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O 161908Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRASILIA IMMEDIATE 
INFO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL RECIFE IMMEDIATE 
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 118094 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/12/2019 
TAGS: IR PGOV PHUM PREL AORC CASC BR
 
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: MANAGING THE VISIT OF 
IRANIAN PRESIDENT AHMADINEJAD TO BRAZIL (S/ES: 
200921227) 
 
REF: Brasilia 1300 
Classified by: Under Secretary William J. Burns, Reasons 
1.4. (B) and (D) 
 
¶1.  (U) This is an action request for Embassy Brasilia. 
Please see paragraphs 5-6. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary.  The Department requests Embassy 
Brasilia persuade Brazilian officials to use the 
expected November 23 visit of Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad to Brazil to urge Iran's constructive 
engagement with the five permanent members of the 
Security Council and Germany (P5+1) on its nuclear 
program, its full compliance with UN Security Council 
resolutions and its assistance in freeing unjustly 
imprisoned American citizens.  End Summary. 
 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
¶3.  (C) Post should persuade highest appropriate 
officials to advance the following objectives during 
Ahmadinejad's visit: 
 
--Encourage Iran's engagement with the P5+1 on its 
nuclear program, specifically: 
 
        --Urge Iran to accept the IAEA's offer, supported and 
guaranteed by Russia, France, and the United States, 
to provide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) 
in exchange for a portion of Iran's existing 
stockpile of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU); and 
 
        --Highlight the opportunity for Iran to improve its 
international relations, including with the United 
States, by committing to an urgent and regular 
process of dialogue with the P5+1 on the issues 
surrounding Iran's nuclear program and other issues 
that Iran wishes to raise. 
 
--Press for Iranian compliance with all UN Security 
Council and IAEA requirements on its nuclear program. 
 
--Urge the speedy release of American citizens unjustly 
held in Iran. 
 
If raised by the Brazilians, post should discourage 
Brazilian support for any alternatives to refuel the TRR 
that do not feature the removal of LEU from Iran.  Such 
alternatives would undermine international efforts to 
build confidence in Iran's nuclear program. 
 
Under Secretary Burns will also pursue these objectives 
with U/S Machado during her visit to Washington on 
November 16. 
 
DEADLINE 
-------- 
 
¶4.  (U) Please report results by November 20. 
 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Post may draw on the following background points 
in working with the Brazilian government: 
 
General Overview 
---------------- 
 
-- Since President Obama took office, he has made clear 
the willingness of the United States to engage with Iran 
and to launch a new relationship based on mutual respect 
and recognition of each other's interests. 
 
-- He has authorized the United States' full 
participation in diplomatic discussions between the five 
permanent members of the Security Council and Germany 
and Iran without pre-conditions. 
 
-- The United States has stated its support for Iran's 
full right to a civilian nuclear program within IAEA 
guidelines, provided Iran meets its international 
obligations and carries out its responsibilities within 
the NPT framework. 
 
-- As a way to build confidence, the United States, with 
Russia and France, has also supported the IAEA's 
proposal to respond positively to Iran's request for 
nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), in 
spite of Iran's continuing violation of UNSC resolutions 
and noncompliance with IAEA requirements on its nuclear 
program. 
 
-- However, almost one year into the Obama 
administration, Iran has not taken practical, concrete 
steps that would begin to create confidence in its 
nuclear intentions.  Iran: 
 
o       Continues to enrich uranium despite UNSC 
requirements that it suspend such operations; 
o       Revealed it had been building a secret uranium 
enrichment facility at a military base near Qom, 
in violation of its safeguards agreement; 
o       Continues to refuse cooperation with the IAEA in 
addressing the full range of IAEA questions about 
the peaceful purposes of its nuclear program; 
o       Has not accepted the IAEA proposal to refuel the 
TRR; and 
o       Since meeting with representatives of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council and 
Germany in Geneva on October 1, has refused all 
subsequent efforts to schedule another meeting to 
discuss its nuclear program. 
-- Iran's failure to take advantage of these numerous 
opportunities raises serious questions about the 
intentions of its nuclear program that deserve urgent 
international attention. 
 
 
 
Background on the Tehran Research Reactor 
----------------------------------------- 
 
 
-- The IAEA, Russia, France, and the United States 
cooperated closely and flexibly to find a way to respond 
positively to Iran's request for fuel for the Tehran 
Research Reactor (TRR) so that it could keep running to 
meet medical needs beyond 2010. 
 
