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P 250407Z NOV 09
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 9534
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0358
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 001398 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019 
TAGS: MARR PGOV PM PREL TW CH
SUBJECT: ACADEMIC TALKS SET MILESTONE IN CROSS-STRAIT 
POLITICAL DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. BEIJING 3111 
     ¶B. ZARING-BIERS E-MAIL 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Bill Stanton for Reasons 1.4 b/d 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  A November 13-14 conference in Taipei on 
cross-Strait relations marked a milestone in PRC-Taiwan 
political discussions.  The PRC delegation, which included 
distinguished academics and retired senior People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) officers, was the highest-profile group 
from the Mainland to have visited Taiwan to discuss the 
cross-Strait political situation.  Although the conference 
highlighted fundamental differences in approaches to 
political and security talks and portended the long and 
difficult process before such talks could formally take 
place, it nonetheless represented an important initial step. 
End Summary. 
 
Unprecedented Conference 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) PolOff attended the November 13-14 "Cross-Strait at 60 
Years" conference hosted by the Pacific Cultural Foundation, 
which is affiliated with the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) party. 
The 28 Chinese academics, former party officials, and retired 
military officers were the highest-profile group ever to 
visit Taiwan to discuss sensitive cross-Strait issues such as 
a peace accord and military confidence building measures. 
The PRC delegation was led by Zheng Bijian, Vice President 
emeritus of the Central Party School in Beijing, founder of 
the China Reform Forum, developer of the "Peaceful Rise" 
theory of China's development, and formerly very influential 
in foreign policy circles.  Taiwan academics and media 
analysts noted the unprecedented level of attendance and 
speculated that the conference marked the de facto start of 
Track Two talks that could lay the foundation, eventually, 
for formal political and security discussion between Taipei 
and Beijing.  According to Taiwan scholars who took part in 
the conference, PRC academics were already pushing to 
schedule a follow-on session, beginning on December 18 in 
Shanghai. 
 
¶3. (C) In Beijing, Taiwan Affairs Office Spokesman Yang Yi 
commented that, while unofficial in nature, the meeting held 
"positive significance" for cross Strait relations (Ref A). 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Senior Fellow Xu Shiquan 
remarked to Embassy PolOff on the high level of the PRC 
group, but portrayed the delegation as a one-off event and 
"not an official track two meeting."  PRC media coverage of 
the meeting has been light (Ref B). 
 
United Front Effort 
------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The PRC delegates' united front effort to convince 
Taiwan of the virtues of unification was in full force at the 
conference.  The PRC delegates repeatedly highlighted the 
ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties between the two sides, 
arguing that, but for foreign intervention since the mid-19th 
century, the Chinese nation would have been whole long ago. 
The PRC delegation also argued that, while Beijing was 
against Taiwan independence, it did not oppose a Taiwan 
identity that existed within a one-China framework.  Taiwan 
participants, most of whom supported the KMT and not the 
independence-minded opposition Democratic Progressive Party 
(DPP), also agreed there was but one China of which Taiwan 
was a part, but disagreed that the PRC government represented 
all of China.  Nevertheless, Taiwan scholars who took part in 
the conference told AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt during a 
November 24 conversation that the PRC delegates were taken 
aback even by the views of the pro-KMT Taiwan participants. 
Suchow University professor Lo Zhih-cheng (who was not 
invited to attend) told Burghardt that when DPP-leaning 
"greens" such as himself entered the conversation, progress 
would be even more difficult. 
 
1992 Consensus Not a Consensus 
 
TAIPEI 00001398  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (SBU) Following the opening plenary session, conferees 
divided into sub-groups to discuss political, economic, 
cultural, and security issues.  While there was general 
agreement on the way forward in the cultural and economic 
realm (e.g., increasing cross-Strait cultural exchanges, 
signing more economic agreements), discussions on political 
and security issues were contentious. 
 
¶6. (SBU) For example, the PRC delegation argued for the need 
to first pen a peace accord to serve as a framework for 
future political negotiations.  While the PRC representatives 
were conciliatory about the formal names used to refer to the 
PRC and Taiwan, they were clear that any accord would have to 
conform to Beijing's One China principle and, by implication, 
recognize Beijing as the national authority.  While Taiwan 
participants agreed there was only one China of which Taiwan 
was a part, they stressed that the China in question was the 
Republic of China (ROC) -- the name used by the government on 
Taiwan -- and not the People's Republic of China.  They also 
argued that a peace accord should be the goal of, not a 
precondition for, negotiations.  In addition, two Taiwan 
academics highlighted the need for public participation by 
the people of Taiwan, who, according to opinion polls, are 
overwhelmingly wary of reunification, in deciding the future 
of cross-Strait political talks.  In a November 24 discussion 
with AIT Chairman Ray Burghardt, Taiwan-based cross-Strait 
scholars Alexander Huang, George Tsai and Wu Ray-kuo, all of 
whom took part in the conference, agreed that the two sides 
appeared to approach political discussions from diametrically 
opposed directions. 
 
