional power 
structures that reinforce the current system. 
 
 
 
SHORT TERM INTITIAVES TO COMBAT CHILD LABOR 
 
 
 
¶11. (SBU) Preventing the use of child labor should focus on 
supporting the efforts of the UN (led by UNICEF) to engage 
cooperatively with the GOU in order to help the GOU meet its 
obligations under international conventions.  The first step should 
be to try to meet with decision-makers at ministerial levels (e.g. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources, Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection) to discuss mutually beneficial ways to address 
the issue of child labor and to enforce existing laws.  Secondly, 
economic groups, such as the Center for Economic Research, should 
be consulted to identify trends in the cotton industry and 
determine how to maximize yields through provision of equipment, 
transfer of technology, and improvement of infrastructure. 
Thirdly, USAID should determine whether the World Bank's pilot 
program to provide funding for farm equipment to farmers who agree 
not to employ child labor is working.  Fourth, USAID should 
investigate ways in which the U.S. and other nations might support 
mechanization of cotton harvesting in Uzbekistan. 
 
 
 
¶12. (SBU) USAID will soon be launching the Local and Regional 
Development Initiative (LRDI) to improve public services, safeguard 
natural resources, enhance effective use of water and repair 
infrastructure through capacity building for local officials and 
through block grants.  Expanding the regional LRDI program (whose 
budget for Uzbekistan is only 1/12 of the total budget for the 
regional program despite Uzbekistan's large population) to address 
issues such as alternatives to child labor through use of 
mechanization and improved resources management can be a quick win 
for both the GOU and the USG on this issue.  However, greater funds 
must be made available for activities like LRDI. 
 
 
 
¶13. (SBU) These initial steps will provide a framework for moving 
forward on the issue and help all parties to extend responsibility 
for ending the use of children in the cotton harvest from the upper 
levels of government to the hokimyat (provincial) level. 
Involvement of Uzbek government officials at all levels will be 
critical to reducing the problem, beginning with clear instructions 
from the top.  Close coordination with the UN in this process is 
essential. 
 
 
 
LONG-TERM INITITATIVES 
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) Over the long-term, working with the UN, the USG should 
consider how to address the interlinked socio-economic, political 
and cultural issues that underlie the use of children in 
harvesting.  These initiatives should leverage the existing work of 
USAID, while providing the necessary funding and support to promote 
a diversified agricultural base, an appropriate policy framework, 
and community-level support for sustainability. 
 
 
 
AGRICULTURAL DIVERSIFICATION 
 
 
 
¶15. (SBU) Cotton has been the keystone of the Uzbekistan economy 
for generations; moving away from this crop will require sustained 
support in terms of technical assistance, provision of equipment 
and facilities, and transfer of technology.  The climate of 
Uzbekistan makes the country an optimal place for growing fruits 
and vegetables; however, farmers are not effectively connected to 
processors, traders and export markets. Improving the value chain 
 
TASHKENT 00001966  004 OF 005 
 
 
by training farmers, establishing facilities for storage and 
processing, and developing linkages with markets will not only 
lessen the reliance of the country on cotton as its main crop, but 
also heighten the resiliency of Uzbekistan's economy. This 
diversification can be the engine for sustained economic growth in 
Uzbekistan, contributing to improved social and economic stability. 
 
 
 
 
¶16. (SBU) To achieve such diversification, the USG should expand 
programs like the Agricultural Linkages (AgLinks) program and 
invest in community-based groups such as Water User Associations. 
Currently, under AgLinks, USAID is establishing value chains for 
stone fruits and grapes.  The program stimulates linkages between 
market-driven producers, for-profit agri-business intermediaries, 
and private wholesalers, processors and retailers of agricultural 
products.  The project also cooperates with private agro-processors 
for specific crops while identifying potential market outlets for 
sale of produce.  Improving the export potential of agricultural 
products while enhancing the capacity of groups such as Water Users 
Associations can build the economy while empowering farmers to 
advocate for the best use of land. 
 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) A factor is any long-term approach to the cotton issue 
should be prospects for restoring the Aral Sea, whose gradual 
disappearance over the past decades has been closely linked to 
cotton production and wasteful irrigation practices.  Until 
recently, experts had given up on the idea of restoring the Aral 
Sea.  However, as reported in Ref D (Astana 1953), it appears the 
Kazakhs are having some success in restoring the northern portion 
of the Aral Sea back to life for fishing purposes.  This leaves a 
southern portion in Uzbekistan whose "eastern basin" is considered 
too far gone to revive but whose "western basin" some experts 
believe could be brought back to life.  This could be hugely 
expensive but would almost certainly involve reducing Uzbekistan's 
dependence on cotton production as part of the economy - and lessen 
the use of child labor. Because reviving the Aral Sea has broader 
implications as well with respect to climate change, it could be 
that U.S. interests on multiple issues will be advanced by 
exploring prospects for a broad international effort to revive the 
western basin of the Aral Sea. 
 