-- The TRR refueling proposal offers Iran the 
opportunity to convert its stockpile of low enriched 
uranium (LEU) into higher-enriched fuel with the help of 
Russia and France.  The proposal's elements are simple: 
 
o       Iran would transfer a portion of its LEU 
necessary for fuel production in one batch to 
IAEA custody outside of Iran before the end of 
the year; 
o       Russia would further enrich the LEU to meet fuel 
requirements; and 
o       France would fabricate the fuel assemblies and 
return them to Iran before Iran's fuel supplies 
are depleted before the end of the year. 
-- In addition, the United States expressed a commitment 
to work with the IAEA to improve safety and control 
features at the TRR. 
 
-- The United States, France, and Russia took great 
political risks in supporting the deal, especially in 
light of Iran's continuing violation of successive UNSC 
resolutions and IAEA requirements, including its secret 
construction of a uranium enrichment facility near Qom, 
and its continuing enrichment operations. 
 
-- We did so because the arrangement would begin to 
build confidence and would give Iran and the 
international community more time to reach a 
comprehensive negotiated solution to Iran's nuclear 
program, while fulfilling Iran's humanitarian needs. 
 
-- When Iran expressed concern about the reliability of 
the proposal, the United States and its partners 
expressed to the IAEA a willingness to address Iran's 
concerns, including through: 
o       a U.S. offer to formally join the deal as a 
signatory; 
o       a readiness of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council and Germany to guarantee the 
deal through a political statement of support; 
o       a willingness to help secure finance for the 
movement of the LEU and fuel; 
o       an openness to move the LEU to any number of 
locations outside of Iran; and 
o       a willingness to support the IAEA's holding 
material equivalent to the fuel in escrow as a 
guarantee for Iran of the fuel's ultimate 
delivery. 
 
-- After reaching an agreement in principle in the deal 
following talks with the E3+3 in Geneva on October 1, 
and following further technical discussions at the IAEA 
October 19-21, Iran has failed to accept the deal to 
date. 
 
Iran's Intentions 
----------------- 
 
-- This raises a question about Iran's intentions.  If 
Iran is enriching uranium to meet its civilian reactor 
fuel needs, why would it not accept an international 
offer (with significant guarantees) to provide its LEU 
for fuel to power the TRR to meet its humanitarian 
needs, particularly since Iran does not have the 
capability to produce the reactor fuel on its own? 
 
-- This question is troubling in the context of Iran's 
continued enrichment activities in defiance of UNSC 
resolutions; its secret construction of an enrichment 
facility on a military base near Qom; its refusal to 
cooperate with the IAEA in answering questions about the 
peaceful nature of its nuclear program; and its refusal 
to meet with the five permanent members of the Security 
Council. 
 
-- Together with our P5+1 partners, the United States 
informed Iranian representatives in Geneva on October 1 
of our willingness to discuss any items of concern to 
Iran -- both bilaterally and multilaterally -- in 
addition to our concerns about Iran's nuclear program. 
 
-- On October 1, Iran's representatives committed to 
meet again before the end of the month based on an 
agenda that included Iran's nuclear program.  Since that 
time, however, the Iranian government has refused all 
invitations to meet if its nuclear program would be on 
the agenda. 
 
-- Iran's continued refusal to engage on its nuclear 
program with the P5+1 or in any other forum deepens our 
concerns about Iran's intentions for its nuclear 
program. 
 
 
Background on Imprisoned American Citizens 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (U) Since July 31, Iran has detained three American 
citizens (Joshua Fattal, Shane Bauer, and Sarah Shourd) 
who were hiking in Northern Iraq when they apparently 
wandered by mistake into Iran in a poorly marked border 
area.  It is unclear what, if any, formal charges have 
been filed against them.  As Secretary Clinton has said: 
"We believe strongly that there is no evidence to 
support any charge whatsoever.  And we would renew our 
request on behalf of these three young people and their 
families that the Iranian government exercise compassion 
and release them, so they can return home."  The 
Department has repeatedly called upon Iran to release 
all other American citizens who are either missing or 
being unjustly detained in Iran. 
 
Q/A 
--- 
 
¶7.  (U) Post may draw on following guidance in 
responding to any counter-arguments or questions from 
the Brazilian government. 
 