Not In My Back Yard 
------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) In discussing cross-Strait security issues and 
confidence building, the PRC delegation again cited foreign 
interference and interventions in Chinese affairs dating back 
to the Opium War as the source of cross-Strait tension. 
Former People's Liberation Army generals expressed their 
belief that the two sides could collaborate on a variety of 
confidence-building measures, including search-and-rescue 
efforts and joint development projects in the East and South 
China Seas.  The generals further stated that the two sides 
could resolve existing maritime and territorial issues 
without interference from the United States or Japan.  In 
fact, they argued, as both sides became more comfortable with 
one another there would be no need for the United States to 
be involved in the Western Pacific at all.  Asked about PRC 
ballistic missiles targeting Taiwan and the PRC's 
unwillingness to renounce the use for force, the Mainland 
participants stressed there should be no preconditions for 
security talks since everything was negotiable.  In fact, the 
generals described those two items as important tools to use 
for leverage against pro-independence advocates on Taiwan. 
Tamkang University professor Alexander Huang recounted a PRC 
general's comment that Taiwan's ability to rely on the United 
States for its security would become impractical as China's 
military capabilities increased.  In the future, the general 
argued, Taiwan's only security guarantee would be 
reunification.  Throughout the conference, the otherwise 
generally amiable PRC participants harshly rejected Taiwan 
independence, insisting the movement had no future.  This, in 
turn, led to considerable negative commentary in the Taiwan 
media. 
 
Comment: Long and Difficult Process 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Taiwan had been planning this conference for some time 
but seemed to have gotten nervous about how it would be 
perceived after it actually opened.  During a November 23 
meeting with AIT Chairman Burghardt (septel), Mainland 
Affairs Council Chair Lai Shin-yuan said groundwork for the 
conference was prepared over the last eight months.  It took 
some time, however, before the PRC finally granted permission 
 
TAIPEI 00001398  003 OF 003 
 
 
to senior mainland military officials to come.  On November 
12, NSC Secretary General Su Chi called the Director to 
downplay any official role by Taiwan authorities in either 
sponsoring or organizing the event and asked U.S. observers 
not to read too much into it.  In a November 24 meeting with 
AIT Chairman Burghardt (septel), however, President Ma 
revealed that he had paid attention to the proceedings, 
citing comments made by PRC participants at this conference 
as evidence that Beijing was impatient to accelerate the pace 
of political dialogue. 
 
¶9. (C) During her November 23 meeting with Burghardt, Lai 
volunteered that she had invited the PRC delegates to dinner 
following the conference "just to hear what they had to say." 
 She commented that the dinner participants were more 
moderate than they had been in their public statements at the 
conference, quoting them as saying they understood they had 
to respect different views and would welcome more DPP 
participants in future discussions.  Lai's comments 
reinforced the views of other Taiwan cross-Strait experts 
that the conference was a milestone in PRC-Taiwan relations, 
bringing an unprecedentedly senior delegation of former PRC 
officials from the diplomatic, government and military 
spheres to Taiwan to hold talks with their counterparts. 
While neither side officially recognized the meetings as the 
start of a process the would lead to official political 
talks, the conference had all the hallmarks of such an event, 
including significant Taiwan media coverage. 
 
¶10. (C) The conference, however, showed that a long and 
difficult process remains before both sides agree to formal 
political talks.  Fundamental differences between Taiwan and 
the Mainland over how such talks should be structured (i.e. 
is a peace accord a precursor to talks or their final goal?) 
and a lack of consensus among Taiwan's population on whether 
and how to proceed with political negotiations are just two 
sticking points.  They explain why the Presidential Office in 
Taipei issued an official statement on November 15 
reiterating President Ma Ying-jeou's position that there is 
no timetable for negotiations on political issues and that 
improving economic ties should come first. 
 
¶11. (C) With his economic opening attacked by critics who 
believe it will increase PRC leverage in pressing for 
reunification, Ma can be expected to continue to move 
cautiously on the political front.  Although Ma has not ruled 
out meeting PRC President Hu Jintao, most analysts think such 
a summit would come only after Ma is re-elected.  While the 
cross-Strait conference does not make a meeting more likely 
in the near term, it is the first of many necessary steps 
that could ultimately pave the way for a PRC-Taiwan summit. 
STANTON