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DE RUEHC #9107 3221815
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O 181808Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 119107 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MARR PARM PREL KTIA RS
SUBJECT: U.S. NON-PAPERS ON MISSILE DEFENSE AND 
NONPROLIFERATION IN PREPARATION FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF 
STATE TAUSCHER'S MEETING WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER 
RYABKOV ON DECEMBER 7, 2009 
 
¶1.  This is an action request. See paragraph 2. 
 
¶2. (SBU) ACTION REQUEST.  Please provide the non-papers on 
missile defense and early warning cooperation at paragraph 3 
and nonproliferation at paragraph 4 to Deputy Foreign 
Minister Ryabkov, in preparation for the December 7, 2009, 
meeting with U/S Tauscher in Moscow.  Please advise DFM 
Ryabkov that these papers represent a list of missile defense 
and early warning cooperation and nonproliferation issues 
that we propose to address at the December 7 meeting, and 
that our suggestion would be to use these as the agenda for 
the meeting, and to plan to work our way through these issues 
one by one, and in each case decide how to proceed.  Post is 
requested to provide confirmation of delivery and to report 
back to Washington any initial reactions. 
 
¶3. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE NON-PAPER: 
 
U.S. Non-Paper 
November 19, 2009 
 
Missile Defense Goals for the U.S.-Russia 
Arms Control and International Security Working Group 
 
The United States offers the following non-paper to guide 
discussion of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and early 
warning cooperation efforts at the meeting of Under Secretary 
of State Tauscher and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov 
scheduled for December 7, 2009, in Moscow. 
 
Missile Defense Cooperation 
 
- In their April 1, 2009, and July 6, 2009, Joint Statements, 
President Obama and President Medvedev endorsed the 
possibility of joint cooperation in the field of BMD. 
 
- U.S. proposals for BMD cooperation involve a wide range of 
joint projects, operations, and activities: 
 
-- Data exchanges for the purposes of transparency, 
confidence-building, and predictability in the field of BMD; 
-- Joint BMD conceptual and architecture analyses; 
-- Joint BMD modeling/simulations/exercises; 
-- Joint sensor cooperation; 
--- This could include the Qabala radar in Azerbaijan, the 
Armavir radar in southern Russia, and U.S. sensors to monitor 
the Iranian missile program; 
-- Joint research & development; 
-- Joint BMD testing; 
-- Transparency and confidence-building measures such as 
visits to missile defense-related facilities and the 
observation of BMD flight-tests. 
 
- Through the use of a Joint BMD Analysis using our latest 
modeling and simulation tools, and consistent with the 
"Phased, Adaptive Approach" to U.S. missile defense 
activities in Europe, we would like to explore options for 
working with Russia on a regional BMD architecture for the 
protection of Europe, the United States, and Russia against 
existing and near-term emerging ballistic missile threats. 
 
- The NATO Summit Joint Declarations at Bucharest and 
Strasbourg-Kehl in 2008 and 2009, respectively, endorsed BMD 
cooperation between the United States and Russia, and 
reaffirmed NATO,s "readiness to explore the potential for 
linking United States, NATO, and Russian missile defense 
systems" in the future. 
 
- The U.S. proposal for a joint BMD architecture in Europe 
would involve exploring the possibility of linking the 
operations of U.S., NATO, and Russian missile defense 
interceptors, sensors, and command and control functions. 
 
- The United States is also interested in exploring President 
Medvedev,s reiteration of Russia,s 2007 proposal to: 
 
-- Jointly monitor emerging ballistic missile threats from 
the Middle East using the Russian-leased early warning radar 
at Qabala, Azerbaijan, as well as the early warning radar at 
Armavir in southern Russia. 
 
- U.S. technical experts found the September 2007 
Russian-hosted visit to Qabala extremely useful in evaluating 
Qabala,s capabilities to monitor the threat from Iran and 
the Middle East. 
 
- We re-affirm the interest of the United States in 
conducting expert-level technical talks to explore the 
details of Russia,s Qabala/Armavir proposal. 
 
- Ultimately, BMD cooperation could build a real strategic 
U.S.-Russia partnership involving operational military 
capabilities against the common danger and threat inherent in 
the proliferation of ballistic missiles of increasingly 
greater ranges, potentially equipped with weapons of mass 
destruction. 
 
- Bilateral BMD cooperation could also leverage the 
scientific and technological strengths of both the United 
States and the Russian Federation to our mutual advantage. 
 
- The United States reiterates its proposal of October 12, 
2009, for a meeting of policy and technical experts in 
Colorado Springs to discuss proposals for BMD cooperation. 
 
Joint Data Exchange Center/Pre-Launch Notification System 
 
- Full implementation of the Joint Data Exchange Center 
(JDEC) and the Pre- and Post-Missile Launch Notification 
System (PLNS) agreements signed in 2000 require final 
resolution of the issues of liability and taxation, "rare 
exceptions" for ballistic missile launches, and reaching 
agreement on a Moscow site for the JDEC facility. 
 