-- In the TRR proposal, why must Iran surrender all of 
its LEU in one batch, and why must it be before the end 
of the year? 
o       The TRR proposal was developed both to supply 
Iran with the fuel required for the continued 
operation of the reactor and also as a measure to 
build confidence in Iran's peaceful intentions 
and its seriousness to negotiate. 
o       By agreeing to the transfer of 1200 kilograms of 
LEU (enough to equal the last fuel supply 
agreement Iran signed for the reactor with 
Argentina in the early 1990s), we aimed to lessen 
international concerns that Iran was attempting 
to create a stockpile of uranium to contribute to 
an eventual breakout from the NPT.  This would 
consequently allow more time for negotiations on 
the broader nuclear file. 
o       The transfer by the end of the year is needed to 
ensure that Iran receives the fuel required for 
the reactor before December 2010, when the 
reactor will run out and be forced to shut down. 
 
-- What risk does the LEU stored in Iran pose to the 
international community?  Isn't it under full IAEA 
monitoring? 
o       Yes, this LEU is currently under IAEA safeguards. 
o       However, given Iran's long history of IAEA 
safeguards violations and NPT noncompliance, the 
international community cannot trust that Iran 
will not interfere with IAEA monitoring or 
withdraw from IAEA safeguards or the NPT 
altogether. 
o       This project will remove an immediate source of 
concern and establish some confidence in Iran's 
peaceful intent and willingness to comply with 
its obligations. 
 
-- How can Iran be sure it will ever receive the fuel 
assemblies for the TRR in the current international 
environment, in which many openly seek to diminish 
Iran's nuclear capacity? 
 
o       We and our partners have each made political 
commitments at the highest levels to the 
fulfillment of this project.  Should Iran agree 
to it, Iran will receive the fuel required. 
o       All participants in this project are taking 
risks.  Iran stands in violation of the NPT, its 
IAEA safeguards agreement, and three Chapter VII 
UNSC resolutions.  This project offers Iran an 
opportunity to establish confidence in its 
peaceful intentions, a confidence that has eroded 
due to Iran's continued non-compliance. 
 
-- Iran suspended enrichment once before in response to 
international demands, and received no benefit.  Why 
should Iran trust the international community now? 
o       Iran's suspension of uranium enrichment and other 
activities in the past was intended to support a 
diplomatic process.  Unfortunately, Iran 
terminated that diplomatic process in August 2005 
by abandoning suspension. 
o       However, prior to that point, Iran's temporary 
suspension avoided its being reported to the UN 
Security Council and the sanctions that would 
have likely come along with that report. 
o       The requirement of suspension imposed by the UNSC 
in resolution 1737 is intended to restore that 
diplomatic process and to lead to a final 
resolution of international concerns with Iran's 
nuclear program. 
o       This was codified in UNSCR 1737 when the UNSC 
stated its intention to suspend implementation of 
the measures adopted by the UNSC if Iran returned 
to negotiations through suspension of its nuclear 
and related activities. 
o       Trust is in short supply on both sides.  It is 
for that reason that we have offered Iran several 
opportunities for reciprocal, confidence-building 
steps (e.g., "freeze for freeze" and the TRR 
proposal). 
 
-- Why is there not equal attention to Israel's nuclear 
status?  Does it not also destabilize the region? 
o       The United States has long pressed for universal 
adherence to the NPT treaty and will continue to 
urge all states that have not done so to join the 
Treaty and accept the full-scope IAEA safeguards 
on all of their nuclear activities. 
o       It is extremely difficult, however, to persuade a 
state that NPT adherence is in its security 
interest when its neighbors are in violation of 
their own NPT obligations, and when the 
international community has not demonstrated the 
political will necessary to enforce compliance. 
o       Iran's failure to comply with its NPT and IAEA 
obligations bears out these concerns and 
undermines attempts to secure universal adherence 
to the NPT.  It became a party to the treaty and 
proceeded to violate its obligations for over 
twenty years, presenting a fundamental threat to 
the entire nonproliferation regime. 
o       Returning regional states to full compliance with 
their NPT obligations would remove a serious 
obstacle to NPT adherence by all states in the 
region. 
o       An Iranian nuclear weapons capability also serves 
as a destabilizer in the region, possibly 
triggering proliferation across the Gulf in 
response to a mounting threat posed by Iran.  Not 
only does this undermine the entire nuclear 
nonproliferation regime, but risks further 
instability in the region. 
 
