VZCZCXRO6062
PP RUEHSK
DE RUEHC #0541/01 3271619
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231613Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 3959
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 2684
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK PRIORITY 1076
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5547
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0352
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 7037
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/DTRA DULLES WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 120541 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED 
ASTANA AND KYIV FOR DTRO AND POL-MIL 
MINSK FOR POL-MIL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5 
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREATY 
 
 ¶1. (U) This is an action request for DTROs in Astana and 
Kyiv, and for Pol-Mil in Minsk. Please see paragraph 4. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Background: The START Treaty expires on December 5, 
¶2009.  The START follow-on treaty will be a strictly 
bilateral treaty between the U.S. and Russia.  There will 
thus be a drastic, but not complete, reduction in message 
traffic utilizing the Government to Government Communications 
Links (GGCLs) with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.  The U.S. 
and its partner countries therefore need to discuss the 
future of the GGCLs.  Terminating the GGCL agreements with 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine requires twelve months, notice, that 
with Belarus ninety day's notice, but such decisions will 
require policy guidance.  (NOTE: the Agreement with Belarus 
calls the GGCLS Continuous Communications Links - CCLs; the 
agreements with Ukraine and Kazakhstan refer to them as 
Secure Communications Links, and they will be referred to 
this way in the demarche language). 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Background continued:  The original agreements to 
establish the GGCLs are based on both the INF and START 
treaties.  Even with the expiration of START, the INF Treaty 
continues in force, and a small number of notifications are 
required yearly.  The GGCLs can be maintained in an efficient 
and cost-effective manner, and there are significant 
benefits, both practical and political in nature, to the U.S. 
in maintaining direct, secure connections with Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus and in encouraging those countries to 
maintain their current NRRC-like structures, which help them 
to fulfill their obligations under other treaties.  The US 
NRRC needs to discuss with its counterparts whether they are 
willing and able to maintain the current satellite-based 
configuration, or whether they wish to explore alternatives, 
such as an internet-based system similar to those in use for 
the notifications required under the various Organization on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) treaty regimes. 
The US NRRC acknowledges that the Presidential election 
campaign now underway in Ukraine may make it difficult if not 
impossible for the Ukraine to engage in any substantive talks 
until well into the new year, but it does not want to request 
talks with Kazakhstan and Belarus without making a 
simultaneous request to Ukraine.  The NRRC also believes that 
a demarche at this time may help the Ukrainians to focus on 
the steps they need to take to repair their GGL, which has 
been down since August 24, 2009, and to either complete their 
unfinished satellite-link infrastructure or develop a 
reliable substitute. 
 
¶4. (U) Action Request: The Department requests Embassy pass 
to the appropriate National Centers and MFA the points below. 
Points for Minsk are to be found at paragraph 5, Astana at 
paragraph 6, and Kyiv at paragraph 7. 
 
The U.S. NRRC also encourages DTRO representatives to attend 
these discussions: please reply to contacts listed in para 8. 
 Please report contact information and any reaction to this 
paper. 
 
¶5. (SBU/Releasable to Belarus) Begin Points for Minsk: 
 
- For fifteen years, our Continuous Communication Links 
(CCLs) in 1994 have been valuable and productive in providing 
bilateral notifications required under the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty.  The CCLs, or Government to Government 
Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually 
refers to them, have proven to be a reliable and secure means 
of communication between our countries, in particular for 
exchanging treaty-related notifications. 
 
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on 
December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in 
 
STATE 00120541  002 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5 
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREA 
message traffic utilizing the CCLs, and we need to make 
decisions soon about the future of the CCLs. 
 
- The United States believes that the CCLs can be operated in 
an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are 
mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections 
between our nations. 
 
- The CCLs have been the core around which our successful 
national centers for security and confidence building 
communications have developed.  These centers now host not 
only the CCLs to support START and INF notifications, but 
also the network terminals to support Organization for 
Security and Cooperation notifications. 
 
- We have devoted years to improving the CCLs to the current 
digital circuitry and state-of-the-art technology within a 
framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch 
officers and engineers.  Both sides of our CCL know how the 
links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side,s 
information-passing capabilities and competencies.  The CCLs 
provide a reliable and easy way for our two countries to 
exchange classified information directly, and an established 
backup capability for our senior officials to communicate 
with the each other.  They serve as an instrument of mutual 
trust and cooperation between our respective governments. 
 
- If the CCLs were discontinued, much of this expertise would 
be lost.  As such, we anticipate that discontinuation of 
CCLs, and the ability for direct bilateral coordination of 
our notification regimes, could have additional negative 
impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our 
national centers. 
 
- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation 
from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of 
the United States' National Center, the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support 
staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss the possibilities for 
maintaining the CCLs after the December expiration of the 
START Treaty.  The Division Chief of the Department of 
State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of 
Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the 
NRRC delegation. 
 
- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February 
1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions.  We envision 
one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues. 
 
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts 
in Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 
 
¶6. (SBU/Releasable to Kazakhstan) Begin Points for Astana: 
 
- For fifteen years, since the inauguration of our Secure 
Communication Links in 1994 to provide bilateral 
notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty, the United States and Kazakhstan, along with 
our national centers, have enjoyed a valuable and productive 
relationship.   The Secure Communications Links, or 
Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs), as the 
United States usually refers to them, have proven to be a 
very effective means of exchanging treaty-related 
notifications and providing rapid, reliable and secure 
communication between our countries. 
 