-- The United States provided a revised draft Joint Statement 
on Liability and Taxation (dated May 18, 2009) that accepted 
the Russian position that U.S. contractors not be given 
liability protections.  On June 15, 2009, the United States 
provided a further revised draft Joint Statement to take 
account of other Russian points on both liability and 
taxation made at the May 28, 2009, meeting in Moscow.  Both 
revised drafts were accompanied by explanatory non-papers. 
-- If a legal experts meeting is still considered by Russia 
to be necessary to reach final agreement on the issues of 
liability and taxation, the United States proposes a meeting 
of legal experts in Washington, D.C. on January 28, 2010. 
-- As part of its May 18, 2009, non-paper package, the United 
States provided a draft exchange of diplomatic notes to 
resolve the "rare exceptions" issue.  Additionally, the U.S. 
transmitted a June 4, 2009 non-paper entitled "Rare 
Exceptions for Ballistic Missile Launches," which was 
provided in response to Russia,s request that the United 
States provide the rationale for "rare exceptions" in writing. 
-- The United States also provided a non-paper on "The Mutual 
Benefits of a U.S.-Russia Joint Data Exchange Center" to 
Russia on October 12, 2009, in Moscow.  We continue to 
believe that JDEC is still relevant to stability, especially 
due to the proliferation of ballistic missiles and space 
launch vehicles worldwide. 
-- On the basis of the visit of a U.S. Delegation of security 
experts in August 2008 to brief the U.S. post-9/11 physical 
site security requirements for the JDEC facility, the United 
States hopes that Russia will in the near future host a 
delegation of U.S. experts in order to evaluate prospective 
JDEC facility sites. 
 
- In its May 18, 2009, non-paper, the United States made 
several proposals for moving forward with implementation of 
the JDEC and the PLNS agreements, including: 
 
-- Signing an extension of the JDEC and PLNS agreements 
before their expirations on June 4, 2010, and December 16, 
2010, respectively.  The United States provided draft 
extension agreements to Russia on October 12, 2009, in Moscow. 
-- Establishing the bilateral JDEC Joint Commission 
responsible under the JDEC Memorandum of Agreement with 
oversight of its implementation. 
-- Establishing an "interim" PLNS arrangement for providing 
ballistic missile and space launch vehicle notifications 
pursuant to the PLNS Memorandum of Understanding, prior to 
the JDEC facility becoming operational. 
 
- The United States is of the view that forward movement on 
implementation of the JDEC and PLNS agreements ) as proposed 
above ) should not be tied to other issues such as progress 
in the Joint Threat Assessment or the dialogue in regard to 
the U.S. "Phased, Adaptive Approach" to BMD in Europe. 
-- Since the JDEC and PLNS agreements encompass important 
transparency and confidence-building measures, and are not a 
form of missile defense cooperation, progress in implementing 
these agreements should not be linked to our dialogue on 
missile defense. 
 
Moscow-Washington Direct Communications Link 
 
- In 2006, the United States tabled a proposal for 
negotiating a pre-formatted notification message for the 
launch of long-range ground-based BMD interceptors that would 
be transmitted over the Moscow-Washington Direct 
Communications Link (DCL), or "Hotline." 
 
- This time-urgent notification message would constitute a 
transparency and confidence-building measure designed to 
prevent a false warning of attack being generated by either 
country,s early warning system. 
 
- In a February 21, 2007, Aide Memoire, Russia stated that 
the U.S. proposal is "consistent with the spirit of the 1971 
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of 
Nuclear War." 
 
- On October 12, 2009, in Moscow, the United States provided 
a non-paper proposing that U.S. and Russian technical experts 
schedule a meeting in November in Moscow to negotiate, and 
agree upon, a pre-formatted notification message. 
 
- Since meeting in November is no longer a viable option, the 
United States wishes to propose a meeting of DCL experts on 
January 21, 2010, in Moscow.  We look forward to Russia,s 
positive response. 
 
Joint Threat Assessment 
 
- Our Presidents have both committed to establish the 
U.S.-Russia Joint Ballistic Missile Threat Assessment Working 
Group to assess the ballistic missile threat jointly. 
 
- From our perspective, this working group is intended to 
provide a meaningful and long-term consultative process 
dedicated to strengthening our mutual understanding of the 
existing and emerging challenges, risks, and dangers posed by 
the spread of ballistic missiles of increasingly greater 
ranges, payloads, lethality, and sophistication. 
 
- The regular exchange of useful intelligence and our 
respective threat assessments will provide a better 
understanding of each other,s perspectives and perhaps bring 
about a narrowing of differences, if not a convergence, 
regarding threats to the security of the United States, the 
Russian Federation, and Europe. 
 
- Ultimately, it is our hope that such a shared perspective 
of the ballistic missile threats we face will inform how we 
can best work together to address these threats bilaterally 
and multilaterally, and to defend against them when 
necessary. 
 