 
 
NECESSARY POLICY REFORMS 
 
 
 
¶18. (SBU) Advocacy for policy reform must cover both economics and 
agriculture.  Although engaging the GOU on policy reforms will be a 
long, delicate process and will require sustained funding, there 
have been recent successes in pushing for reform.  First, the USG 
should look for ways to quietly support farmer groups, private 
entrepreneurs and associations as they engage in policy advocacy 
with key government agencies (such as with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Water Resources, the Ministry of Trade, and the 
Customs Department) on issues related to agricultural and trade 
policy.  Second, the USG should encourage the Uzbek parliament and 
others in authority to review the institutions that allow local 
elites to control key resources and revitalize the reform process 
that started during independence.  Transforming the system whereby 
local decision-makers provide inputs to farmers and promise to meet 
demanding quotas to one where farmers make choices about planting 
will eventually contribute to the diversification of the 
agricultural base while making space for private enterprise. 
Third, changes in the financial products and services available to 
farmers would help to encourage diversification and increase 
innovation and crop yields.  Complementary activities in 
microfinance can assist rural residents in filling gaps in 
agricultural inputs, while also helping farmers to purchase 
technology and equipment. 
 
 
 
COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN REFORMS 
 
 
 
¶19. (SBU) Initiatives should consider the economic circumstances in 
the country that preclude immediate changes to systems and 
policies.  At the same time, actions should address the entrenched 
cultural significance of the cotton harvest.  For generations, 
children have taken part in the harvest and there have been several 
campaigns trumpeting the need for everyone to "do their share." 
 
TASHKENT 00001966  005 OF 005 
 
 
The general attitude about cotton is not one that policy changes or 
provision of inputs can diminish: there should to be a 
cognitive/behavioral replacement for the cultural meaning attached 
to the cotton harvest. Initiatives should incorporate changing of 
attitudes about the practice on a broad scale while also offering 
economic alternatives and cultural substitutions. 
 
 
 
¶20. (SBU) Interventions of this type have been successful in ending 
harmful traditional practices (e.g. FGM, early marriage) in 
different countries (at relatively low cost); however, they are 
only one central piece of the larger socio-economic and political 
equation.  It is not sufficient to have a policy in place; there 
has to be a practical way for the policy to be enforced which can 
involve the different actors who perpetuate the practice. 
Community involvement would engage parents, teachers, hokims, 
mahallahs (neighborhood councils) and other community institutions 
to determine the most appropriate way to confront the problem of 
child labor and develop viable alternatives.  One of the sharpest 
issues to tackle will be the notion that any shift to mechanization 
will deprive farming families of the small but important additions 
to their income that come from each family member who picks cotton 
being paid for it by the kilo. 
 
 
 
DONOR RESPONSE 
 
 
 
¶21. (SBU) Various donors to Uzbekistan have attempted to tackle 
different parts of the child labor issue: the World Bank has 
pledged to provide financing to farmers; UNICEF has begun work with 
local government structures (including the development of community 
action plans to respond to the needs of children) and is advocating 
for the rights of children; and the Asian Development Bank is 
supporting agricultural reforms and infrastructural rehabilitation. 
The USG must become better aware of the efforts of other donors and 
identify how to use its technical development expertise and 
capacity to help the UN develop and present to the GOU a holistic 
approach to improving the cotton industry and transforming 
agricultural practices.  Regular coordination on programs with 
donors and the GOU is vital to the initiation of any activity to 
address child labor. 
 
 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
¶22. (SBU) Significantly reducing the number of children involved in 
the cotton harvest cannot be accomplished overnight, and it cannot 
be achieved without concerted effort and dedicated financial 
resources of the USG and others in the international community. 
This problem also cannot be addressed solely by mechanization. The 
USG should work closely with the UN and Uzbek counterparts to 
devise strategies and systems to confront the problem.  At the same 
time, putting greater resources towards USAID programs that work on 
local governance (i.e. LRDI) and agricultural 
productivity/diversity (i.e. AgLinks) will offer quick wins while 
providing a strong basis for reforms at the systemic, political and 
institutional levels requisite for lasting change. 
NORLAND