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on 
December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in 
message traffic utilizing the Secure Communications Links, 
and we need to make decisions soon about the future of the 
links. 
 
- The United States believes that the Secure Communications 
Links can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective 
manner, and that there are significant mutual benefits in 
maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations. 
 
 
STATE 00120541  003 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5 
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREA 
- The Secure Communications Links have been the core around 
which our highly successful national centers for security and 
confidence building communications have developed.  These 
centers now host not only the Secure Communications Links to 
support START and INF notifications, but also the network 
terminals to support Organization for Security and 
Cooperation notifications. 
 
- We have devoted years to improving the Secure 
Communications Links to the current digital circuitry and 
state-of-the-art technology within a framework of a highly 
skilled communications staff, watch officers and engineers. 
Both sides of our Secure Communications Link know how the 
links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side's 
information-passing capabilities and competencies.  The 
Secure Communications Links provide a reliable and easy way 
for our two countries to exchange classified information 
directly, and an established backup capability for senior 
officials to communicate directly with the President, Foreign 
Minister, and Minister of Defense in each country.  They 
serve as an instrument of mutual trust and cooperation 
between our respective governments. 
 
- If the Secure Communications Links were discontinued, much 
of this expertise would be lost and much work would have to 
be unnecessarily repeated if we sought to re-establish these 
capabilities at a later time.  As such, we anticipate that 
discontinuation of Secure Communications Links, and direct 
bilateral coordination of our notification regimes, could 
have additional negative impact to the infrastructure and 
operational capacity of our national centers. 
 
- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation 
from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of 
the United States' National Center, the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support 
staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss the maintaining of the 
Secure Communications Links after the December expiration of 
the START Treaty.  The Division Chief of the Department of 
State,s Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of 
Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the 
NRRC delegation. 
 
- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February 
1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions.  We envision 
one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues. 
 
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts 
in Belarus and Ukraine. 
 
End Points for Astana 
 
¶7. (SBU/Releasable to Ukraine) Begin Points for Kyiv: 
 
- For fifteen years, since the inauguration of our Secure 
Communications Links in 1994 to provide bilateral 
notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty, the United States and Ukraine, and our national 
centers, have enjoyed a valuable and productive relationship. 
 The Secure Communications Links, or Government to Government 
Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually 
refers to them, have in the past proven to be an effective 
means of exchanging treaty-related notifications and 
providing rapid, reliable and secure communication between 
our countries. 
 
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on 
December 5, 2009, there will be a drastic reduction in 
message traffic utilizing the Secure Communications Links, 
and we need to make decisions soon about the future of the 
Secure Communications Links. 
 
- The United States believes that the Secure Communications 
Links can be operated in an efficient and cost-effective 
manner, and that there are significant mutual benefits in 
maintaining direct, secure connections between our nations. 
 
 
STATE 00120541  004 OF 004 
 
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO 
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS) UPON DECEMBER 5 
2009 EXPIRY OF THE START TREA 
- The Secure Communications Links have been the core around 
which our highly successful national centers for security and 
confidence building communications have developed.  These 
centers now host not only the Secure Communications Links to 
support START and INF notifications, but also the network 
terminals to support OSCE notifications. 
 
- We have devoted years to improving the Secure 
Communications Links to the current high performance level 
within a framework of a highly skilled communications staff, 
watch officers and engineers.  Both sides of our Secure 
Communications Link know how the links work, how the other 
end is staffed, and each side's information-passing 
capabilities and competencies.   The Secure Communications 
Links have provided a reliable and easy way for our two 
countries to exchange classified information directly, and 
when current problems are resolved, they can once again 
provide an established backup capability for senior officials 
to communicate directly. 
 
- If the Secure Communications Links were discontinued, much 
of this expertise would be lost and much work would have to 
be unnecessarily repeated if we sought to re-establish these 
capabilities at a later time.  As such, we anticipate that 
discontinuation of the Secure Communications Links, and 
direct bilateral coordination of our notification regimes, 
could have additional negative impact to the infrastructure 
and operational capacity of our national centers. 
 
- The United States proposes, therefore, to send a delegation 
from the Department of State, led by the Staff Director of 
the United States, National Center, the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center (NRRC), or his Deputy, as well as support 
staff from the U.S. NRRC, to discuss maintaining the Secure 
Communications Links after the December expiration of the 
START Treaty.  The Division Chief of the Department of 
State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of 
Information Resources Management (IRM) will accompany the 
NRRC delegation. 
 
- The U.S. side would like to propose dates between February 
1 and February 12, 2010, for these discussions.  We envision 
one or two days of meetings to discuss the relevant issues. 
 
- We are planning similar consultations with our counterparts 
in Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
 
End Points for Kyiv 
 
¶8. (U) Points of contact for the consultations are NRRC 
Senior Staff Officer Dennis Curry at (202) 647 1895 and Staff 
Officer Kevin Stickney at (202) 647 0026. The NRRC 
unclassified fax number is (202) 647 4892.  Post assistance 
is greatly appreciated. 
CLINTON