- In early November, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow relayed 
Washington,s proposal to hold the JTA Working Group on 
either December 21, 22, or 23, in Washington, D.C.  Once 
again, we look forward to receiving Moscow,s response. 
 
END TEXT OF U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE NON-PAPER. 
 
¶4. (SBU) BEGIN TEXT OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION NON-PAPER 
 
U.S. Non-Paper 
 
November 19, 2009 
 
Key Issues for the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) 
 
Middle East:  U.S. bilateral consultations, the results of 
the IAEA General Conference meeting, and the recently 
concluded session of the UNGA First Committee all indicate 
that Egypt and other Arab states continue to stress, almost 
to the exclusion of other matters, the need for progress on 
the 1995 RevCon,s Resolution on the Middle East.  The P-5 
should make clear that we fully support all of the 
Resolution,s objectives, and will work with all states 
toward implementing those objectives at the earliest possible 
date.  It should be noted, however, that a Middle East free 
of weapons of mass destruction will not be achieved 
overnight, and can be achieved only in the context of 
progress towards a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. 
It remains unclear what actions the Arab states would 
consider concrete progress toward achieving the 1995 
Resolution.  The P-5 should indicate that they are ready to 
address achievement of the 1995 Resolution, but emphasize 
that NPT Parties should not allow this one item to distract 
us from our goal of a successful RevCon that provides 
balanced treatment of the three pillars of the NPT 
(nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses). 
 
Article VI*Disarmament:  Assuming that the post-START 
agreement is finished on time, the Administration intends to 
begin the ratification process (and we assume the Russian 
side will as well) by the time of the RevCon.  The P-5 should 
work before the RevCon convenes to encourage additional 
ratifications of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
and the start of negotiations next January in the Geneva 
Conference on Disarmament on a verifiable Fissile Material 
Cutoff Treaty.  The United States and Russia in particular 
have a good story to tell on disarmament at this RevCon, but 
we can expect pressure to limit the roles of nuclear weapons, 
to grant legally binding negative security assurances, for 
negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, and to 
eliminate nuclear weapons.  In addition to making clear the 
progress that is already being made, the P-5 should be united 
in stressing that all states share responsibility for 
creating conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.  The 
P-5 should consider whether additional undertakings (such as 
committing to make regular reports on implementation of 
Article VI) would help secure support at the RevCon for the 
nonproliferation outcomes that we favor. 
 
Nonproliferation:  The P-5 should work for a reaffirmation at 
the RevCon of the fundamental importance of full compliance 
with the NPT, and a recognition that noncompliance undermines 
the integrity of the Treaty.  We also should seek commitments 
to ensure that the IAEA has the resources and legal 
authorities necessary for it to verify whether states are in 
compliance with their nonproliferation obligations.  The P-5 
in addition should also support the proposition that a 
comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an 
Additional Protocol, should constitute the minimum 
international verification standard. 
 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy:  The attitudes of the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states will be key to success at 
this RevCon, and many of them see access to peaceful uses as 
their key interest.  The P-5 should be prepared to reaffirm 
the right of all NPT Parties to pursue peaceful uses in 
conformity with the Treaty,s nonproliferation obligations. 
In addition to seeking a commitment to enhancing the IAEA,s 
verification resources, we should be prepared to make a 
commitment to help develop the human resources and 
infrastructure for advancing peaceful applications of nuclear 
energy.  We should also strive to secure recognition that a 
country can enjoy the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy without possessing the most sensitive nuclear 
technologies, and the RevCon should encourage the work of the 
IAEA on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. 
To this end, the U.S. has endorsed Russia,s proposal for a 
nuclear fuel bank at Angarsk. 
 
Abuse of the NPT,s Withdrawal Provision:  We believe that it 
is very important for the RevCon to address this problem and 
possible solutions.  This should include an affirmation of 
the sovereign right to withdraw in conformity with Article X, 
but also the recognition that abuse of this right could pose 
a grave threat to the international nuclear nonproliferation 
regime.  The RevCon also should affirm that any NPT Party 
withdrawing from the Treaty prior to remedying a violation 
remains accountable for that violation.  For example, NPT 
parties could urge the IAEA to advise on the applicable 
safeguards in the event of an NPT withdrawal.  A violation of 
any remaining safeguards agreement would still be subject to 
a finding by the IAEA Board of Governors of safeguards 
noncompliance that would be reported to the UN Security 
Council, which in turn could decide to place sanctions on 
that state. The RevCon additionally could agree on measures 
that could be taken up bilaterally or in other forums, such 
as the UN Security Council and the IAEA, or at least develop 
ideas that could be explored further within the NPT review 
process. 
 
We look forward to the P-5 discussion of these issues in 
Geneva and a draft P5 RevCon statement in advance of the 
Tauscher-Ryabkov meeting. 
 
END TEXT OF U.S. NONPROLIFERATION NON-PAPER. 
CLINTON