-- How can you say that the Qom facility was secret, 
when it was Iran that announced its existence and 
invited IAEA inspectors to visit? 
o       Iran was required to declare the existence of 
this facility to the IAEA the moment the decision 
was made to construct it, not several years into 
its construction.  This is a requirement of 
Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement (contained in 
Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangement to Iran's 
Safeguards Agreement). 
o       This code was modified after revelations 
surrounding Iraq's nuclear program were made in 
the early 1990s. 
o       Iran was the last state to agree to the revised 
code, but it did so in March 2003.  Iran 
attempted to revert to the early form of the code 
(which requires notification only 180 days prior 
to the introduction of nuclear to the facility) 
in March 2007.  The IAEA consistently has denied 
that Iran has the legal ability to make such a 
change. 
o       We also believe that Iran made the decision to 
declare the facility not to conform to its legal 
obligations, but because it had become aware that 
the secrecy of the facility had been compromised. 
 
-- Why should Iran discuss its nuclear program with the 
self-appointed E3+3?  Isn't the IAEA the proper place 
for Iran to engage on its nuclear program with the 
international community? 
o       We welcome Iran's engagement with the IAEA.  But 
despite its rhetoric, Iran has not engaged with 
the IAEA.  Iran has refused for several years to 
answer the IAEA's questions (even before the IAEA 
reported Iran to the UNSC for its myriad 
violations of its international obligations). 
o       The E3+3 mechanism evolved as a means to 
negotiate a solution precisely because Iran was 
refusing to engage with the IAEA on the concerns 
regarding Iran's nuclear program. 
 
-- Iran claims it needs such a hardened facility as the 
Qom Enrichment Facility because for years both the 
United States and Israel have threatened to bomb its 
nuclear sites. Is it not surprising Iran would try to 
keep its location a secret to have an emergency back-up 
facility? 
 
o       Iran's own failure to meet its obligations for 
transparency and IAEA monitoring of sensitive 
nuclear installations is the cause for the 
international community's concerns that 
surrounding its nuclear program. 
o       Iran's decision to construct yet another 
clandestine site only deepens these concerns. 
 
-- Can Iran simply purchase the fuel from an 
international supplier, as some have advocated in Iran? 
o       Legally, Iran can purchase fuel from an 
international supplier if it wishes. 
o       However, we are confident Iran would not find a 
willing supplier given the concerns surrounding 
its nuclear program and its continued defiance of 
the international community. 
o       Outside of the context of the IAEA proposal 
before Iran, we would oppose such a deal. 
 
-- How would the E3+3 respond if Iran announced it had 
"no choice" but to make its own fuel for the TRR? 
o       Under three UN Security Council resolutions, Iran 
is required to suspend all uranium enrichment- 
related activities.  We have offered Iran a way 
to secure the necessary TRR fuel without further 
violating these obligations.  Enrichment 
activities to produce its own fuel for the TRR 
would be a violation of current UNSCRs. 
o       Further, Iran is not currently able to produce 
the fuel.  Reconfiguration of Iranian centrifuges 
to produce the required enrichment level (19.75 
percent) would cause serious international 
concern and could permit Iran to produce a 
stockpile of even greater enriched uranium than 
it has currently (Iran's current enrichment level 
is 3.5 percent).  This would increase the risk of 
a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT and 
sprint to producing nuclear weapons. 
 
-- What about recent reports indicating the Iranian 
enrichment program has not grown. What is the 
significance of this stagnation? 
o       Iran has slowed or scaled back the enrichment 
program several times since the project became 
public in 2002. 
o       There are many possible explanations for the 
stagnation of the Iranian enrichment program, 
including technical issues with the centrifuges 
and general system maintenance. 
o       Regardless of Iran's lack of progress in its 
enrichment program, it continues to enrich and 
stockpile LEU. This activity in violation of 
three United Nations Security Council resolutions 
calling for full suspension of its nuclear and 
enrichment related activities, and increases the 
risk of a near-term Iranian breakout from the NPT 
and sprint to producing nuclear weapons. 
 
POINT OF CONTACT 
---------------- 
 
¶8.  (U) Please contact Mordica Simpson at 202-647-4994 
with any questions. 
 
 
END TEXT. 
CLINTON